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'When an alien lives with you in your land, do not ill treat him. The alien living with 
you must be treated as one of your native born. Love him as yourself, for you 
were aliens in Egypt' (Leviticus, 19: 33-34). 
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ABSTRACT 
The large rise in the number of asylum seekers coming to Britain in the 1990s and since 
then has made asylum policy and associated matters an increasingly important issue for 
the government. On the one hand, the government has wished to deter asylum seekers 
but on the other, it recognises the importance of integrating those who are given 
permission to settle. Issues surrounding asylum seekers have become highly political as 
the media, local authorities and local people have all become involved in trying to 
influence the content and delivery of asylum policy. This thesis focuses on the effect of 
the current dispersal policy on asylum seeker and refugee integration. In this piece of 
research, an asylum seeker is an individual who reaches the UK through his/her own 
means and submits a request for asylum to the Immigration and Nationality Directorate 
(IND) at the Home Office. Asylum seekers who are granted permission to reside in the 
UK are defined as refugees in this thesis, whether they be Convention refugees or 
individuals possessing Humanitarian Protection (HP) or Discretionary Leave (DL). This 
study uses the approach to integration developed by Ager and Strang (2004a) and in 
particular their four main components of asylum seeker and refugee integration. My major 
hypothesis is that dispersal exercises a negative impact on the four dimensions of 
integration studied because this policy sends asylum seekers to localities where there are 
no settled co-ethnics, hostile host-community members, limited employment opportunities 
and inadequate dwellings. 
In order to test this hypothesis, I compare the significantly different integration 
opportunities encountered by asylum seekers and refugees in two contrasting dispersal 
cities, Newcastle and Birmingham. Given the national, ethnic and socio-economic 
heterogeneity of the group under study, I also adopt a case study approach and focus on 
the experiences of Kurds from Iraq. Significantly, asylum seekers and refugees possess 
different rights and for this reason, their experiences of dispersal and integration are 
analyzed separately. 
I chose semi-structured interviewing with asylum seekers and refugees because this 
method reflects my structured research strategy as well as my commitment to remain 
alert to unexpected findings. Furthermore, this technique helps the researcher appreciate 
the standpoint of the group studied, an important objective in my study. The in-depth 
nature of the qualitative data produced also assists with the understanding of the complex 
processes tied to the effect of the dispersal policy on integration. A non-probability 
sampling technique, snowball sampling, customarily used when a population is elusive, 
was employed to select the sample of asylum seekers and refugees. Semi-structured 
interviews were also carried out with national policy-makers and local service providers 
as well as Kurdish community workers and businessmen. These interviews helped the 
researcher understand the standpoints of central and local government, the voluntary and 
private sector as well as the perspective of influential Iraqi Kurds. 
The findings suggest that asylum seekers and refugees' experiences of dispersal and 
their process of integrating into UK society are not necessarily contradictory phenomena. 
In fact, in some instances, the dispersal policy has introduced members of this group to 
better integration opportunities than they would otherwise have encountered in their 
voluntarily chosen, traditional areas of concentration, in London and the South East of 
England. The conclusions also highlight several gaps in Ager and Strang's (2004a) 
integration framework, namely the absence of an intra-national spatial dimension, the 
failure to incorporate the ambivalent, non-linear effect of the passage of time and finally, 
the lack of reference to the idea that success in one sub-area of integration can reduce 
progress in another. 
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INTRODUCTION 
'Our nightmare is of asylum seekers being scattered across the country, isolated 
on sink estates in monocultural areas. Local community relations would suffer. Of 
course, many, if not a majority, will drift back to London. Without any entitlement 
to state support, they will be dependent on their families and communities - 
already desperately poor - for help or face the risks and exploitation of illegal 
working'(Nick Hardwick, Refugee Council, The Guardian, 5 August 1998). 
This statement accurately reflects the perspective of national voluntary sector 
agencies and local authorities outside of London and the South East of England 
at the time when central government was forming the very first foundations of the 
current UK dispersal policy. For some of those involved in the formulation and 
implementation of the dispersal programme, this view has become a reality. 
However, based on my research, this description of dispersal does not constitute 
the full picture. In order to explore the reasons for this assertion, it is first 
necessary to present the specifics of my dissertation as well as the reasons for 
choosing to study this particular topic. 
The aim of this thesis is to identify the impact of the current UK dispersal policy 
on asylum seeker and refugee integration. Iraqi Kurds, a group who present 
many of the typical traits of the broader asylum seeker and refugee population in 
the UK, were chosen as a case study. There exists a significant amount of 
literature concerning the integration of Black and Minority ethnic groups and to a 
certain extent asylum seekers and refugees. However, very little research has 
been undertaken on integration in relation to dispersal policies. Having studied 
various approaches to integration, Ager and Strang's (2004a) stance was finally 
II 
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adopted for this study. The particular strength of their approach is that these 
authors combine the functional and relational aspects of integration whilst valuing 
and emphasising the 'two-way process' of integration. They note that 'an 
individual or group is integrated within a society when they: 
- achieve public outcomes within employment, housing, education and health 
which are equivalent to those achieved within the wider host communities; 
- are socially connected with members of a (national, ethnic, cultural, religious 
or other) community with which they identify, with members of other 
communities and With relevant services and functions of the state; 
- and have sufficie. nt linguistic competence and cultural knowledge, and a 
sufficient sense of security and stability, to confidently engage in that society 
in a manner consistent with shared notions of nationhood and citizenship'. 
Several dimensions of integration have been focused upon in this piece of 
research, namely social bonds, social bridges, employment and housing. 
Following fieldwork, it was ascertained that a series of intervening factors 
influenced the effect of the current UK dispersal policy on the integration of 
asylum seekers and refugees. As a result, my analysis of the relationship 
between dispersal and integration focuses on the different ways in which these 
elements intervene to produce varied outcomes. My findings are based upon 
semi-structured interviews undertaken with Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and 
refugees, national policy-makers, local service providers and Iraqi Kurdish 
community workers and businessmen in Newcastle and Birmingham. The 
reasons for carrying out this particular piece of research are presented below. 
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Researching asylum seekers and refugees 
Undertaking research on asylum seekers and refugees is important because, 
since the 1990s, at a worldwide level, the number of individuals in search of 
asylum has increased significantly. Moreover, the asylum route constitutes one of 
the most popular and effective ways, at least for those originating from 
developing countries, of entering and settling in a Western country. In the case of 
the UK, asylum seekers and refugees constitute a high proportion of the newly 
immigrated population. Furthermore, they represent a growing share of the total 
immigrant population presently residing in the UK. 
Table A. Asylum applications received in the UK (excluding dependents), 1989- 
2003. 
Year Number of asylum applications_ 
1989 11640 
1990 26205 
1991 44840 
1992 24605 
1993 22370 
1994 32830 
1995 43965 
1996 29640 
1997 32500 
1998 46015 
1999 71 160 
2000 80315 
2001 71025 
2002 84310 
2003 49405 
Source: Home Office asylum statistics (Heath, Jeffries and Purcell, 2004; Watson and 
Danzelman, 1998). 
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Studying integration 
Integration, as defined by Ager and Strang (2004a: 5), constitutes an essential 
research field, particularly in the political and social climate that exists in the UK 
at present. The riots in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the summer of 2002 
revealed that many members of the different national and ethnic groups residing 
in the UK rarely interact with one another, living parallel rather than cohesive lives 
(Community Cohesion Unit, 2003). In addition, the suicide bombings in London 
on 7 th July 2005 showed that some British-born Muslims feel a greater loyalty 
towards their Muslim brothers and sisters abroad than they do towards their co- 
nationals in the UK. As a result of these events, many individuals from all sectors 
of UK society are reflecting upon the effects of national and ethnic diversity on 
the current and future cultural, social and religious norms of the country. The 
relative absence of community cohesion amongst the Black and Minority Ethnic 
groups as well as between the latter and the majority white British group is 
concerning as is the divided allegiances of some British-born Muslims. 
Consequently, the principles and the process of integration currently feature 
prominently in the minds of host-community members as well as on the 
government's policy agenda. 
Refugee integration is particularly topical, at present. The Home Office is now 
channelling substantial resources towards developing a refugee integration 
strategy. Their SUNRISE programme (Strategic Upgrade of National Refugee 
Integration Services) is due to commence shortly (Home Office, 2005a). Finally, 
within the sphere of academic research, according to Castles et al (2002: 158), 
'there has been very little systematic research about integration issues at the 
national level, since 1996'. 
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Analysing the current UK dispersal policy 
Embarking upon a study that focuses on a dispersal policy represents a crucial 
research initiative. Certainly, dispersal policies for asylum seekers, refugees, 
members of Black and Minority Ethnic groups and the homeless have been 
frequently used by many Western countries since the end of the Second World 
War. Given their continuing popularity, it is important to analyse and evaluate the 
effectiveness of dispersal policies, to ensure that the lessons learnt from one 
policy model are channelled into the formulation and implementation process of 
the next dispersal programme. 
The current dispersal policy itself is very different from previous UK policies and 
therefore constitutes an important subject for research. Indeed, the dispersed 
asylum seekers form a highly diverse population, both in terms of their 
nationalities and ethnicities. This contrasts with the earlier dispersal schemes that 
were directed towards one national or ethnic group at a time. The pattern and 
process of integration certainly varies when the integrating population is very 
diverse. Secondly, the current policy has been implemented on a far larger scale 
than ever before, given the greater number of asylum claimants in the UK at 
present compared to previously. Thus, this policy, unlike earlier programmes, has 
the potential to modify dramatically the whole ethno-cultural landscape of the UK. 
Regarding the existing body of research on the current UK dispersal policy, the 
majority of the publications originate from the government and voluntary sector 
agencies. These studies essentially focus on policy formulation and 
implementation, organisational operations and the functioning as well as the 
quality of specific, tangible services (Refugee Council, 1997,2004c, 2005a, 
15 
2003a, 2004a, 2004b; Audit Commission, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Wilson, 2001; 
Carter and EI-Hassan, 2003; Garvie, 2001). Indeed, there is very little research 
on the actual experiences of dispersed asylum seekers and refugees. This study 
endeavours to fill this gap. 
The extent to which public policies, like dispersal, can successfully influence the 
residential location of a large group of individuals, and in so doing affect their 
social ties, their employment prospects and their housing conditions, is also very 
interesting. Studying a dispersal policy is certainly a way of exploring the degree 
to which public policy can shape the social structure of society. It is important to 
note, however, as discussed and implied throughout this thesis, that some of 
those dispersed are able to overcome the restrictive aspects of the dispersal 
programme via the use of creative, subversive strategies. Thus, researching 
dispersal can also help uncover the extent to which individuals and groups re- 
shape public policy to their own advantage. A further fascinating feature of the 
current UK dispersal policy, in particular, is that it embodies the very 
contradictions that are present within UK asylum policy. Certainly, dispersal aims 
to deter future asylum applicants whilst striving to encourage the settlement and 
integration of refugees in the dispersal localities to which they are sent as asylum 
seekers. The research undertaken reveals how these incongruities are worked 
out in practice. 
Investigating Iraqi Kurds 
There are considerable practical and methodological difficulties in studying such 
a heterogeneous and mobile category of people as asylum seekers and 
refugees. The problems of obtaining a representative sample and interviewing 
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people in different areas with different languages would be huge. I therefore 
decided to undertake qualitative rather than quantitative research and to focus 
my research on one specific group, namely Kurds from Iraq. 
Iraqi Kurds were chosen as a case study group because of my existing 
knowledge and personal experience of Kurdistan and Iraq. Indeed, between 
October 1999 and February 2001,1 worked on a project, funded by the 
Department for International Development (DfID), as a research officer in the 
Kurdish region of Iraq. The project, entitled the Iraqi Kurdish Research 
Programme (IKRP), aimed to develop the evidence-based planning capabilities of 
the recently established Kurdish Regional Authorities. During my stay in Iraq, I 
had the opportunity to meet many Kurdish politicians, policy-makers and service 
providers. I also developed several good friendships with my Kurdish colleagues. 
Through the discussions I had with Kurds, I developed an understanding of their 
cultural norms and views. My experience of living and working in the Kurdish part 
of Iraq certainly helped me connect, during my fieldwork, with Iraqi Kurds residing 
in the UK. Moreover, my knowledge of Kurdish society helped me improve my 
understanding of Iraqi Kurds' experiences of dispersal and integration in the UK. 
The entire idea of undertaking this thesis first emerged whilst I was working for 
IKRP. At the time, many Kurds were asking me about life in the UK and what it 
would be like for them to live there. I knew little about refugee policy and the 
experiences of refugee communities in the UK and I was therefore unable to 
accurately answer their questions. Their queries, however, sparked my interest 
and I therefore decided, at the end of my contract with IKRP, to undertake 
research on the experiences of asylum seekers and refugees in the UK. Finally, 
keeping in mind that the profile of migrant groups is constantly changing, Iraqis, a 
proportion of whom are Kurds, currently constitute a significant share of the total 
17 
population of asylum seekers and refugees in the UK and thus, I judged that a 
study focusing on Iraqi Kurds would be valuable for policyrnakers and academic 
researchers alike. Certainly, according to Home Office asylum statistics (Heath, 
Jeffries and Lloyd, 2003), 17% of all asylum applications lodged in 2002, 
excluding dependents, were made by Iraqis, the largest nationality group that 
year. 
Table B. Asylum applications received in the UK from Iraqis (excluding 
dependents), 2000-2003. 
Year AsvIum applications from Iraqis 
Number Percentage of all applications 
2000 7475 9.3 
2001 6680 9.4 
2002 14570 17.3 
2003 4015 8.1 
Source: Home Office asylum statistics (Heath, Jeffries and Purcell, 2004) 
In addition to interviewing Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees, I also 
interviewed national policy makers, local service providers, Kurdish community 
workers and Kurdish businessmen. 
Exploring Newcastle and Birmingham 
Newcastle and Birmingham were chosen as case study dispersal cities because 
of the contrasting traits they presented regarding the four main domains of 
integration chosen for this study. Thus, I opted for Newcastle which is 
characterised by a small group of recently arrived Iraqi Kurds as well as host- 
society members that are generally unaccustomed to residing alongside Black 
and Minority Ethnic groups and refugee communities. In Newcastle, there is also 
18 
a large amount of vacant dwellings, particularly in the social rented sector and 
there are relatively limited employment opportunities. Birmingham, in contrast, 
contains a large group of newly settled Iraqi Kurds and host-society members 
that are accustomed to living in a multicultural environment. Birmingham is also 
typified by a relatively small proportion of empty housing and greater 
opportunities for work. Importantly, as noted by Castles et al (2002: 158), 
'comparative research about the situation of refugees and asylum seekers in 
different geographic locations within the UK is missing'. 
Thesis structure 
The following chapter examines the rationale for and traits of past and current 
dispersal policies in the UK as well. as contemporary dispersal programmes 
present in several European countries. The effect of the dispersal schemes on 
the short and long term spatial distribution of those dispersed is also discussed. 
Chapter 2 analyses the sociological debates regarding the meaning of 'refugee' 
and presents the legal approaches towards and definitions of this term. Various 
definitions and theories concerning refugee integration, including the one 
adopted in this thesis, are presented as well as the reasons for focusing my study 
of integration on the dimensions of employment, housing, social bonds and social 
bridges. The potential effect of the dispersal policy on these aspects of 
integration and the possible intervening factors that influence this relationship are 
also examined. Chapter 3 investigates the ways in which my research 
hypotheses were tested through my fieldwork, exploring my justification for using 
semi-structured interviews, snowball sampling and a case study approach. My 
own experiences of research in the field are discussed and the effects I might 
have had on the various components of the research process are analysed. 
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Finally, the ethics of interviewing asylum seekers and refugees as well as 
undertaking research on a politically sensitive and emotionally charged subject 
are scrutinised. Chapter 4 appraises the short and long term impact of the 
dispersal policy on Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees' participation in 
local, co-ethnic social bonding. Chapter 5 considers the short and long term 
effect of the dispersal policy on Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees'social 
bridging with non-co-ethnics. Chapter 6 and 7 assesses the short and long term 
influence of the dispersal policy on Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees' 
access to suitable employment and housing. The Conclusion chapter presents 
the main findings of the thesis and the implications for policy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE CURRENT UK DISPERSAL POLICY: 
FOUNDATIONS, PRINCIPLES AND OPERATIONAL TRAITS 
This chapter examines the origins as well as the objectives, underlying principles 
and operational traits of the contemporary UK dispersal policy. The Vietnamese 
'thin' dispersal model as well as the Bosnian 'cluster' dispersal scheme are 
reviewed in detail, given their influential role in forming the basis of the current 
UK policy. As a means of locating this discussion within the broader context of 
contemporary international migration patterns, this chapter begins with the 
analysis of Europe's new position in the global refugee system. 
1.1 Europe's new position in the qlobal refuciee svstem and the 
introduction of dispersal policies 
In the early 1970s, Europeans viewed the circumstances of refugees as a Third 
World concern to be resolved within the Third World. On the occasions when 
Europe did become involved, it received predetermined, cautiously selected 
programme refugees whose settlement occurred under controlled conditions 
(Robinson, 2003b: 3). Furthermore, European states implemented a reasonably 
open policy with regards to asylum seekers and until the mid-1970s, European 
countries still welcomed foreign labour. However, from the mid-1980s, the liberal 
governmental policies became increasingly restrictive and the question of 
asylum, until then relatively uncontroversial, became more and more of an issue. 
This change is the product of several phenomena. 
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Firstly, the economic boom came to an end in the 1970s. Indeed, Europe 
experienced a severe recession sparked off by the increase in oil prices and 
perpetuated by the New International Division of Labour. The latter d eeply 
damaged the manufacturing industry of the high wage economies in Europe and 
significantly decreased their previously high demand for unskilled labour. As a 
result, labour immigration was stopped. Secondly, the number of applications for 
asylum began to increase because of the reduction in the real price of air travel, 
the propagation of direct air routes to European destinations, the wider 
dissemination of media and communications technology in the Third World and 
the chain effect of prior migration (Robinson, 2003b: 4& 22). Importantly, the 
number of asylum claimants also grew because it was difficult to be granted 
admission into a European country in other ways (Joly, 1996: 46-48). These 
events coincided with the outbreak of conflicts which failed to attract significant 
international humanitarian attention. Consequently, the option . available to 
refugees in these areas was to travel to Europe on their own initiative and lodge 
a claim for asylum (Kjaerum in Joly, 1996: 48). Thirdly, the prospect of the Single 
European Act being ratified in 1986 caused great concern amongst the so-called 
Northern EC countries. Promising to abolish internal EC borders, the 
implementation of this Act would eventually lead to the free movement not only of 
goods and capital but also of people. The Northern EC nation states felt that this 
measure would increase the concentration of asylum claimants in their respective 
countries, the latter being very attractive to asylum seekers because of their 
relatively strong economies and good welfare systems. These fears and 
concerns gave rise to the Schengen Agreement between Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Germany in 1985. This agreement 
signified a 'harmonisation of asylum policies to make them more restrictive 
throughout the Schengen territory' (Joly, 1996: 48). Finally, the beginning of the 
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1990s witnessed the dismantlement of the communist regimes and the end of the 
Cold War. These events certainly increased the potential for significant 
population movements from the Eastern European states to the Northern EC 
countries, the prospect of this possibility becoming a reality further deepening 
Europe's restrictive approach on immigration (Joly, 1996: 45). 
A rationale of deterrence now dominates the policy objectives of European 
countries. Refugee recognition rates across Europe have sharply declined 
suggesting that national governments are keen to present to the indigenous 
population an image of toughness towards 'bogus asylum seekers', this higher 
proportion of refusals being perceived by the public as evidence that the majority 
of those applying for asylum are in fact economic migrants (Robinson, 2003b: 4). 
Additionally, with the source of those seeking asylum having expanded from 
fellow European countries to Third World nations, the term asylum seeker has 
become racialised, referring now to individuals who are visibly distinct and 
culturally different (Robinson, 2003b: 5). The growing perception of asylum 
seekers, amongst Europeans, as counterfeits and therefore undeserving has 
provided a strong justification for the national governments' restrictive stance and 
consequently, national public policies directed towards asylum claimants are 
generally portrayed as solutions 'to what is now perceived and represented as a 
problem' (Robinson, 2003b: 6). 
One of the central concerns of the late 1990s in Europe regarding asylum 
seekers and refugees was the manner in which this group was inclined to 
congregate and settle in specific areas, cities and even neighbourhoods in their 
host-country (Robinson, 2003b: 6). In particular, the ports of entry and capital 
cities constitute attractive locations for asylum seekers and refugees. Certainly, 
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these areas are typified by the presence of already established co-national and 
co-ethnic communities, the existence of a large formal and informal economy as 
well as proximity to the authorities involved with the asylum application process 
(Pearl and Zetter, 2002: 228-9). In addition to this phenomenon of congregation 
being perceived by Europeans as problematic in itself, this trend also led to the 
concentration of the financial and social costs involved in settling asylum seekers 
and refugees (Boswell, 2001). 
In response to media hype (Kaye, 1998) and the combination of the events listed 
above, public attitudes towards asylum seekers in Europe changed significantly. 
Across Europe, it would appear that the growing consensus during the 1990s 
was that dispersal policies constituted a reasonable response as well as an 
adequate solution to the 'problem' of asylum seeker and refugee spatial 
concentration. The main justification for its introduction is the conviction that this 
type of policy effectively and efficiently distributes the costs of supporting this 
group. Indeed, national European governments maintain that the arrival of 
asylum seekers constitutes a national, rather than a local, 'problem' and 
consequently, no specific area should be expected to cover a disproportionate 
share of the costs involved in this group's settlement. Moreover, it was 
maintained that the indigenous population possessed a right, over and above the 
rights of asylum seekers and refugees, to reside in communities where their 
cultures and identities would not overly be challenged by the settlement of non- 
conforming groups (Robinson, 2003b: 23). 
This review of the current international migration patterns, within which the 
current dispersal policy is broadly located, is now followed by a discussion of the 
Vietnamese and Bosnian dispersal models. 
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1.2 Foundations of the conternDorarv UK disDersal Dolic 
The dispersal of refugees (or asylum seekers) is not a novel concept in the UK. 
Indeed, since 1945, the government has formulated and implemented dispersal 
policies for various groups of programme refugees. However, the contemporary 
UK model is new. Indeed, it originates from the failings of the Vietnamese 'thin' 
dispersal programme and builds upon the subsequently devised 'cluster' 
dispersal model adopted for the Bosnian and Kosovan programme refugees. 
These dispersal policies are herewith reviewed as a means of presenting the 
origins of the contemporary dispersal model. Prior to this, as a means of placing 
these past policies in context, the earlier Polish and Ugandan Asian dispersal 
programmes are briefly discussed. 
The first post-war dispersal policy in the UK was directed towards Polish 
programme refugees who arrived during and after World War 11. These 
individuals were dispersed 'as widely as possible', in clusters of approximately 
450 persons to reception centres (Sword, Davies and Ciechanowski, 1989: 271). 
In the long term, the bulk of the Polish refugees continued to reside near their 
initial dispersal area, usually in neighbouring cities (Patterson, 1977: 222). It is 
possible that the widespread labour shortages existing across the UK, English- 
Polish marriages and onward emigration plans account for this outcome. 
Importantly, by 1950, a quarter of the dispersed Polish refugees had drifted 
1 Programme refugees are refugees who came to the UK as part of an organised programme and 
include the Poles (legally defined as economic migrants but sociologically identified as refugees), 
the Ugandan Asians (British passport holders who, in sociological terms, are refugees) and the 
Vietnamese, Bosnians and Kosovans (both legally and sociologically defined as refugees). 
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towards London and the South East (Sword, Davies and Ciechanowski, 1989: 
339). 
In 1972, the UK government introduced another dispersal programme in 
response to the resettlement of approximately 30,000 Ugandan Asians to the UK 
(Bristow, 1976: 268). The principal aim of the policy was to disperse the refugees 
as 'widely as possible throughout the UK'. Although dispersal would be voluntary 
(Bristow, 1976: 270), only the localities designated by the government as 'green' 
contained dispersal housing. The attribution of one of these two colours to a 
location depended on the local availability of housing, schools, social services 
and employment (Kuepper, Lackey and Swinerton, 1975: 74). Interestingly, the 
criterion most frequently used was the size of the locality's existing Asian or other 
immigrant communities (Dines, 1973: 381). Significantly, the UK government only 
dispersed 38% of the Ugandan Asians (Ugandan Resettlement Board, 1974: 8). 
The primary explanation for this low rate of dispersals appears to have been the 
lack of political will amongst governmental officials to facilitate the implementation 
of the policy (Kuepper, Lackey and Swinerton, 1975: 75). Indeed, the principal 
aim, given Enoch Powell's popularity at the time, was to minimise the possibility 
of a white backlash over immigration and race relation issues rather than 
disperse and settle destitute refugees or meet refugee needs (Bristow, 1976: 
277). 
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1.2.1 The dispersal of the Vietnamese refugees 
Traits of the Vietnamese dispersal policy and basis for its introduction 
In 1979, in response to the crisis in Hong Kong, the UK government accepted two 
quotas of Vietnamese, totalling 11,500. Relatives arrived subsequently through 
the family reunification scheme (Robinson, 1993: 325). As part of the reception 
and resettlement policy, the government dispersed the Vietnamese throughout 
the UK, following a short stay in transit camps. 
One of the principal characteristics of the Vietnamese dispersal policy was that it 
presented compulsory characteristics whilst never overtly being labelled as 
forced. Indeed, on the one hand, the UK government provided Vietnamese 
families with a selection of alternative destinations for resettlement and in some 
cases, the Vietnamese visited potential homes to assess their suitability. 
However, on the other, the Vietnamese had very limited knowledge of the various 
UK regions and towns, given the absence of a pre-existing, established co- 
national community residing in the UK that could have informed them. 
Consequently, 'choices were ... ) not based upon rational assessments of a 
destination's advantages or disadvantages but were effectively random 
selections between unknown alternatives' (Robinson, 1993: 327). The 
resettlement officers' keenness for the Vietnamese to vacate the transit camps 
quickly further reinforced this compulsory aspect of the policy. Certainly, those 
implementing dispersal placed subtle pressure on the Vietnamese to 'choose' 
their housing promptly. 
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A further distinguishing feature of the Vietnamese dispersal policy was the Home 
Office's recommendation to disperse this group of refugees thinly in sets of four 
to ten families. The UK government seemingly advocated this approach for 
several reasons. Firstly, from the perspective of the local authorities involved, 
securing council housing for a small number of individuals would be more easily 
achieved and more readily acceptable by practitioners as well as local residents 
than obtaining dwellings for a larger group of persons. Thus, central government 
could rely on voluntary offers of accommodation from each relevant local 
authority, thereby avoiding the politically unfavourable task of requisitioning 
property. 
Moreover, the UK government believed that the adoption of this measure would 
circumvent the need to reimburse local authorities for any additional costs 
engendered by the presence of the families in their locality, given the very small 
number of Vietnamese refugees in each area. In addition, central government 
was keen to avoid criticism over accepting Vietnamese refugees at a time of 
mass unemployment and consequently hoped that the thin dispersal of this group 
throughout the UK would minimise their impact on any particular local labour 
market. Furthermore, the UK government maintained that dispersing this group 
widely, in such small numbers, would prevent the formation of strong local 
opposition to their resettlement. In addition, the UK government claimed that the 
thin dispersal of the Vietnamese would stimulate the process of integration, their 
small numbers in any one locality encouraging them to interact with host- 
community members. Finally, the government wished to avoid the formation of 
Vietnamese 'gheflos' (Robinson and Hale, 1989: 6; Robinson, 1993: 326). 
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lmr)act of the dispersal policy on the lasting geogral2hical distribution of 
Vietnamese refugges across the UK 
Significantly, the UK government failed to disperse all of the Vietnamese quota 
refugees. Indeed, according to Jones' (1982) research, the government 
dispersed less than half of his random sample. Certainly, some Vietnamese 
refugees relied upon their own strategies, obtaining assistance, in particular, from 
the UK Catholic community who helped some members of this group settle in 
their new host-country. Illustrations of this trend are especially evident in 
Birmingham (Joly, 1989: 89-90). 
It would seem that slightly more than half of the dispersed Vietnamese refugees 
(51%) relocated to another area in the UK (Robinson, 1993), a significant 
proportion moving shortly after their initial dispersal. Indeed, 'almost a third of 
movers had changed their address within one year of resettlement and over half 
of all movers had made their first move within two years' (Robinson and Hale, 
1989). Robinson remarks that the scale of secondary migration amongst the 
dispersed Vietnamese refugees is astounding, considering the barriers to 
relocation that exist amongst recently arrived immigrant groups. Indeed, the 
majority of the dispersed Vietnamese spoke little English, possessed limited prior 
experience of contact with western culture and had low levels of education and 
transferable skills. Moving localities thus involved high levels of risk and 
insecurity without the assurance that life in the new location would be of an 
improved standard. Moreover, on arrival in the UK, the Vietnamese had no pre- 
existing ethnic community on which they could rely upon for assistance. 
Furthermore, they brought with them their experience of persecution, flight and 
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loss and their possible lack of motivation as a result of their refugee trauma and 
camp living (Robinson, 1993: 333-334). 
The dispersed Vietnamese's sense of isolation in their respective dispersal 
localities explains, in part, the trend towards secondary migration amongst half of 
this group. Certainly, the isolation of the Vietnamese was a product of thin 
dispersal, the absence, as already noted, of an already established Vietnamese 
community throughout the UK as well as the group's poor level of English 
language fluency and their consequent inability to communicate effectively with 
host-community members. The Vietnamese's feelings of loneliness are likely to 
have been further aggravated by the unwillingness of the local authorities to 
provide services specifically for this group, precisely because their numbers were 
so small (Joint Committee for Refugees from Vietnam, 1982). Incidentally, 
refugees, in contrast to economic migrants or members of Black and Minority 
Ethnic communities, may require supplementary support and assistance because 
of the additional trauma they have suffered. UK governmental agencies have 
clearly acknowledged the phenomenon of isolation experienced by the 
Vietnamese. Indeed, 'the policy of dispersal is now almost universally regarded 
as mistaken, despite its initial attraction ( ... ). It has left many Vietnamese isolated 
from compatriots to whom they can relate and from whom they can draw support' 
(House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, 1985: xxii). 
An additional reason for the presence of secondary migration amongst this group 
appears to be the lack of employment opportunities in the initial dispersal 
localities or, similarly, the existence of increased work prospects in non-dispersal 
areas. Certainly, as is the case with the current UK dispersal policy, the 
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Vietnamese dispersal programme was essentially housing-led 2. This meant that 
the regions to which this group were sent tended to be characterised by high 
levels of unemployment (Joly, 1996: 97). Indeed, as discussed in chapter two, the 
presence of available and affordable housing in a locality is customarily tied to 
the low job prospects in that area. Thus, as Robinson notes, the Vietnamese 
tended to migrate towards the urban regions of the South East, West Midlands 
and the North West (1993: 337), the Vietnamese congregating 'not simply in 
areas with existing ethnic concentrations but more precisely in areas of ethnic 
concentrations contained within the UK's economic heartland' (Robinson, 1993: 
342). Interestingly, it would appear that prior to 1984, the dispersed Vietnamese 
who left their original dispersal locality would tend to converge towards areas of 
the UK possessing a buoyant economy whilst following 1984 and the 
strengthening of the UK economy overall, this group usually congregated in 
locations of the UK characterised by significant concentrations of co-ethnics; 
(Robinson, 1993: 348). 
Significantly, according to Robinson's (1993) figures, 49% of the dispersed 
Vietnamese refugees continued in the long-term to remain in proximity to their 
original dispersal area. Some members of this group might have been dispersed 
to localities containing more than the stated quota of between four and ten 
Vietnamese families, their sense of isolation being less pronounced and their 
2 It is noteworthy that the Vietnamese in the UK were viewed as resettled once accommodation 
had been arranged for them whilst in France, 'the settlement policy aimed to find employment 
before the refugees left their reception centres. The securing of accommodation was linked to 
employment, as a regular income often had to be demonstrated before housing was offered' (Joly, 
1996: 109). At the policy implementation level, 'this led several reception centres to employ 
officers whose task was to prospect for jobs, establish links with employers and sometimes 
organise a campaign of information for employers in the region' (Barrou et al, 1988 and Fie, 1988 
in Joly, 1996: 109). Research has shown that 'specific measures taken by the Centre Provisoire 
d'Hebergement (CPHs) to actively seek out positions made a noticeable difference (Fle, 1988) 
while in the few cases where the reception centre was simply referring the refugees to structures 
existing for French people, it did not yield positive results' (Fie, 1988 in Joly, 1996: 109). 
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ensuing desire to rejoin larger groups of co-ethnics elsewhere in the UK being 
more subdued. Certainly, the availability of housing offers as a criterion 
determining the location of an individual's dispersal often superseded the 
principle of thin dispersal. Indeed, 'offers of accommodation were so scarce and 
of such variable quality that the charities were unable to refuse them simply 
because they were in areas of existing ethnic concentration or because the quota 
of four to ten families had already been resettled in the locality' (Robinson, 1993: 
328). Jones' research undertaken for the Home Office (1982) reflects this 
phenomenon, 53% of the dispersed Vietnamese, in his sample, settling in groups 
which exceeded the Home Office's maximum recommended size. Another part of 
this set of individuals who had experienced thin dispersal was probably unable to 
overcome the barriers to secondary migration, listed above, the remainder of this 
group perhaps genuinely preferring to settle permanently in their original 
dispersal locality. 
Overall, this dispersal policy failed to impact upon the long-term spatial 
distribution of the majority of the Vietnamese refugees primarily because of the 
social isolation this group experienced in their dispersal areas as well as the lack 
of employment prospects. As -noted by Robinson, 'the government's efforts to 
disperse the Vietnamese across all regions and all types of regions have already 
been largely negated by secondary migration. Moreover, this has occurred within 
only six years of the implementation of the dispersal policy' (Robinson, 1993: 
350). 
32 
1.2.2 The dispersal of the Bosnian refugees 
It is particularly insightful to explore the origins, principles and traits of the 
dispersal scheme for the Bosnian programme refugees because firstly, this 
scheme forms the basis of the current UK dispersal policy. Secondly, unlike 
preceding dispersal policies, the Bosnian model is widely regarded as having 
been highly successful in terms of limiting the loneliness of those dispersed, 
fomenting settlement and reducing secondary migration to London and other 
large conurbations (Asylum Rights Campaign, 1999: 11; Pearl and Zetter, 2002: 
235). Incidentally, the dispersal of the Kosovan programme refugees mirrors the 
Bosnian dispersal model (Sales, 2002: 468)3. 
Characteristics of the Bosnian disr)ersal mlic 
In 1992, under pressure from the UNHCR, European countries, opposition parties 
and sectors of the national media, the UK government accepted a quota of 1,000 
Bosnian ex-detainees and their dependents as well as a group of medical 
evacuees. In August 1995, the UK accepted a further quota of 500 Bosnians 
(Graessle and Gawlinski, 1996: 14). During that time, a total of 2,585 programme 
Bosnians settled in the UK (Robinson and Coleman, 2000: 1222). 
The reception and resettlement of this group was managed by the Bosnia 
Project, a government-funded, voluntary sector, multi-agency partnership, led by 
the Refugee Council (Graessle and Gawlinski, 1996: 1). With the programme 
Bosnians, the UK government decided to fund a novel type of dispersal called 
3 For further analyses on the Kosovan dispersal programme see Srarn and Ward, 2000; Smart, 
2004; Bloch, 1999b. 
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'cluster' dispersal. The main principle of this model is that programme refugees 
are dispersed to a relatively small number of designated localities which leads 
this group to be concentrated, over time, in clusters rather than thinly dispersed 
across the UK. By adopting this approach, the Bosnia Project hoped that 
programme refugees would feel more settled in their dispersal locality and 
therefore less likely to undertake secondary migration. Importantly, the 
government agreed to fund this form of dispersal in response to pressure from 
the Refugee Council, the latter objecting to bein6 involved in a repeat of the failed 
'thin' dispersal model used with Vietnamese programme refugees. The 
government also feared bad publicity if an isolated Bosnian committed suicide, 
for instance, in one of the dispersal localities. 
Although the size of the clusters was never explicitly defined, the Bosnia Project 
suggested that the number of individuals per cluster should be between 150-300 
individuals, a size 'sufficient for a degree of mutual support to occur without 
having so many in one area that local service providers would be unable to cope 
with their needs' (Kelly, 2001: 178). At the policy formulation stage, it was 
intended that the cluster areas would be chosen on the basis that firstly, they 
possessed a Regional Refugee Council that would provide the support, 
assistance and advocacy normally offered by an established co-ethnic 
community. Importantly, the absence of a pre-existing, settled Bosnian 
community in the UK was concerning and thus, the Bosnia Project tried to 
remedy this lacuna. Secondly, the cluster area should contain established, albeit 
non-Bosnian, refugee communities, their presence having hopefully already 
raised awareness, amongst the local service providers and residents, regarding 
refugee needs and issues. Thirdly, the cluster locality should be characterised by 
sensitive and adaptable local authorities and voluntary sectors as well as have a 
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good availability of housing and suitable premises for reception centres. In 
addition, the area should be able to provide appropriate healthcare as well as be 
capable of economically sustaining a sizeable and growing community. 
Importantly, the UK government advocated a restrictive, although not prohibitive, 
policy towards the settlement of Bosnians in London, insisting that they strongly 
preferred that this group resettle. in areas without existing housing stress 
(Robinson and Coleman, 2000: 1226-1239). The six designated cluster areas 
were Central Scotland, London, North East of England, West Yorkshire, West 
Midlands and East Midlands. On the arrival of the programme refugees to the 
UK, reception centres run by the Bosnia Project promptly opened, each center 
being tied to a resettlement cluster (Robinson and Coleman, 2000: 1226). The 
intention was for programme Bosnians to be initially accommodated in these 
centres and then to be moved on, usually within four months (Graessle and 
Gawlinksi, 1996: 29), to more permanent housing in the resettlement cluster to 
which the reception center was linked. Despite disagreements at the policy 
formulation stage between the NGOs and the UK government over the Bosnians' 
right to choose their place of residence, in practice, due to a shortage of available 
housing, 'choice'was largely illusory. Indeed, if an individual elected to settle in a 
locality other than that designated by the Bosnia Project, customarily s/he was 
not assisted in his/her search for accommodation and did not receive post- 
settlement support (Robinson and Coleman, 2000: 1233-4; Kelly, 2001: 177). 
The vast majority of programme Bosnians were housed in public housing with 
security of tenure (Kelly, 2001: 180). 
The implementation of the Bosnian cluster dispersal model produced a couple of 
unexpected outcomes. Firstly, the locations of the reception centres, and by 
extension the cluster areas, were predominantly chosen based on the availability 
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of affordable housing in a given locality rather than the degree to which the area 
matched the cluster criteria set out at the formulation phase of the policy. In this 
instance, the phenomenon of housing shortages compromised the strategic 
elements of the programme. (Robinson and Coleman, 2000: 1229). Secondly, 
programme Bosnians were unevenly spread across the designated cluster 
dispersal areas because, firstly, the Bosnia Project was expecting the arrival of 
the full quota of Bosnians and their dependents. Consequently, in the early 
stages, the Project paid little attention to distributing Bosnians evenly between 
the clusters. By the time it became clear that there would be a shortfall in the 
number of arrivals, it was too late to top up the smaller clusters. Secondly, 
programme Bosnians did not reach the UK in a steady stream. Instead, large 
numbers would arrive in several flights and then no one would come for a few 
months. This meant that the reception centres were often running below capacity. 
Consequently, in order to fill the vacancies, new arrivals were sent to the under- 
occupied centres and as a result, new centres, attached to new cluster localities, 
were not opened. This phenomenon led to significant numbers of Bosnians 
settling in the areas where reception centres had first been opened. Thirdly, 
family reunion limited the even spread of Bosnians across the cluster dispersal 
areas, dependents invariably wishing to reside near family networks (Robinson 
and Coleman, 2000: 1236-7). 
Influence of the disgersal policy on the long-term sDatial distribution of Bosnian 
refuaees across the UK 
It would appear, in contrast to the geographical mobility of previous refugee 
arrivals, that the cluster dispersal policy exercised a significant influence. on the 
long-term spatial distribution of Bosnian refugees across the UK, the Refugee 
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Council estimating that by the end of 1997, less than 200 Bosnians had 
undertaken secondary migration (Robinson and Coleman, 2000: 1237). 
Kelly (2001) offers several interesting explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, 
the clustering feature of this dispersal policy might have encouraged the 
Bosnians to remain in their area of initial dispersal. Certainly, from the 
perspective of the Bosnia Project and Refugee Action staff, 'the larger numbers in 
each town compared to the Vietnamese programme meant that there were 
enough people to form a community and there was not the same urge to move to 
be with others' (Kelly, 2001: 271). Kelly, on the other hand, argues that the 
programme Bosnians' temporary refugee status constitutes the major factor that 
accounts for this group's lack of secondary migration and relative immobility 
(Kelly, 2001: 273). Certainly, on arrival in the UK, many of these refugees 
envisaged a short stay in their host-country following which they would return 
home. 'They thought it was going to be temporary so there was little point in 
trying to be housed in one city rather than another' (Kelly, 2001: 263-264). 
Seemingly, this feeling continued to permeate their behaviour, 'even after a few 
years of living in the UK, when it was increasingly obvious to the refugees that 
return would be difficult' (Kelly, 2001: 275). Indeed, 'their continuing temporary 
refugee status reminded them that no matter what their own preferences were 
the UK government could decide to send them back to Bosnia, and this meant 
that long term plans were futile' (Kelly, 2001: 276). Kelly (2001) also notes that 
the programme Bosnians risked losing the Bosnia Project's support and 
assistance were they to leave their original dispersal locality, this penalty thereby 
constituting 'a huge disincentive as the Bosnia Project carried out all the support 
tasks for the families' (Kelly, 2001: 278). 
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Interestingly, the convoy Bosnians, who did not enrol on the Bosnia Project, 
showed higher levels of secondary migration. Kelly explains this phenomenon by 
arguing that this particular group 'usually had very little to lose by moving to 
another town' (Kelly, 2001: 278). Indeed, these refugees were commonly housed 
in poor quality privately rented accommodation and a move to another area 
would almost certainly lead to improved housing conditions. Furthermore, they 
were more aware than the programme Bosnians of the mechanisms for securing 
accommodation since they had found their initial dwelling themselves with limited 
assistance from governmental or voluntary sector agencies and consequently, it 
is likely that they felt more confident and empowered than the other Bosnians. 
Thus, Kelly concludes that 'it was often clear to those that had come by convoy 
that moving to another area presented opportunities but no great risks, whereas 
for programme Bosnians a move presented no greater opportunities and a 
degree of risk' (Kelly, 2001: 279). 
In sum, the long-term geographical distribution of the majority of the programme 
Bosnians largely matched the UK government's spatial distribution of this group 
via the dispersal policy. Some argue that this trend proves the success of cluster 
dispersal (eg the Bosnia Project and Refugee Action staff) whilst others maintain 
that other factors contributed to the relative long-term geographical immobility of 
the Bosnian refugees in their respective dispersal localities. Certainly, Kelly 
(2001) suggests that this group's temporary refugee status and the risk of losing 
entitlement to state-funded support wielded a significant influence on this group's 
limited post-dispersal secondary migration. 
Having presented the antecedents of the contemporary UK dispersal policy, an 
analysis of the current policy is now presented. 
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1.3 The current dispersal Policv In the UK 
1.3.1 Origins: the ad hoc dispersal programme (1996-1999) 
In keeping with the general trend across Europe, the number of individuals 
claiming asylum in the UK increased in the mid to late 1990s. This group tended 
to reside in London and near the ports of entry in the South East of England 
(Robinson, 2003b: 7; Carey Wood et al, 1995). As a result, the supply of 
affordable temporary housing in these localities decreased whilst the costs of 
supporting asylum seekers increased. The challenge revolved around 
accommodation in particular, certain London boroughs, for instance, failing to 
obtain reasonably priced housing that would permit their total spending per 
asylum seeker to remain below the government's grant cap (Audit Commission, 
2000b). Dispersal across the UK, on an ad hoc basis, was therefore introduced in 
an attempt to reduce the overspending in London and the South East, avoid the 
politically-sensitive process of raising local council tax and appease host- 
community members. This early form of dispersal was undertaken in an 
unplanned and unstrategic manner by local authorities, boroughs and voluntary 
agencies based in London and the South East. Asylum seekers were sent to 
areas in the UK with offers of more affordable and available housing. Importantly, 
the accommodation was rented from private landlords without necessarily the 
receiving local authority or voluntary sector organisation being notified or granting 
its consent (Asylum Rights Campaign, 1999: 8& 31). 
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1.3.2 Objectives of the current UK dispersal policy 
The current UK dispersal policy systematised, formalised and organised the ad 
hoc dispersal programme. According to the Home Secretary, Jack Straw (1997- 
2001), the objective of the policy is to distribute the costs of supporting asylum 
seekers away from hard-pressed London boroughs and South East local 
authorities, where this group traditionally settles, to other parts of the country (HC 
Deb, 9th November 1999, col. 982). The costs most in need of being 
geographically spread across the UK were the social costs namely the increase 
in demand for accommodation, school places and health services (Boswell, 
2001). Certainly, Mr Desmond Browne, Minister of State for Citizenship, 
Immigration and Counter-terrorism, emphasises that 'the dispersal of asylum 
seekers helps to reduce pressure on social housing and local government 
services where they are already stretched, especially in London and other areas 
of the South East' (HC Deb, 12 th July 2004, col. 1208). 
A further objective of the current UK dispersal policy is to actually reduce or 
minimise asylum seeker support costs, given the unpopularity of this group 
amongst the majority of the UK electorate. In order to achieve this, NASS 
procured the cheapest accommodation in the UK from private and public sector 
housing providers under five year contracts 'in order to get value for money for 
the taxpayer', according to Ms Fiona Mactaggart, the Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary for Race Equality, Community Policy and Civil Renewal (House of 
Commons Social Cohesion Select Committee, I 1th February 2004). Indeed, as 
Jack Straw emphasised, 'our aim is to make better use of spare and underused 
housing in less pressured parts of the country. I do not believe that the genuine 
asylum seeker who is fleeing persecution will mind where in the country s/he is 
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properly accommodated for the period while his/her claim is processed' (HC Deb, 
9th November 1999, col. 982). Reflecting this stance, a policyrnaker in NASS 
remarks that 'at least with dispersal, the government can say we are doing our 
best to meet our international obligations as cheaply as possible' (NASS, para 
69). The subsistence only support option as well as the 'grace period' offered to 
asylum seekers in receipt of the Home Office's decision on their application, 
measures which are discussed more fully below, constitute other means by which 
NASS aims to minimise its support costs. Indeed, in the case of subsistence only 
asylum seekers, NASS is exempt from paying for their accommodation costs 
whilst the 'grace period' ensures a swifter vacating of NASS housing. The 
outcome of the latter is that this measure reduces the total amount of 
accommodation that NASS is required to procure (Refugee Council, 2002a: 2). 
An additional objective of the dispersal policy is to encourage the long term 
settlement of refugees in the designated dispersal areas. Indeed, according to 
the Home Office Minister, Mr Mike O'Brien, 'our long-term aim is to ensure that 
those who are granted refugee status can stay in the area to which they have 
been dispersed as asylum seekers so that communities can develop there. We 
do not support secondary migration, especially back to London and the South 
East' (Stg Co Deb, Immigration and Asylum Bill, 4'h May 1999). In order to 
achieve this aim, policy makers agreed that asylum seekers should be dispersed 
to localities where this group could access adequate support and assistance. 
In response to criticism from the Opposition and other political parties regarding 
the Labour government's treatment of asylum and immigration, the dispersal 
policy also implicitly seeks to present an image of political toughness to the 
electorate. Certainly, the growing concentration of asylum seekers in London and 
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the South East was an important election issue in 1997-1998, the British National 
Party, the Conservatives and the press increasingly criticising the Labour 
government's 'soft' approach. This phenomenon was particularly apparent in 
Dover, a politically contested town as well as one of the main ports of arrival for 
asylum seekers. 
1.3.3 Characteristics of the current UK dispersal policy 
The current UK dispersal policy incorporates two dispersal schemes that run in 
parallel. The first began on 6 th December 1999 and is called the interim dispersal 
measures and the second commenced on Td April 2000 and is entitled the NASS 
dispersal programme. Since the dominant means of dispersal, at the time of my 
fieldwork (October 2003-March 2004), was via NASS, the following section 
focuses primarily on the NASS dispersal programme. Nevertheless, prior to 
discussing this measure, the workings of the interim scheme are briefly 
presented. 
In December 1998, the Home Secretary encouraged the Local Government 
Association (LGA) and the Association of London Government (ALG) to devise 
an official dispersal policy that would replace the ad hoc arrangements. This 
would allow local authorities and boroughs to'transfer supported asylum seekers 
to another local authority outside of London and the South East, as long as the 
latter authority agreed to be responsible for supporting the asylum seekers (Audit 
Commission, 2000c: 11). This initiative developed into a dispersal scheme and is 
formalised in the IAA 1999 where s95, s98 and Schedule 9 empower local 
authorities to provide interim support to asylum seekers. This distribution 
programme operates through multi-agency regional consortia, their role 
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consisting in organising new arrival arrangements and identifying available 
accommodation. Due to the significant number of agencies participating in the 
programme, negotiations were extensive and the scheme eventually became 
operational on 6" December 1999 (Robinson, 2003a: 122). 
The initial interim measures (December 1999 - April 2000) were largely 
unsuccessful. Indeed, a significantly low quantity of housing units were secured 
in the dispersal localities and, moreover, the designated distribution areas were 
mainly located in only two regions, namely Yorkshire and Humberside and the 
North West (Audit Commission, 2000c: 17). This trend developed despite the 
emphasis, at the policy formulation stage, on allocating dispersal accommodation 
based on 'patterns of ethnicity, availability of accommodation, access to support 
services and equity of responsibility across the UK regions' (Asylum Rights 
Campaign, 1999: 9-10). Moreover, the implementation of this scheme appears to 
have been significantly chaotic, the financial and logistical responsibility for the 
transport arrangements of asylum seekers from their initial place of residence to 
their designated dispersal area remaining unclear throughout the initial stages of 
the programme and the exchange of information between participating local 
authorities being significantly flawed., Certainly, some local authorities offering 
housing units never received their scheduled number of asylum seekers and on 
the occasions when dispersed individuals reached their destination, limited prior 
information was available regarding the new arrivals' language or personal 
characteristics (Robinson, 2003a: 122). Finally, the asylum seekers themselves 
were particularly unenthusiastic regarding dispersal, 37% of the initial referrals 
made to the London Asylum Seekers Consortium refusing assistance if this 
involved residing outside of the capital (Robinson, 2003a: 123). 
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Importantly, due to the lack of sufficient NASS accommodation secured in the 
dispersal areas by Td April 2000, it was decided that the interim measures would, 
temporarily, continue to function in conjunction with NASS dispersal. Thus, NASS 
began its operations by supporting destitute asylum seekers who had claimed 
asylum 'on arrival' in the UK on or after 3rd April 2000. Destitute asylum seekers 
who claimed asylum in-country on or after 3rd April 2000 continued to be eligible 
to claim interim support from local authorities only. Later, in-country applicants 
were eligible for NASS support, depending on whether they were living in 
England and Wales, and the date of their asylum claim (Willman, Knafler and 
Pierce, 2004: 110). The aim is for NASS to eventually take responsibility for all 
destitute asylum seekers, the interim period having been extended until 4ý' April 
4 2005. 
NASS' role, the concept of emergency accommodation, NASS' support options 
as well as NASS' dispersal programme are now discussed. According to the lAA 
1999 s95(l) and AS Regs 2000 reg 7, NASS is responsible for supporting asylum 
seekers and any dependant who appears to be destitute or is likely to become 
destitute within 14 dayS5 . 
NASS is a constituent part of the Home Office and 
'support' refers to accommodation adequate to the household's needs and/or 
essential living expenses provided in cash. Significantly, in keeping with the NIAA 
2002 s55(l), NASS may not provide support unless it is satisfied that the asylum 
claim was made as soon as reasonably practicable after the person's entry into 
the UK 6. Under lAA 1999 s98, full-board emergency accommodation is arranged 
4 Asylum Support (Interim Provisions) Amendment Regulations 2002 Sl No 471 and Asylum 
Support (Interim Provisions) (Amendment) Regulations 2004 Sl No 566. 
5 Or 56 days if they are already receiving asylum support. 
6 The exceptions to this provision are if support is necessary to avoid a breach of the asylum 
seeker's rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or if the household 
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whilst NASS considers whether an asylum seeker is eligible for s95 support. This 
type of housing is provided by one of the NASS-funded voluntary sector refugee 
organisations, in the locality where the asylum se eker registered his/her request 
for support (Refugee Council, 2003a: 2). As discussed in NASS Policy Bulletin 
73, NASS initially aimed to make a decision on an asylum seeker's eligibility 
within two working days of receiving the application form. However, in practice, 
there have been delays of several months in processing the forms (Refugee 
Council, 2003b: 1). 
According to IAA 1999 s96(l), NASS support is provided in the form of 'essential 
living needs and/or adequate accommodation'. Significantly, accommodation and 
living expenses can be provided separately. Thus, an asylum seeker may apply 
and receive NASS 'subsistence only'support if s/he already has accommodation 
with friends or relatives. Under this particular support package, s/he receives 
vouchers (until Autumn 2002) or cash (from Autumn 2002 onwards) equivalent to 
70% of current income support levels. Importantly, this particular option frees the 
person from dispersal since there are no restrictions on the location of his/her 
residence. The right to claim subsistence only support may be ended by NIAA 
2002 s43, if the Home Secretary introduces an order (Willman, Knafler and 
Pierce, 2004: 238). If an asylum seeker has no offers of accommodation from 
acquaintances, s/he is entitled to the dispersed accommodation only package or 
the subsistence and dispersed housing option. Under either of these support 
plans, s/he is allocated housing by NASS, on a no-choice basis, in one of the 
designated dispersal areas located outside of London and the South East. The 
I no-choice' aspect of dispersal is presented in AS Regs 2000 regs 12 and 13 
includes a dependent child under 18 years old (NIAA 2002 s55(5)). For a detailed discussion 
regarding the controversial s55, see Willman, Knafler and Pierce, 2004: 114-126. 
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which states that NASS is required to disregard certain factors, including the 
household's preferences as to the location of accommodation. Moreover, 
according to AS Regs 2000 reg 20, an asylum seeker's support may be 
suspended or discontinued if s/he or his/her dependant leaves 'the authorised 
address'. NASS must, nevertheless, take into account individual circumstances 
such as the location of other family members, education, medical and other social 
welfare needs when reaching a decision about where to accommodate a 
supported household, as set out in NASS Policy Bulletin 31. 
NASS contracts housing providers to offer dispersed accommodation to destitute 
asylum seekers. Regarding tenure, 60% of the housing is provided by private 
landlords through direct contracts and the remaining 40% is made available 
through regional consortia contracts. The consortia in turn contract out to local 
authorities, Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) and private landlords. Dispersed 
asylum seekers are accommodated in hostels with full-board and/or self-catering 
facilities or in self-contained flats/houses (Audit Commission, 2000c: 47,55). 
Importantly, in each dispersal locality, the One Stop Service, run by NASS- 
funded voluntary sector agencies, provides a wide range of front-line advice and 
assistance to asylum seekers, both immediately after arrival in the UK and 
throughout the process of waiting for a decision on their asylum claim (Refugee 
Council, 2005d). 
The asylum seeker remains in his/her dispersal accommodation and/or receives 
a subsistence allowance until his/her entitlement to NASS support ends, the latter 
terminating on the 'date of determination'. According to lAA 1999 s94(3) and AS 
Regs 2000 reg 2(2), as amended, for a successful asylum applicant, this date is 
28 days after the Home Secretary notifies the asylum claimant of his decision. 
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The aim of this measure is to allow a 'grace period' for the asylum seeker to 
make other arrangements and move out of NASS accommodation. Individuals 
should expect to receive a decision on their asylum application within two months 
of having lodged their demand, with the possibility of appeal available during the 
subsequent four months (Robinson, 2003a: 123-124). 
NASS has adopted a cluster dispersal model that is based on the lessons learnt 
from the failings of the Vietnamese 'thin' dispersal programme. Significantly, it 
builds upon the subsequently devised 'cluster' dispersal policy adopted for the 
Bosnian and Kosovan programme refugees. It is noteworthy that the UK 
government's decision to undertake a centrally managed dispersal policy via 
NASS reveals a shift in its attitude towards asylum. Indeed, since 1998/1999, 
asylum is conceptualised as a highly sensitive and politicised national concern 
rather than a local matter. As noted by Mrs Barbara Roche, Minister of State in 
the Home Office, 'we are not in a position in which the unfair share of the 
responsibility should fall on just a few boroughs. ... ) We are facing a national 
problem, which demands a national solution' (HC Deb, 5 th July 2000, 
col. 107WH). 
The selection of the NASS cluster dispersal areas was based, in theory, on 'the 
presence of available affordable housing, the existence of a multi-ethnic 
population or infrastructure able to assist asylum seekers, the possibility of linking 
in with existing communities and the opportunity to develop the support of 
voluntary and community groups' (Home Office, 1999). Furthermore, it was 
agreed that efforts would be made to group dispersed asylum seekers into 
geographical language clusters. According to the Home Office, these clusters 
aimed to be 'of sufficient size to allow for mutual support and economies of scale 
47 
but not so large as to place undue pressure on local resources' (Immigration and 
Nationality Directorate Asylum Seekers Support Project, 1999: 65). In other 
words, the objective was to ensure that asylum seekers would access support in 
the dispersal localities, this positive experience enhancing the probability of 
successful asylum applicants'long term settlement in their original dispersal area. 
The clusters were also designed to maximise cost-savings, particularly regarding 
interpretation costs (Asylum Rights Campaign, 1999: 11), minimise the 'over 
concentration' of the social costs (Boswell, 2001) of supporting dispersed asylum 
seekers as well as limit the contentious reactions from the receiving host- 
communities. According to a policymaker in NASS, the cluster limit was set at 
one asylum seeker per two hundred host-community members. 
However, even during the Parliamentary discussions surrounding the Immigration 
and Asylum Bill 1999, the real priority criterion for selecting the cluster dispersal 
areas was the availability of affordable housing. This emphasis is certainly 
reflected in s2 of part VI of the IAA 1999 where it states that cluster dispersal 
localities are identified based on the availability of 'suitable housing 
accommodation'. This trend continued during the early stages of the 
implementation phase of dispersal. Indeed, as a result of logistical difficulties and 
the time pressures NASS operational staff were under, asylum seekers were 
largely allocated to localities across the UK based on the existence of affordable 
and available housing in that area at the time of their dispersal. The cluster 
destinations were thus predominantly characterised by a surplus of dwellings, a 
weaker housing demand and high levels of poverty, unemployment and 
deprivation (Pearl and Zetter, 2002: 238). As a community officer notes 'the 
Home Office did adopt a clustering policy but it was driven by accommodation 
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and also what happened to be available the day a person needed to be 
dispersed' (Refugee Council, para 21). 
This national pattern is reflected in both of my case study cities. Indeed, in 
Birmingham, an asylum lead officer observed that the language-based cluster 
dispersal policy 'was thrown out of the window by NASS operational staff, back in 
early 2001. The first flush of the NASS dispersal arrangements was going very 
very badly and as a result, they changed the way in which dispersal was 
organised, including the language clustering. They bullied us a lot but we gave in' 
(Housing, City Council 2, para 259). Similarly, in Newcastle, until October 2002, 
WASS was completely ignoring the twelve languages specific to the city and 
sending anybody' (Support manager, Housing, City Council 1, para 57). The 
manager of a voluntary agency observes that 'in the early days, one of the 
privately run hostels in Newcastle, out of the 70 people who were living there, 
there were about 26 different nationalities. It was very much accommodation-led. 
If there was a place for someone to go, they appeared to be sent there 
regardless of their ethnic origin' (Specialist voluntary agency 1, para 33). As 
Robinson observes 'the pressures of everyday implementation have overridden 
the lists of the ideal dispersal zone. Dispersal has become a scramble to locate 
vacant and reasonably priced accommodation' (Robinson, 2003a: 146). 
Retrospectively, NASS observes that 'by failing to disperse in accordance with 
policy, it has caused asylum seekers to be sent to areas without established 
communities, who share the same language'. Aware of the consequence, NASS 
states that, as a result, 'many asylum seekers had no potential networks for 
seeking support and integration with local communities was consequently harder 
to achieve'. It is affirmed, by stakeholders and other interested parties that NASS' 
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lack of adherence to dispersal based on language clusters, 'has led to dispersed 
asylum seekers returning to London and the South East' (National Asylum 
Support Service, 2001: 13,40). 
Following an internal review in 2001 and 2002, the Home Office expressed its 
wishes, 'taking account of the practical and financial impact on local services', to 
revert to a policy of dispersal based on language cluster areas (Home Office, 
2002: 58 in Robinson, 2003a: 142). According to my own fieldwork, this practice 
appears to have been unevenly implemented across the UK. Newcastle City 
Council, for instance, witnessed its return from October 2002 onwards, for 
council-managed dispersal properties only (Support worker, Housing, City 
Council 1, para 21). This change followed substantial pressure from local service 
providers who stressed the pressing need for and substantial benefits of this 
particular measure in the traditionally white areas of the city (Support manager, 
Housing, City Council 1, para 61). In Birmingham, however, language-based 
clustering has not been re-introduced. This might be explained by the absence of 
an urgent need for this policy due to the multicultural nature of the city. Indeed, 
newly arrived asylum seekers are at a lower risk of isolation, in comparison with 
the more mono-cultural context of some localities in Newcastle. Importantly, even 
in the dispersal areas where language clustering has been re-introduced, as in 
the case with Newcastle, this criterion remains secondary to the availability of 
accommodation in that locality. Indeed, under the terms of NASS' contract with 
the housing providers, if the size of the household to be dispersed does not 
match the size of the available property in the cluster area, NASS has the right to 
override the housing provider's wish for language clustering (Support manager, 
Housing, City Council 1, para 61; LGA, para 103). NASS itself admits that it 
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follows 'a fairly crude, unrefined, broad-brush language cluster policy' (NASS, 
para 
Conclusion 
This chapter's review of previous and current UK dispersal policies shows that 
government, local authorities and boroughs as well as the voluntary sector have 
channeled some of the lessons learnt from previous dispersal programmes into 
current policy-making. Certainly, a 'thin' dispersal model has been widely 
recognised as unsatisfactory and thus, has been superseded by a 'cluster' 
dispersal approach, as in the cases of the dispersal of the Bosnian programme 
refugees and the multi-national / multi-ethnic asylum seekers. This review also 
points towards the difficulty in selecting 'cluster' areas based on more criteria 
than simply the existence of affordable and available housing. 
In the following chapter, theories of integration are examined, an analysis that 
culminates in the identification of key hypotheses that require testing in order to 
ascertain the impact of the UK contemporary dispersal policy on asylum seeker 
and refugee integration. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REFUGEE INTEGRATION 
This chapter focuses upon the sociological debates surrounding the meaning of 
'refugee' as well as the legal approaches towards and definitions of this term. 
These issues are addressed in order firstly, to help identify the extent to which 
refugees are distinctive from other migrants and secondly, to demarcate the 
appropriate meaning of the 'refugee' concept for this piece of research. In 
addition, this chapter reviews the definitions of refugee integration elaborated by 
international, European and national organisations as well as by social scientists. 
The approach towards and definition of refugee integration adopted in this thesis 
(Ager and Strang, 2004a) is placed within the context of this review. The reasons 
for prioritising access to employment, housing, social bonds and social bridges 
are also examined and the potential effects of the dispersal policy on these 
means and markers of integration are demarcated. 
2.1 Who is a refugee? 
2.1.1 Sociological discussions and definitions 
There exists an ongoing debate regarding the sociological definition of the term 
'refugee', the deliberation centring on the analytical validity of distinguishing 
between refugees and labour migrants. From the perspective of those designated 
by Koser (1997) as the realists, refugees are clearly distinctive from other 
migrants (Kunz, 1973; 1981). Indeed, refugee movements are the result of 
primarily political rather than economic factors and refugee flight is principally 
involuntary rather than voluntary. On the other hand, for those labelled by Koser 
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(11997) as nominalists, the distinction between economic and socio-political 
determinants of population movements is inappropriate since these factors are 
inextricably linked (Richmond, 1995). Moreover, the division of migratory flows 
into voluntary and involuntary movements is misleading since freedom of choice 
is often limited. These scholars suggest that a more accurate means of 
conceptualising population movements is by locating them on a continuum where 
the majority are situated between two sets of extremes combining various 
degrees of autonomous decision-making on the one hand and numerous 
combinations of economic and socio-political determining factors on the other. 
The standpoints of Koser's realists and nominalists are now presented in more 
detail. 
Refugees: involuntary population movements caused by political factors 
Kunz, who according to Koser's (1997) classification is a realist, supports the 
view that refugee movements are characterised by their involuntary nature. 
Indeed, the distinguishing traits of refugee movements, unlike voluntary 
migrations, are 'the reluctance to uproot oneself and the absence of positive, 
original motivations to settle elsewhere' (Kunz, 1973: 130). Kunz also notes that 
'when making their choices the refugees are seldom aware of crucially important 
factors and even when they are, they are seldom able to exercise a rational 
choice' (1981: 46). Thus, Kunz (1973: 131) perceives refugee movements as 
primarily kinetic. 
Joly (11996) similarly argues that whilst the distinction between refugees and other 
migrants is somewhat unclear, refugees nevertheless do exhibit some very 
distinctive characteristics. In order to clarify the specificity of the refugee 
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experience, Joly contrasts this group with 'so-called economic migrants'. The first 
distinction between refugees and economic migrants is that refugees leave their 
society of origin primarily because of political reasons whilst the departure of 
economic migrants is principally due to economic factors. Secondly, Joly notes 
that the refugee's decision to leave his/her home country carries primarily 
negative connotations whilst the economic migrant's decision involves essentially 
positive associations. Thirdly, the refugee's move is collective in nature, occurring 
in response to 'a dramatic change that jeopardised the life they were leading'. In 
contrast, the economic migrant's move is more individual since s/he has a 
personal project to improve his/her life. Fourthly, in contrast to the circumstances 
of economic migrants, the refugee's flight from his/her society of origin is most 
often unplanned because s/he is moving in response to a dramatic change that is 
threatening his/her life. Consequently, the refugee usually leaves unprepared, 
both psychologically and materially. Fifthly, the refugee's experience of flight can 
be particularly traumatic, more so than for the economic migrant, because of 
his/her possible experiences of 'detention camps, severe persecution, torture and 
fear of death'. Moreover, the majority of refugees are 'dispersed at the whim of 
fate'. This means that, having not been able to select their host-society, the 
cultural compatibility between themselves and the receiving population is likely to 
be lower than in the case of economic migrants who have the opportunity to 
choose their preferred destination. In addition, the past of the refugee, his/her 
degree of suffering in the home country prior to flight, as well as the trauma of 
flight itself mark the present and the future of the refugee in a deeper way than in 
the case of other migrants. Indeed, 'the overriding importance of the past to 
determine and understand refugee settlement is unique'. Furthermore, refugees 
share a collective sense of loss. Indeed, 'refugees have experienced the most 
complete dislocation of their social world. They are deprived of power as social 
54 
actors both in the country of origin and the country of reception' (Joly, 1996: 149- 
150; 154). 
Joly and Kelly (1999) propose additional aspects that distinguish refugees from 
other migrants. Firstly, refugees carry different legal statuses with distinctive 
political rights and entitlements to social welfare that contrast with those of other 
migrants. Secondly, other migrants can envisage returning to their country of 
origin whilst refugees are prevented from considering this option. Their home 
country could continue to be in a situation of generalised political instability and 
insecurity. Alternatively, they could risk persecution if they returned home 
because they might adhere to the ideology and projects of political groups 
opposing the governing regime. Finally, whilst all migrants are likely to 
experience separation from their relatives, refugees are particularly concerned for 
the security of their relatives who continue to live in their home country. 
The voluntary-involuntarv and political-economic dichotomies are problemati 
Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo (1989), nominalists according to Koser's (1997) 
typology, recognise that distinguishing refugees from other migrants based upon 
the involuntary-voluntary and political-economic dichotomy is problematic. 
Concerning the latter, these authors quote Vernant (1953) who states that 'it is 
difficult to distinguish between events which are political and those which are not. 
( ... ) In a great many States any measure, whatever its nature, is a political event' 
(1989: 31). With reference to the involuntary-voluntary nature of migration, 
Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo note that 'the more immediate and intense the life- 
threatening violence is, the more clearly a person is a refugee rather than a 
migrant'. These authors introduce a notion of a degree of need to flee the country 
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of origin, itself based upon 'an index of danger, which might combine the 
magnitude of threat with the probability of its occurrence' (1989: 31). Thus, they 
support the view of locating migrants along a continuum, based upon an index of 
danger, rather than adopting a dichotomous view of refugees as involuntary 
migrants and other population movements as voluntary. 
Richmond, another nominalist according to Koser's (1997) classification, argues 
that a clear distinction between economic and socio-political factors that 
determine population movements is untenable. Indeed, he notes that'the modern 
world is characterised by states, religious leaders, multinational co-operations 
and supra-state agencies that become involved in decisions which affect the lives 
of millions of people. Consequently, the majority of the contemporary population 
movements are a complex response to the reality of a global society in which 
ethno-religious, social, economic and political determinants are inextricably 
bound together'. Richmond is equally critical of the distinction made between 
voluntary and involuntary movements. He notes that 'all human behaviour is 
constrained and enabled by the structuration process within which degrees of 
freedom of choice are limited. Individual autonomy is relative to opportunity 
structures that are themselves determined by social forces' (Richmond, 1988: 
20). 
If it is not possible to distinguish between political and economic reasons for 
migration and if all migrants have a limited freedom of choice, then how does one 
distinguish, in sociological terms between refugees and other migrants? What if 
the boundaries between these sociological categories are further blurred by the 
fact that, whilst claiming to be a refugee, the individual prepared him/herself, both 
psychologically and materially, to migrate? What if this same person did not flee 
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from his/her country in response to a dramatic change that jeopardised his/her 
life? 
As an alternative to the political-economic and involuntary-voluntary dichotomies, 
Richmond suggests that population movements should be conceptualised based 
upon their location on two axes, one vertical and one horizontal. The vertical axis 
represents decision-making on a continuum from maximum to minimum 
autonomy. The horizontal axis represents the interaction of economic and socio- 
political forces. 'Between the two extremes, a large proportion of the people 
crossing state boundaries combine characteristics, responding to economic, 
social and political pressures over which they have little control, but exercising a 
limited degree of choice in the selection of destinations and the timing of their 
movements' (Richmond, 1988: 17,20). In this paradigm, Richmond distinguishes 
between proactive and reactive migrants. Proactive migrants are 'those who have 
relatively unconstrained choice' whilst reactive migrants are more constrained 
(1988,1995: 58). Richmond's model 'demonstrates the inadequacy of any 
definition of "refugee" that singles out one element in the causal chain, such as 
having a "genuine fear of persecution" because such fear is often only one factor 
in a much more complicated relation' (Richmond, 1995: 62,71). 
2.1.2 Legal definitions 
The 1951 Geneva Convention 
The 1951 Geneva Convention constitutes the principal international legal 
instrument that defines who a refugee is. S/he is an individual who 'owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
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membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his/her nationality, and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
him/herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his/her former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it' (1951 Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Chapter 1, Article 1, A(2)). It is 
important to stress the declaratory nature of refugee status defined in paragraph 
28 of the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status: 'a person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon 
as s/he fulfils the criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur 
prior to the time at which his refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of 
his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be 
one. S/he does not become a refugee because of recognition but is recognised 
because s/he is a refugee'. Significantly, from the mid-1970s onwards, with 
economic recession, the growth in the volume of international migration and the 
ensuing development of a new asylum regime a situation developed whereby 
'more asylum seekers were arriving at a time when few were welcome'. Thus, a 
restrictionist trend came to the fore and alternatives to Convention refugee status, 
demanding less commitment from European states, were introduced (Joly, 
1996: 11-12)7. 
7 For a European-wide illustration of this phenomenon, see Joly, Nettleton and Poulton's (1992) 
refugee typology. 
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Asvium seekers, Convention refuaees and refuciees with comlimentary statuses 
in the UK 
The UK, like other European countries, has developed its own series of legal 
statuses: asylum seekers, Convention refugees, those in receipt of Humanitarian 
Protection (HP) and those granted Discretionary Leave (DL). - Exceptional Leave 
to Remain (ELR) is included in the current discussion, despite it being 
superseded in April 2003 by HP and DL, because the overwhelming majority of 
those interviewed in my fieldwork were either asylum seekers, Convention 
refugees or individuals with ELR. 
An asylum seeker is an individual who reaches the UK through his/her own 
means and submits a request for asylum to the Immigration and Nationality 
Directorate (IND) at the Home Office. The IND aims to decide on asylum claims 
within two months (Refugee Council, 2003a: 2, Home Office, 2005b: 35). 
Individuals who apply for asylum from 23d July 2002 onwards are generally not 
permitted to work. However, persons who requested asylum prior to 23 rd Jul y 
2002 are able to apply for a work permit once their claim for asylum has been 
lodged with the IND for six months. Asylum seekers who were granted 
permission to work before 23 rd July 2002 are permitted to continue working. Only 
asylum seekers with permission to work who applied for asylum before 1" April 
2000 are entitled to the same training and educational rights as UK citizens on 
income support. Concerning adult education, all asylum seekers can study any 
further or higher education course at any level, either full-time or part-time 
(Refugee Council, 2002b: 1-2,2004a: 2,35 & 38-39,2003a: 5). Although asylum 
seekers are free to travel within the UK, if they are residing in dispersal housing, 
they are not permitted to leave their accommodation for more than seven 
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consecutive days. If they travel outside of the UK, the Home Office will withdraw 
their asylum application. Asylum seekers are generally not entitled to family 
reunion. They are legally permitted to access all available NHS services 
(Refugee Council, 2003a: 4,2004a: 42-43). 
A Convention refugee is an asylum claimant who is residing in the UK who has 
been recognised as a refugee by the IND within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention. Receipt of this status is also accompanied by the granting to the 
individual of Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) in the host-country. From August 
2005, Convention refugees are granted five years leave to remain. Prior to April 
2003, those asylum applicants who did not qualify for Convention refugee status 
but for whom the IND considered it was too dangerous to return to their home 
country were granted ELR, for a duration of four years or less, with the option of 
being able to apply for ILR on completion of the four year period (Refugee 
Council, 2004b: 1; Refugee Council, 2004a: 10; Refugee Council, 2004c: 2). 
From April 2003 onwards, HP and DL replaced ELR. 
The first of these two statuses, HP, is granted 'to anyone who is unable to 
demonstrate a claim for asylum but who would face serious risk to life or person 
arising from the death penalty, unlawful killing, torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. HP should be granted for up to three years. If at the 
end of three years, following an active review, it is decided that further protection 
is needed, a claimant will usually receive ILR. If protection is no longer needed 
and a person has no other basis of stay in the UK, they will be expected to leave' 
(APU notice 1/2003, Home Office website). DL 'may be granted for a limited 
number of specific reasons. These people will either not be considered to be in 
60 
need of international protection or will have been excluded from such protection. 
DL may be granted to an applicant who: 
1. Has an Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the ECHR claim 
2. Has an Article 3 of the EHCR claim only on medical grounds or severe 
humanitarian cases 
3. Is an unaccompanied asylum seeking child (UASC) for whom adequate 
reception arrangements in their country are not available 
4. Would qualify for asylum or HP but has been excluded 
5. Is able to demonstrate particularly compelling reasons wýhy removal would not 
be appropriate. 
An individual grant of DL should not be made for more than three years. ( ... ) After 
the DL period has expired the claimants situation will be reviewed with further 
leave granted if appropriate. A person on DL will normally become eligible to 
apply for ILR after 6 years. However, a person who has been excluded from 
asylum and/or HIP but granted DL will be excluded from ILR under the DL 
provisions. They will only be able to apply for ILR under the long residence 
concessions and even then they may be excluded. A person who no longer 
qualifies for leave will be expected to depart from the UK' (APU notice 1/2003, 
API Discretionary Leave, Home Office website). 
Individuals with Convention status, ELR, HP or DIL, all possess the right to work 
and are fully entitled to access all available NHS services. Moreover, they 
generally have the same rights and entitlements to social, housing and welfare 
benefits as all other UK residents and citizens. In terms of this group's entitlement 
to government training schemes and adult education, they possess the same 
rights as the asylum seekers who lodged their claim with the IND before 1"' April 
2000. This group is only allowed to vote for or stand at elections if they are a 
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Commonwealth citizen or if they have been granted UK citizenship. Persons with 
Convention status are not allowed to travel using their national passports 
because they are no longer considered to be under the protection of their home 
country. Instead, they are required to apply for a UN Convention Travel 
Document (CTD) granting him/her the right to pass through and sojourn in any 
country apart from his/her country of origin. Persons with ELR, HP or DL wishing 
to travel abroad are permitted to use their national passports or alternatively, they 
may apply for a Certificate of Identity. For those individuals with Convention 
status, it is possible to request family reunion for close family members. Persons 
with ELR, HP or DL, however, are generally only eligible for family reunion once 
they have been granted ILR. Persons with Convention status or ILR are entitled 
to apply for UK citizenship once they have possessed ILR for a minimum of one 
year and have continuously resided in the UK for five years or three years if the 
individual is married to a UK citizen (Refugee Council, 2004a: 35,38,41-43,49, 
53-54; Refugee Council, 2004b: 1-3). 
2.1.3 Refugees in this piece of research 
Given the focus in this thesis on dispersal and integration, the individuals of 
particular interest are those who are most significantly affected by the dispersal 
policy as well as those who have the potential, however remote this might 
actually be, to integrate. Thus, two groups are omitted from this study, namely 
those persons reaching the UK who decide, for whatever reason, not to apply for 
asylum as well as those individuals who have received a final negative decision 
from the IND on their asylum application. Both these groups are relatively 
unaffected by the redistribution scheme and possess limited opportunities to 
integrate. The remaining groups in the UK that can be considered as forced 
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migrants are asylum seekers, Convention status refugees and individuals who 
are granted the right to stay on humanitarian grounds, that is individuals with 
ELR, HP or DL. Members of these legal categories are affected by dispersal and 
possess a potential for integration and therefore these sets of individuals all 
constitute the subject matter of this piece of research. However, as reflected in 
the analysis above, they possess different rights, the two most distinctive 
categories being asylum seekers on the one hand and those with permission to 
reside in the UK on the other, called refugees in this piece of research. 
Consequently, whilst referring to the distinctive legal groups when necessary, the 
research undertaken centres around these two categories of persons. 
It is important to emphasise, however, that this thesis focuses primarily on the 
experiences of asylum seekers. Insufficient time has elapsed between the 
introduction of the dispersal policy and the undertaking of the fieldwork for this 
study to thoroughly assess the effect of this policy on refugees. Indeed, 
previously dispersed asylum seekers who were refugees at the time of my 
fieldwork only obtained this status several years ago and thus, as analysed in the 
following chapters, the observable impacts of dispersal on this group are similar 
to those experienced by asylum seekers. Notwithstanding, the findings regarding 
refugee circumstances enrich this thesis, as they highlight, more powerfully, the 
situation of asylum seekers. 
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2.2 Defininq refuqee intewation 
2.2.1 The challenges involved in defining refugee integration 
Prior to commencing the process of discussing refugee integration, it is important 
to note that this particular concept is difficult to define precisely. Indeed, 'there is 
no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and 
refugee integration. The concept continues to be controversial and hotly 
debated'. It would seem that this is partly due to the scope of the phenomenon of 
integration. Certainly, 'the integration of newcomers to a society takes place at 
every level and in every sector of society' and consequently, it requires the 
involvement of a multiplicity of different social players. As a result, the definition 
of integration easily becomes blurred as various sectors, lobbies and interest 
groups appropriate the concept, attribute their own particular meaning to it and 
infuse the term with connotations tied to their specific belief and value system. 
Thus, 'integration means different things to different people. It has been used in 
varying ways in different places and at different times' (Castles et al, 2002: 113- 
114; Ag er et al, 2002: 4). 
2.2.2 Refugee integration for policy makers and lobbyists at an 
international, European and national level 
The United Nations Hiah Commissioner for Refuqees (UNHCR) 
The principal mandate of the UNHCR is to 'seek permanent solutions for the 
problems of refugees' (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951), by 
facilitating 'resettlement in a third country of durable asylum, local integration in 
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the country of first asylum or voluntary return'. The 1951 Geneva Convention 
outlines the social, civil and economic rights of people in need of international 
protection, emphasising that 'refugees should be treated on a basis "not less 
favourable" than that accorded to non-nationals' (ECRE, 1998: 6). In so doing, it 
is hoped that 'refugees become assimilated in their new countries and avoid the 
kind of social marginalisation that might result if they were given only a second- 
class status' (UNHCR, 1995: 83). In this instance, 'assimilation within new 
national communities' has usually been interpreted as meaning economic, social 
and legal integration, although this has never been formally defined, by the 
Convention (ECRE, 1998: 6). 
The mandate of the UNHCR and the refugee rights enshrined in the Geneva 
Convention are crucial in setting a rights-based, international standard and 
agenda. However, the brevity with which the meaning of refugee integration is 
developed and the need for the UNHCR to apply its definition to the context of 
both developing and developed nations render this particular explanation of 
integration inappropriate for my piece of research. 
The European Council for Refuciees and Exiles (ECRE) 
ECRE, a pan-European organisation of 72 refugee-assisting agencies in 28 
countries, has developed an extensive definition of refugee integration founded 
principally upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
(ECRE, 2002: 8). ECRE describes integration firstly, as'a process of change that 
is dynamic and two-way' placing demands on both host-societies and refugees. 
From the standpoint of the latter, integration entails a willingness to adapt to the 
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way of life of the society of reception without being obliged to abandon one's own 
cultural identity. From the perspective of the former, integration necessitates a 
readiness to adjust public institutions to modifications in the population profile, 
acknowledge refugees as a component of the national community, and be 
decisive in assisting with this group's access to resources and decision-making 
processes. Moreover, integration constitutes a long-term process, beginning, at 
least psychologically, at the point of arrival in the host-country and ending when 
the individual develops into an active constituent part of the society of reception, 
from a legal, social, economic, educational and cultural perspective. Additionally, 
it is intended that integration is multi-dimensional. It should connect 'both the 
conditions for and actual participation in all aspects of the economic, social, 
cultural, civil and political life of the country of durable asylum as well as to 
refugees' own perception of acceptance by and membership in the host society' 
(ECRE, 2002: 4; Ager et al, 2002: 7; ECRE, 1998: 7). 
Although ECRE's definition and understanding of refugee integration is extensive 
and very useful for this particular piece of research, it is primarily directed 
towards the national governments in Europe. Therefore, it emphasizes the means 
by which the conditions for integration can be achieved, through national and 
local governmental programmes and strategies, omitting in the process to fully 
discuss and conceptualise the process of integration itself, namely the 
development of relationships amongst refugees themselves and also between 
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this group and host-community members and host-society institutions. Thus, 
ECRE's position on refugee integration does not constitute, in my view, a 
sufficiently exhaustive approach towards the subject matter. 
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The Home Office 
Prior to discussing the content. of the Home Office's definition of refugee 
integration, it is necessary to present the foundational principles that underpin the 
adopted approach. Firstly, a national government's definition of refugee 
integration tends to be based upon the society's 'cultural understandings of 
nation and nationhood' (Saggar, 1995 in Ager et al, 2002: 4), this sense of 
identity including particular values that permeate the national understanding of 
integration. In the case of the UK, since 1965 and the first Race Relations Act, 
society has been conceptualised as multicultural and characterised by ethnic 
pluralism, divergent sets of individuals concomitantly existing whilst maintaining 
independent cultural identities. Under the broader banner of race relations, UK 
policy-makers have been attentive to the cultural and social repercussions of 
integration, significant focus being placed on harmony and the risk of disharmony 
as well as achieving 'good race relations' in terms of 'peaceful co-existence 
through tolerance, diversity and pluralism' (Castles et al, 2002: 122; Weil and 
Crowley, 1999: 108). Thus, the Home Office's refugee integration policy 'should 
be seen as an important contribution to the work of promoting good race relations 
under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and in building cohesive 
communities'. Similarly, the strategy is founded upon a tradition of upholding the 
1951 Geneva Convention, promoting the national economic benefits of refugees 
and ensuring equality of opportunity for all (Home Office, 2005a: 3,5). 
Significantly, the focus of discussion in the UK appears to centre on integration 
rather than assimilation. Certainly, achieving integration has now become the 
primary aim of refugee settlement policies in the UK, the right to maintain cultural 
and religious identity and practices increasing in acceptance and the concept of a 
pluralist society gathering strength (Ager et al, 2002: 5). Notwithstanding this 
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linguistic paradigmatic shift, assimilationist policies can continue to develop under 
the guise of 'integration' programmes. 
Recently, debate amongst civil society in the UK has been pronounced regarding 
the point in time at which refugee integration and therefore state-funded refugee 
integration programmes should begin. The Home Office clearly notes, from its 
standpoint, that 'integration can only begin in its fullest sense when an asylum 
seeker becomes a refugee'. The UK government's promotion of asylum seeker 
integration would counter the principally deterrent nature of its asylum seeker 
policies, undermine the Labour government's image of political toughness 
towards immigration as well as make it harder to deport failed asylum applicants. 
A further characteristic of the Home Office's refugee integration strategy is that it 
applies to those refugees who arrived in the UK relatively recently and who are 
'at the beginning of the process of integration'. The strategy also stresses the 
specificity of the experience and needs of refugees, in contrast to that of other 
migrants. However, the Home Office is committed to mainstrearning the support 
offered to this group rather than opt to provide separate services or structures. 
The Home Office also emphasizes refugee empowerment, equality of 
opportunity, self-sufficiency as well as rights and responsibilities. Moreover, the 
Home Office believes that the personal safety of refugees as well as the 'building 
of bridges' with host-community members is essential in order for this group 'to 
contribute to the community as fully as possible'. In addition, the Home Office 
emphasises that, in order to facilitate access to services, such as housing, the 
NHS and education, assistance should be offered 'in a timely way and particularly 
during the critical period after receipt of a positive decision on asylum' (Home 
Office, 2005a: 3,5-6 14-15,20,23,26). 
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The definition and understanding of refugee integration offered by the Home 
Office is particularly insightful and informative concerning the specificity of the UK 
policy experience. However, insufficient emphasis is placed on the 'two-way 
process' of integration. The responsibilities that host-society members and 
communities have with regards to facilitating the integration of refugees thus 
appear limited. Additionally, despite discussions within the strategy regarding 
community cohesion, race relations, social harmony and the development of 
constructive relationships between refugees and host-society members, the 
Home Office appears to be predominantly concerned with functional integration, 
those elements of integration that deal with the availability and quality of social 
services as well as refugee access and rights to employment, education and 
housing (Korac, 2001; Ager et al, 2002: 6; Castles et al, 2002: 124). As will be 
discussed shortly, my study of integration focuses, in addition to the functional 
aspects, on the relational components, namely the relationships that develop 
amongst refugees and also between this group and members of the host- 
community. Consequently, a definition that overly stresses the functional qualities 
of integration is inadequate. 
The Refuaee Council 
The Refugee Council, the main voluntary sector organisation in the UK working 
for refugees, posits a significantly distinct stance from that adopted by the Home 
Office, their definition and appreciation of refugee integration being based 
fundamentally on ECRE's pro-refugee approach. 
Firstly, the Refugee Council emphasises that a person's integration process 
begins from their point of arrival in the UK and thus, government-led integration 
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policies and measures should commence whilst a person is still an asylum 
seeker. The Refugee Council's concern regarding the delay of an individual's 
entitlement to state-funded integration schemes until they receive permission to 
remain in the UK is based on the principle that a person's potential experience of 
exclusion during the reception phase can stunt their long-term integration, 
particularly when the duration of the asylum application process is significant. 
Moreover, the Refugee Council highlights that refugee integration constitutes a 
'two-way' process, where demands are placed not only on refugees but also on 
the receiving society. ' Furthermore, the Refugee Council advocates that 
community organisations are of vital importance in promoting and facilitating 
integration. Additionally, the Refugee Council observes that refugees' real and 
perceived sense of contribution to and membership of the host-country are 
crucial, the integration process seeking 'to create conditions for participation in all 
aspects of the economic, social, cultural, civil and political life of the country of 
asylum'. Finally, the Refugee Council believes that for integration to develop 
refugees need to feel safe and secure within their local areas, possess the 
confidence to report incidents of racial harassment as well as trust the relevant 
authorities that they are taking action in their best interests (Refugee Council, 
2004d: 3-4,19,21; Ager et al, 2002: 7; Refugee Council, 1997: 15). 
Whilst the Refugee Council's approach towards refugee integration covers many 
of the components of integration, the definition itself is overly functional, in the 
same way as the Home Office's stance, and not sufficiently developed or refined 
for it to constitute the conceptual foundation of integration in this piece of 
research. Moreover, the Refugee Council's definition of integration and its 
emphasis, along with ECRE's, on striving for equal group rights borders on being 
unrealistic and unachievable without a significant societal transformation. Whilst it 
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is morally right that refugees are treated as equals, in practice, refugees do not 
possess equal powers. Indeed, they do not possess the right to vote unless they 
have naturalised and, as a group, they constitute a relatively small and less 
resourced proportion of the population, in the UK. This inequality of power 
significantly influences the type of integration that can be achieved. 
2.2.3 Sociological conceptual isations of integration 
Intearation as one of the outcomes of Berrv's (1980,1988) acculturation process 
Berry (1980; 1988) has devised an acculturation model, whereby acculturation 
constitutes 'the process by which groups adjust to different cultures' (Castles et 
al, 2002: 113). Acculturation, in this context, is conceptualised as a process with 
four possible outcomes: integration, assimilation, separation and marginalisation. 
The distinction between these four states is based upon two factors: firstly, 
whether the acculturating group maintains or loses its own cultural identity and 
secondly, whether or not it engages in social relations with the dominant society. 
'A situation where the group becomes submerged into the dominant society is 
labelled assimilation. The opposite, where there are no relations with the larger 
society and the group sticks to its own identity is called separation (or 
segregation where it is imposed by other groups). There is also the possibility 
that the group loses its own culture yet does not become part of the dominant 
society - this is termed marginalisation. Finally, a group may maintain its identity 
but also interact with society as a whole - this is integration' (Kuhlman, 1991: 5). 
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Tnhfp PI Rprrv'q qr-r-i ilti irntinn mnripi 
Maintenance of cultural identity 
YES NO 
Relations with YES Integration Assimilation 
other groups NO Separation Marginalisation 
Source: Kuhlman (1991), modified from Berry, 1988: 45 
Berry's acculturation model and his approach towards the definition of integration 
focus supremely upon cultural orientation. The nature of the relationships that 
develop in the country of reception amongst the in-coming group and host-society 
members is also central. Thus, Berry's standpoint adds significant depth to the 
present discussion on refugee integration by exploring issues such as 'identity, 
belonging, recognition and self-respect' (Castles et al, 2002: 114). Nevertheless, 
his perspective fails to include a more functional viewpoint and since, as stated 
earlier, a significant part of my research focuses on state policy and policy-related 
aspects of integration, Berry's definition, on its own, is incomplete and therefore 
inadequate for this particular study. 
The components of adaptation (Goldlust and Richmond, 1974) 
Goldlust and Richmond's (1974) research offers a detailed study of the 
components of the overarching process of acculturation, or as they call it, 
adaptation. These authors distinguish between objective or external aspects and 
subjective or psychological aspects of adaptation. 
Goldlust and Richmond's objective aspects of adaptation are the economic, 
cultural, social and political experiences of the migrant. The economic experience 
refers to 'the industries and occupations into which migrants move, their 
subsequent occupational and social mobility, together with their incomes and 
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expenditures. The cultural sphere includes the establishment of channels of 
communication with the receiving society through language learning, together 
with the interchange of cultural artefacts and symbols between immigrants and 
the receiving society. Social aspects include the integration of immigrants into 
networks of primary relationships with kith and kin, as well as members of the 
receiving society. It also involves the secondary level of social participation in 
formal organisations of various types'. Finally, 'political aspects include 
participation in the normal processes of voting and standing for election, together 
with the formation of new parties and pressure groups representing the special 
interests of immigrants and ethnic minority groups'. Goldlust and Richmond's 
subjective aspects of adaptation are the migrant's experiences of identification, 
internalisation and satisfaction. Identification refers to 'the modification of the 
migrant's own sense of identity and a transference of loyalty from his/her former 
country to the new'. Internalisation involves 'the processes of change in the 
attitudes and values of the migrant and is closely related to the objective process 
of acculturation. However, the latter may simply involve outward conformity to the 
demands of the new society due to external sanctions, without any marked 
change in the personality'. The level of satisfaction of the immigrant is likely to 
'differ according to the specific aspect of the post-migration experience. It'will 
almost certainly involve relative comparisons with the immigrant's situation before 
migration and may also involve comparisons with other immigrants and with 
members of the receiving society' (Goldlust and Richmond, 1974: 198-199). 
Goldlust and Richmond's (1974) extended analysis of the components of 
adaptation contributes significantly to the understanding of the constituent parts, 
both functional and relational as well as objective and subjective of refugee 
integration. However, by opting to exclusively develop the meaning attributed to 
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adaptation, they offer limited assistance concerning the specificity of a definition 
of integration. 
Refugee integration (Kuhlman, 1991) 
Kuhlman (1991: 7) defines refugee integration as: 'participating in the host- 
economy; attaining an acceptable standard of living; maintaining individual or 
group cultural identity; establishing a progressive mode of psychological 
adjustment; absence of a deterioration in the standards of living and economic 
opportunities of host-society members; level of friction between host population 
and refugees no worse than within host-population itself; level of discrimination 
experienced by refugees no higher than what already exists between groups 
within the host-society'. 
Kuhlman's perspective on refugee integration is broad and wide-ranging, 
covering both the functional and relational features of the concept and as such, 
his work contributes significantly to an overall appreciation of the phenomenon 
under study. However, his standpoint is deeply rooted in his research 
experiences in developing countries. Given both the different scale of refugee 
movements as well as the distinct economic, social and political circumstances of 
the host-countries in these regions, compared to Europe, for instance, his 
definition of refugee integration is unsatisfactory for a study that focuses on 
refugee settlement in developed nations. 
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iee integration (Ac -1.2004a) 
Refuc ger and Stranc 
Ager and Strang (2004a), basing themselves largely on social capital literature, 
have elaborated a holistic refugee integration framework. Prior to analysing their 
definition, it is helpful to contexualise their stance by presenting the origins and 
fundamental traits of the social capital concept. Although social capital has 
become a buzzword in political and academic circles, there is often confusion 
regarding the meaning of the term. Generally speaking, social capital is 
concerned with the advantages of people being connected to one another 
(Halpern, 2005: 1). This principle is not new in sociology. Durkheirn emphasised 
that group life can bp an antidote to anomie and self-destruction and Marx 
distinguished between an atomised class-in-itself and a mobilised and effective 
class-for-itself. However, the contemporary value of the social capital concept is 
that it highlights how non-monetary forms of capital can be important sources of 
power and influence (Portes, 1998: 2). 
The origins of mainstream academic interest in social capital date back to the late 
1980s when Bourdieu and Coleman drew attention to the concept (Halpern, 
2005: 6). Bourdieu maintains that 'social capital is the sum of the resources, 
actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a 
durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119). Coleman 
argues that 'social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a 
variety of different entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some 
aspect of social structures and they facilitate certain actions of actors within the 
structure' (Coleman, 1988: S98). Despite the significant theoretical contributions 
made by these two authors, it is Putnam who is now most closely associated with 
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the social capital concept. He defines the latter as 'the features of social life - 
networks, norms and trust - that enable participants to gather together more 
effectively to pursue shared objectives' (Putnam, 1995: 664-5). Portes (1998: 15) 
has also contributed significantly to this field, emphasising, in particular the 
potentially negative, as well as positive, effects of social capital on individuals or 
groups. Certainly, the presence of social capital can exclude outsiders, make 
excessive claims on group members, restrict individual freedom and lead to a 
downward levelling of norms. 
New theoretical work has broken down the notion of social capital into different 
sub-types, the most relevant of these distinctions being between 'bonding' and 
'bridging' social capital. 'Bonding' social capital 'brings closer together people 
who already know each other' (Gittell and Vidal, 1998: 15). It is inward looking, 
reinforces exclusive identities as well as homogeneous groups and creates 
strong in-group loyalty. It is considered 'good for getting by'. The dense networks 
present in some ethnic enclaves, that provide crucial social and psychological 
support, constitute the archetype 'bonding' social capital. Significantly, this form 
of social capital may also create strong out-group antagonism (Putnam, 2000: 22- 
3). In contrast, 'bridging' social capital 'brings together people or groups who 
previously did not know each other' (Gittell and Vidal, 1998: 15). It is outward 
looking, encompasses people across diverse social cleavages and facilitates 
linkages to external assets and information. It is viewed as 'good for getting 
ahead' (Putnam, 2002: 22-3). This differentiation closely mirrors Granovetter's 
(1973) distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' ties. Similarly, Woolcock (1998: 
168) distinguishes between integration (bonding) and linkage (bridging). 
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Woolcock's societal typology, based upon the divergent mixes of bonding and 
bridging, is particularly insightful since it illustrates that individuals and groups 
can possess 'too much' or'too little' social capital, thereby suggesting that social 
capital is a resource that needs to be optimised rather than maximised (1998: 
158). 
Table 2.2 Woolcock's societal typology of bonding and bridgi g 
Low bridging I High bridging 
Low bonding Amoral individualism Anoml'e 
High bondinq Amoral familism Social opportunity 
. 5ource: W OOICOCK (1998) 
According to this typology, amoral individualism equates to a deficit of bonding 
and bridging, a situation where there is no familial or generalised trust, where 
narrow self-interest pervades all social and economic activity and where 
members are isolated, by circumstance or discrimination, from all forms of 
cohesive social networks. Anomie is associated with a relative excess of bridging 
and a deficit of bonding, where individuals possess a newly-found freedom and 
opportunity to participate in a wide range of activities whilst lacking the stable 
community base to provide guidance, support and identity. Amoral familism is 
present when there is a relative excess of bonding and a deficit of bridging. In 
these instances, generalised trust extends only to immediate family members / 
blood relatives generating fierce ethnic loyalties as well as familial attachments. 
This state of affairs can discourage economic advancement, geographical 
mobility and amicable conflict resolution with outsiders. Finally, social opportunity 
is achieved when equally high levels of bonding and bridging are present 
(Woolcock, 1998: 171-5). 
77 
Having provided the social capital background to Ager and Strang's (2004a) 
approach, an explanation of these authors' visually displayed integration 
framework follows. 
Figure 2.1 Indicators of integration framework 
Tf* Indraton of Integration Framemik 
r4c. awý and markerS Ln -pic, viliont Ldw-Ation wom, 
Social conty,, niom. 
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Source: Ager and Strang (2004a: 3). 
Firstly, one can observe from this schema that Ager and Strang (2004a) 
incorporate into their framework the principal functional aspects of refugee 
integration, namely employment, housing, education and health. These fields 
constitute the 'major areas of attainment that are widely recognised as critical 
factors in the integration process. These domains are "markers" because success 
in these areas is an indication of positive integration outcomes as well as 
11 means" because success in these fields is likely to assist the wider integration 
process'. Secondly, Ager and Strang stress the importance of relationships for 
the definition and achievement of the integration process. Like Woolcock (1998), 
the authors identify three forms of social connections namely 'social bonds, that 
is connections within a community defined by, for example, ethnic, national or 
religious identity; social bridges, with members of other communities; and social 
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links with institutions, including local and central government services'. Thirdly, 
Ager and Strang have located within their framework, two key facilitators, namely 
'language and cultural knowledge' and 'safety and stability', which, they argue, 
stimulate the integration process. The former incorporates 'both refugees' 
knowledge of national and local procedures, customs and facilities, but also non- 
refugees' knowledge of the circumstances and culture of refugees'. The latter 
includes 'experiences relating to racial harassment and, more generally, fear of 
crime as well as issues of continuity and a sense of permanence (both of which 
are seen as an important factor in helping people to begin establishing 
relationships)'. Finally, the authors include within their framework a contextual 
element, namely rights and citizenship, which constitutes 'the basis upon which 
expectations and obligations for the process of integration are established' (Ager 
and Strang, 2004a: 3-4). 
Ager and Strang remark that there exist 'complex inter-linkages between all of the 
domains posited in the framework, actions influencing one of the domains having 
potential impacts on all the others'. Significantly, it is noted that the way in which 
the domains are visually represented in the above diagram does not suggest that 
6any domain is more important than any other, or that integration should happen 
in a particular order, for instance that you achieve employment first, then greater 
social bonds'. Nevertheless, when using the framework, it would be possible to 
trace the broad range of 'pathways' connecting the various domains (Ager and 
Strang, 2004a: 4-5). 
Basing themselves on the framework presented above, Ager and Strang (2004a: 
5) argue that'an individual or group is integrated within a society when they: 
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achieve public outcomes within employment, housing, education, health etc. 
which are equivalent to those achieved within the wider host communities; 
are socially connected with members of a community with which they identify, 
with members of other communities and with relevant services and functions 
of the state; 
- and have sufficient linguistic competence and cultural knowledge, and a 
sufficient sense of security and stability, to confidently engage in that society 
in a manner consistent with shared notions of nationhood and citizenship'. 
2.2.4 Refugee integration in this piece of research 
In this thesis, the approach and definition of refugee integration as elaborated by 
Ager and Strang (2004a) has been adopted. In contrast to the other standpoints 
reviewed above, Ager and Strang are uniquely successful firstly, in valuing and 
emphasising the 'two-way process' of integration, secondly, in rooting their 
research and conclusions in the UK and other developed nations and thirdly in 
combining the functional and relational aspects of integration. Comprehensive 
research on all features of their integration framework, however, lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Consequently, only four domains have been chosen: 
housing, employment, social bonds and social bridges. These fields have been 
elected because they cover functional and sociological aspects of integration as 
well as raise important issues relating to the effect of the dispersal policy on 
refugee integration in the UK. As illustrated below as well as in subsequent 
chapters, the four domains selected are interdependent, each element 
influencing the other. Consequently, they can be extricated from Ager and 
Strang's (2004a) framework and studied as an independent whole from the other 
aspects of the integration structure. 
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On the functional side, the housing domain has been selected because housing 
provision has always constituted the key pillar of refugee settlement in the UK 
(Joly, 1996). Moreover, given the centrality to this thesis of the dispersal policy, 
an accommodation-led strategy introduced to relieve housing pressures in 
London and the South East, it wad considered essential to analyse the effect of 
this housing policy on asylum seeker and refugee housing. The employment 
domain has been chosen because work and income are central to the integration 
process (Ager, Strang, O'May, Garner, 2002: 10) and also because employment 
is intimately intertwined with housing, job opportunities and affordable 
accommodation rarely being encountered together. In light of the dispersal 
policy's priorities, namely securing affordable housing outside of London and the 
South East, it is important to'explore the consequences this approach has on 
asylum seeker and refugee access to employment. Housing and employment 
have been chosen above education and health firstly, because the majority of the 
Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees are young single men rather than 
couples with children. Therefore, whilst education issues will be relevant to some 
members of this group, they are not as prevalent as housing and employment 
concerns. Secondly, the health issues of the group under study are deemed too 
complex to analyse for a researcher who does not possess significant medical 
training. 
On the sociological side, the social bonds domain has been elected because it is 
precisely through this type of social relationship that integration, one of the main 
focuses of this thesis, distinguishes itself from assimilation. Moreover, by 
focusing on social bonds, this piece of research can inform the frequently 
discussed debate regarding the extent to which the dispersal policy stifles 
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integration by isolating co-ethnics from one another. The social bridges domain 
has been chosen because this form of social interaction renders the integration 
process complete, social bonds providing security and social bridges offering 
independence. Centring on this feature also helps establish the degree to which 
the dispersal policy facilitates bridging or instead encourages mutual hostility and 
antagonism. Furthermore, the interactions of social bridges, social bonds and 
employment prospects are valuable for study. Indeed, most research on social 
capital amongst Black and Minority Ethnic groups as well as refugees has 
centred around the link between social capital and employment (Light and 
Karageorgis, 1994; Portes, 1994; Lamba and Krahn, 2003). Focusing on this 
relationship amongst Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees will thus 
contribute directly to the existing body of academic literature in this field. 
Significantly, Ager and Strang's (2004a) integration facilitators, safety and 
stability as well as language and cultural knowledge, are not considered 
independently in this study but rather are discussed within the broader remit of 
the social bridges research. Similarly, the foundation of Ager and Strang's 
(2004a) integration framework, rights and citizenship, is not overtly researched in 
this thesis although these principles remain central to the way in which asylum 
seeker and refugee housing, employment, social bonds and social bridges are 
studied. Finally, the study of asylum seeker and refugee relationships with 
governmental, private and voluntary sector organisations does not constitute an 
aspect of this piece of research because previous studies have frequently 
focused on this subject matter already. 
82 
Regarding specifically the four chosen aspects of integration, for the purpose of 
my field research and data analysis: 
1. An asylum seeker or refugee is residentially integrated when they are able to 
obtain suitable housing, that is, when the abode they occupy offers adequate 
personal space for individual privacy, satisfactory shared space for communal 
living, guaranteed personal physical security and average quality housing. 
2. An asylum seeker or refugee is economically integrated when, assuming that 
they wish to and are fit to work, they are successful in obtaining an adequate 
job, that consists in formal, secure employment that broadly matches their 
qualifications and prior professional experience. 
3. An asylum seeker or refugee is socially integrated when they are firstly, in 
spatial proximity to and are involved in local co-ethnic social bonds and 
secondly, when they are able to engage in social bridging with members of 
-the host-community. 
2.3 The potential imDact of the dispersal Policv on intewation 
The dispersal policy possesses a strong potential to fundamentally affect the 
housing, as well as its location, and the employment of the group under study. 
The dispersal policy's stated aim, is to spatially distribute asylum seekers away 
from London and the South East, placing them in state-funded dwellings on a no- 
choice basis. It would seem, as discussed in chapter one, that the allocation of 
dispersal accommodation is largely based, in practice, upon housing availability 
and affordability. The use of these criteria has led many dispersed individuals to 
reside in poor quality, previously vacant dwellings, this phenomenon hindering 
their capability to obtain an adequate living environment and thus restricting their 
integration. As noted earlier, the employment and housing markets in a given 
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location are closely interlinked. Thus, the selection of dispersal dwellings based 
upon housing availability and affordability impacts upon the employment 
prospects of those dispersed, dispersal accommodation thwarting the ability of 
those dispersed to secure work, in itself a significant impediment to integration. 
Some of the dispersed individuals have been isolated from the principal 
groupings of their co-ethnics. In these instances, the benefits of possessing 
access to local co-ethnic social bonds have logically been absent and integration 
has been hampered. This is primarily the consequence of the UK government 
selecting dispersal localities largely based on housing availability and affordability 
as well as its failure to follow, particularly at the beginning of the dispersal 
programme, the language-cluster principle enunciated at the policy formulation 
stage. Finally, for some of those dispersed, the opportunities for social bridging in 
the dispersal localities have also been minimal, a phenomenon that additionally 
constrains their integration. This trend is once more the product of the UK 
government's prioritization of selecting the dispersal areas based on the housing 
availability and affordability in localities rather than the degree to which the host- 
communities are accustomed to living alongside refugee communities and / or 
members of Black and Minority Ethnic groups. 
Factors influencing the impact of the dispersal 12olicy on integration 
Having identified the potential impact of the dispersal policy on the integration of 
asylum seekers and refugees in the UK, the intervening factors that might 
influence this relationship are now presented. Basing myself primarily on the work 
of Kunz (1973,1981) and Goldlust and Richmond (1974), the variety of factors 
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that appear to affect the impact of the dispersal policy on integration are identified 
as follows. 
Firstly, there are elements relating specifically to the characteristics an individual 
migrant possesses on departure from his/her country of origin. These are the 
extent of his/her educational and technical training, his/her experience of urban 
living, his/her prior knowledge of the host-country language and his/her 
demographic traits (Goldlust and Richmond, 1974). Secondly, structural factors 
connected to local variations within the society of reception influence the impact 
of dispersal on integration, namely the local degree of cultural compatibility 
(Kunz, 1973; 1981), the local conditions of the labour (ECRE, 1998) and housing 
market and the local traits of the public transport infrastructure. Thirdly, 
governmental structural factors in the country of reception affect the influence of 
dispersal on integration. Indeed, the date an individual applies for asylum is 
important, the latter determining which dispersal scheme the person is registered 
onto as well as whether or not the asylum applicant possesses the right to work. 
The length of the asylum determination procedure (ECRE, 1998), the range of 
welfare support packages available to asylum seekers, the time of arrival in the 
dispersal locality and the variation in size of the dispersal area are also 
significant. Additionally, the difference in the housing offered to dispersed asylum 
claimants, the percentage of failed asylum applicants, disbenefitted asylum 
seekers and refugees in the total co-ethnic population and the receipt of refugee 
status (Castles et al, 2002) are worthy of note. Fourthly, co-ethnic structural 
factors in the host-country impinge upon the effect of dispersal on integration, 
namely, at the local level, the degree of organisation within the co-ethnic group 
and the presence of migrant leaders suited to act as intermediaries between co- 
ethnics and host-community members (Patterson, 1963). At the national level, 
85 
the relative size of the incoming co-ethnic group (Goldlust and Richmond, 1974) 
is significant. Finally, the length of residence of an individual in their country of 
reception (Goldlust and Richmond, 1974) impacts upon the influence of dispersal 
on integration, his/her settlement experiences and needs changing over time 
(Lieberson, 1996), namely, for instance, his/her aspirations for return migration 
(Bloch, 1999a). Significantly, it is possible that the effect of dispersal on 
integration decreases over time. 
Basing myself on the discussions above, the hypotheses to be tested in this 
piece of research are: 
1. The contemporary UK dispersal policy exercises a negative impact on the 
social bonds of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees 
because this policy sends this group to localities were there are no settled co- 
ethnics. 
2. The current UK dispersal policy wields a negative impact on the social 
bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees because this 
policy sends this set of individuals to areas where the perceptions and 
attitudes of host-community members towards them are hostile. 
3. The contemporary UK dispersal policy exercises a negative impact on the 
employment of dispersed Iraq! Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees 
because this policy sends this group to localities where suitable employment 
opportunities are limited. 
4. The current UK dispersal policy wields a negative impact on the housing of 
dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees because this policy 
houses this set of individuals in inadequate dwellings. 
When testing these hypotheses, it is necessary to locate the impact of the 
dispersal policy on refugee integration within the broader sociological debate 
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regarding structuration and voluntaristic action, the latter consisting in 'an actor's 
free will or capacity to make choices despite constraints' (Sciulli, 1986 in 
Richmond, 1988). Certainly, in this particular piece of research, efforts are made 
to identify instances when asylum seekers and refugees exercise their freewill 
and integrate despite the structural constraint of the dispersal policy or instead, 
by manipulating this seemingly limiting aspect of their lives to their own 
advantage. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, my approach towards the concept of who is a refugee has been 
delineated and my viewpoint on refugee integration has been explained. The 
reasons for focusing on four specific components of integration, namely 
employment, housing, social bonds and social bridges have also been presented. 
Moreover, a series of personal, structural and circumstantial factors that reinforce 
or counter the impact of the dispersal policy on asylum seeker and refugee 
integration have been identified. Finally, the potential outcome of the effect of 
dispersal on each of the four aspects of integration chosen has been suggested 
in the form of hypotheses. The following methodology and methods chapter will 
explain the ways in which the hypotheses outlined above are tested. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
In the social sciences, there exist two broad types of data collection methods, 
namely those that pertain to the quantitative approach, customarily typified by the 
social survey, and those that relate to the qualitative stance, habitually 
exemplified by participant observation and unstructured, in-depth interviewing 
(Bryman, 2000: 1). Significant controversy exists regarding the ways in which a 
researcher opts between either of these two, seemingly distinct, groups of 
research methods. 
Some authors advocate that the choice should be based upon the 
epistemological standpoint of the researcher. Others suggest that the decision 
should be founded upon a study's particular research questions and the 
appropriateness of the chosen methods for providing evidence to test the key 
hypotheses. From the perspective of the former, quantitative and qualitative 
approaches and methods are viewed as competing standpoints, 'the terms 
"quantitative research" and "qualitative research" signifying much more than ways 
of gathering data and rather, denoting divergent assumptions about the nature 
and purposes of research in the social sciences'. From the point of view of the 
latter, quantitative and qualitative data collection methods simply constitute 
'denotations of different ways of conducting social investigations' (Bryman, 2000: 
3-5). An individual's epistemological perspective constitutes what s/he believes to 
be valid or acceptable knowledge about the social world as well as what data 
collection methods s/he perceives as most suitable to the process of soliciting 
that knowledge from the social world. 
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In this research, I maintain that there exist significant differences between 
quantitative and qualitative research, regarding the type of data that each 
engenders and the levels of analysis at which each operates. Nevertheless, 'it is 
important not to minimise the importance of similarities between the two 
traditions'. Moreover, I maintain that 'the association of quantitative and 
qualitative research with different epistemological positions is largely assumed' 
and data collection techniques should be chosen 'in relation to the research 
problems posed' (Bryman, 2000: 172-173). 
The operational definition of integration in this study, based on Ager and Strang's 
(2004a) approach and presented in chapter two, has not been refined by the 
identification and use of indicators. The validity of indicators, in general, is 
questionable since it is difficult to be certain that an indicator or measure of 
integration accurately reflects the concept to which it is supposed to be referring. 
Moreover, the focus of my research topic is the relationship existing between the 
dispersal policy, the integration process and any intervening factors that impact 
upon that relationship, rather than on the exact degree of integration or non- 
integration achieved. Thus, the expectation is that the hypotheses detailed in 
chapter two would be validated under certain conditions and rejected under other 
circumstances. A deductive and structured approach has been adopted, this 
stance being particularly suited to policy research (Bryman, 2000). 
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3.1 Data collection methods 
3.1.1 Interviews 
In social research, there exist several interviewing techniques, namely structured 
interviews, unstructured interviews and semi-structured interviews (May, 2001). 
Prior to discussing the reasons for adopting the latter in this piece of research, 
the main characteristics of each of the three existing interviewing methods are 
delineated. 
Structured interviews 
Structured interviews are firstly based upon a questionnaire that is finalised, in 
terms of the themes to be discussed and the wording of the questions 
themselves, once the pilot study has been undertaken. Moreover, each 
interviewer involved aims to adopt a standardised systematic stance, striving to 
ask the same questions in the same way to all the interviewees (May, 2001: 92), 
adopting friendly but not over-sociable behaviour (Burgess, 1984: 101). Contact 
with each interviewee is intended to be brief, 'the researcher adopting the posture 
of an outsider looking in on the social world. S/he applies a pre-ordained 
framework on the subjects being investigated and is involved as little as possible 
in that world' (Bryman, 2000: 95-96). The latter approach is adopted in an attempt 
to facilitate the impartiality of the researcher and control his/her impact on the 
interview process. Indeed, it is hoped that, as a result, the differences in the 
research findings, between one interview and another, 'can be attributed to a 
"true" difference rather than as a result of how the question was asked or the 
context of the interview' (May, 2001: 92). 
90 
Relative to other interview methods, the structured standpoint of the current 
technique can facilitate the replicability of the interview itself by other interviewers 
working alongside one another on the same research project, thus making this 
method particularly suitable to large scale surveys (May, 2001: 121). Certainly, if 
many interviewers adopted the fluid and more unpredictable stance of 
unstructured interviews, the data collected during these types of surveys is likely 
to be less manageable and troublesome to analyse. - It is also hoped that the way 
in which structured interviews are undertaken can enhance the replicability of the 
research as a whole, 'replication providing a means of checking the extent to 
which findings are applicable to other contexts as well as consisting in a means 
of checking the biases of the investigator' (Bryman, 2000: 37; May, 2001: 91-92). 
Regarding the suitability of this method to particular research questions, 
structured interviews or social surveys 'are likely to be preferred when there is a 
concern to establish cause and effect relationships, (... ) survey researchers 
tending to be more concerned with the precise delineation of a causal factor 
relative to other potential causes' (Bryman, 2000: 110). 
Unstructured interviews 
In contrast, unstructured interviews are founded upon flexible interview guidelines 
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containing a non-prescriptive list of themes which are themselves likely to be 
eliminated or modified during fieldwork (May, 2001: 125), an approach which 
'allows new leads to be followed and additional data to be gathered in response 
to changes in ideas'. Generally, specific research questions are not identified 
before the beginning of work in the field. Furthermore, the data collection 
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technique under discussion is typified, largely, by the interviewer surrendering the 
control of the interview to the interviewee, 'the researcher providing minimal 
guidance and allowing considerable latitude for the subjects. Finally, 
unstructured, compared to structured, interviews are characterised by the 
researcher engaging in more 'sustained contact', over a longer period of time, 
with the interviewee (Bryman, 2000: 46,95 & 99). 
This data collection method is well-suited to research that focuses on 'viewing 
events, actions, norms and values from the perspective of the people who are 
being studied', the opportunity to develop a 'sustained contact' with the subjects 
through unstructured interviewing enabling the growth of closer relationships 
between the interviewer and the interviewee. As argued by Bryman, 'in order to 
gain the necessary vantage point from which empathy may be feasible, sustained 
periods of involvement are required' (2000: 61 & 96). In addition, unstructured 
interviews can be appropriate to social research that emphasises changet 
interconnections and linkages 'between events and activities and explores 
people's interpretations of the factors which produce such connections'. Use of 
the latter technique in policy studies, for instance, would 'emphasise the various 
responses of both those who implement and those who are affected by the 
policy, the interpretations they invoke of the policy initiative, how they respond to 
each other's views, how perspectives change' (Bryman, 2000: 66 & 102). 
Semi-structured interviews 
In broad terms, the principles and traits of semi-structured interviews constitute a 
hybrid of those that typify structured and unstructured interviews. For example, it 
has been emphasised that semi-structured interviews 'allow people to answer 
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more on their own terms than the structured interview permits but still provide a 
greater potential for comparability over that of the unstructured interview' (May, 
2001: 123; see Newton, 1996). Additionally, questions'are normally specified but 
the interviewer is freer to probe ( ... ) seeking both clarification and elaboration on 
the answers given' (May, 2001: 123). 
It is important to note that all three interview methods discussed above are 
necessarily confronted with the problem of reactivity. The latter is 'the reaction on 
the part of those being investigated to the investigator and his/her research 
instruments, ( ... ) the subjects' awareness creating a variety of undesirable 
consequences in that their behaviour or responses may not be indicative of their 
normal behaviour or views' (Bryman, 2000: 112). Cicourcel, criticising interviews 
for their lack of 'ecological validity', questions whether 'our instruments capture 
the daily life, conditions, opinions, values, attitudes and knowledge base of those 
we study as expressed in their natural habitat' (Cicourcel, 1982: 15). Even the 
more low-key unstructured interview remains 'an obtrusive interruption in the 
natural flow of events, the most informal interviews still conforming to a question 
and answer format'. Thus, as a result of reactivity, and despite the lack of viable 
alternatives, 'the pervasive acceptance of the interview as a legitimate tool of 
research' is always questionable (Bryman, 2000: 115). 1 take account of this 
limitation of my data collection technique in my analysis as well as in the drawing 
up of my final conclusions. 
This particular form of interview was chosen firstly because my research strategy 
was deductive and structured, as discussed above. Thus, although my 
preparations for the field did not involve the elaboration of a highly structured 
questionnaire, my interview guidelines, a copy of which can be found in Appendix 
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One, did contain a list of fixed themes and sub-themes each of which related in 
specific ways to my hypotheses, the latter having been delineated prior to 
commencing fieldwork. Incidentally, although the thematic focus of my research 
remained throughout the fieldwork process, many of the findings were 
unexpected and unforeseeable. Moreover, on several occasions, I added some 
queries to my interview guidelines in response to ideas that arose during the 
fieldwork process. 
In conjunction, one of the focuses of my research is to present the perspectives 
of asylum seekers and refugees on the dispersal policy and their (non) 
integration. Indeed, it would appear, regarding this particular topic, that there 
exists a significant research gap in terms of presenting the perspectives of the 
group under study, research focusing primarily on evaluating integration or 
dispersal-related projects or presenting the reported views of asylum seekers and 
refugees, as perceived by policy makers and service providers employed in this 
field. In order to grasp a sense of asylum seekers and refugees' standpoint 
directly, it was envisaged that it would be necessary to engage in relatively 
unstructured and informal exchanges, usually interviewing individuals on several 
occasions when time permitted. Certainly, repeat interviews can be 
advantageous to the research process, Collinson noting that they help 'establish 
greater levels of trust between the researcher and the respondents, by increasing 
the informal and personal nature of these relationships. They enable 
respondents' actions and accounts to be examined over time for consistency; 
also, it is important to maintain close ongoing contact with informants because 
over time significant changes can occur' (Collinson, 1992: 106). 
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A final reason for using semi-structured interviews in my research was that the 
core of my study consisted essentially in analysing the interconnections and 
linkages existing between the dispersal policy, integration and other intervening 
factors. The in-depth nature of the qualitative data produced by semi-structured 
interviewing greatly assists with the understanding of these complex processes. 
In practice, the degree to which the interviews undertaken were more or less 
structured or unstructured varied depending on the location of the exchange and 
the individual being interviewed. Indeed, the interviews carried out with asylum 
seekers and refugees as well as those with Kurdish community workers and 
businessmen tended overall to be more informal than those embarked upon with 
national policy makers and local service providers. This pattern perhaps ensued 
from the fact that interviews with the latter group were all undertaken at their 
place of work, during working hours and thus in a more anonymous and 
impersonal professional environment, the additional concern of divulging 
confidential information on my politically sensitive research topic seemingly 
constituting an ever-present backdrop in the mind of the interviewee. Additionally, 
the interviews with policy makers and local service providers were subject to 
tighter time constraints so necessarily they were more focused and formal. 
Furthermore, this group may have been defensive about the dispersal policy. In 
contrast, the interviews with asylum seekers and refugees were generally 
conducted during their spare time, at their own convenience, in a location of their 
choosing, most commonly in their own home or at a coffee shop, the situational 
atmosphere of the interview apparently being more conducive to friendly and 
informal discussions. The extent to which the interviews carried out were more or 
less structured or unstructured was also influenced by the personality of the 
individual interviewed and their mood as well as the rapport that developed 
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between the interviewee and myself, the more talkative, gregarious, interested, 
relaxed and comfortable s/he was, the more informal and personal the exchange. 
3.1.2 Sampling the asylum seeker and refugee population 
Probabilitv and non-probabilitv samplina 
In social research, there are two forms of sampling, probability and non- 
probability sampling. In probability samples, 'it is vital that a complete list of the 
population, a sampling frame, exists from which a sample is randomly selected, 
mathematically. (... ) Each person in the population of interest thus has an equal 
chance of being part of the sample' (May, 2001: 93). When the sampling frame is 
unknown, however, 'the researcher must use a non-probability sample' (May, 
2001: 95), a sample type where 'there is no guarantee that every element has an 
equal chance of being studied' (Burgess, 1984: 54-55). Using a non-probability 
sample means that generalisations cannot be drawn as in the way they can for 
representative random samples. 
Regarding my sample of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees, a non- 
probability sampling method was adopted because systematic statistical data 
regarding this group in Newcastle and Birmingham (the two fieldwork sites) is 
impossible to obtain. Certainly, the Home Office regularly publishes statistics on 
the number of NASS-supported asylum seekers per dispersal city, by nationality. 
However, these figures fail to include those asylum seekers who are supported, 
via the interim dispersal scheme, by local authorities. Moreover, they do not 
provide personal information regarding each individual asylum seeker supported 
by NASS, for example their addresses. Finally, Iraqi Kurds are not identified in 
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the Home Office statistics as a separate nationality group or ethnic category. 
Concerning refugees, to date, no central government agency systematically 
records any data on this set of persons. 
Non-probability samgling technigues 
There exist several forms of non-probqbility sampling methods. Firstly, there is 
quota sampling, a method often used in market research for street interviewing, 
where Ihe general characteristics of the population under study are often known 
from data obtained from, for example, the Census. The proportion of particular 
age groups or social classes is thus known beforehand and the sample will 
consequently consist of a proportionate quota of people with these 
characteristics' (May, 2001: 95). When I began my fieldwork, this type of 
information regarding Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees was publicly 
unavailable and consequently, I decided that this sampling technique would be 
unsuitable for my study. Nevertheless, in 2004, a Home Office skills' audit of 
refugees was published (Kirk, 2004) and this report contains valuable information 
regarding the personal characteristics of a probability sample of Iraqis. Reference 
to this study will be made in more detail when evaluating the representativeness 
of my own sample. 
There is another non-probability technique called purposive sampling, a method 
generally employed in political polling, where 'a selection of those to be surveyed 
is made according to a known characteristic' (May, 2001: 95). This approach is 
also inappropriate for my study because one of the aims of my research was to 
interview as varied a group of individuals as possible. Surveying a set of 
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individuals because they possess one or two known characteristics would fail to 
capture the variety of perspectives I wished to collect. 
Finally, there is snowball sampling, the technique chosen for this study, which is 
customarily used 'when a population is widely distributed or elusive' (May, 2001: 
95). This method 'involves using a small group of informants who are asked to 
put the researcher in touch with their friends who are subsequently interviewed, 
then asking them about their friends and interviewing them until a chain of 
informants has been selected' (Burgess, 1984: 55). Importantly, unlike the other 
non-probability sampling techniques, this stance does not require any prior 
systematic knowledge of the group under study. Snowball sampling has already 
been used for research on refugees (Gammel et al, 1993; Carey-Wood et al, 
1995; Wahlbeck, 1999; Griffiths, 2002), a group 'whose members are hard to 
locate and are therefore hard to identify for the purpose of sampling' (Bloch, 
1999a: 371; Sudman and Kalton, 1986). 
The advantage of using snowball sampling as a method of selecting the asylum 
seekers and refugees to be interviewed in my research is the built-in 'security' 
feature of this approach, namely the fact that 'intermediaries are known to 
potential respondents and trusted by them and thus are able to vouch for the 
researcher's bona fidee (Lee, 1992: 130). One of the principal disadvantages, 
however, of this technique is its inclination to produce a relatively uniform sample, 
the networks of contacts that underpin the procedure lending to turn in upon 
themselves and be homogeneous in their attributes rather than providing 
linkages to others whose social characteristics are different' (Lee, 1992: 132; 
Granovetter, 1973). In an effort to remedy this weakness,, I have used 'as wide a 
variety of starting points as possible to ensure an extensive coverage of the study 
98 
population' (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981 in Lee, 1992: 133). In addition, it is 
important to note that the success of snowball sampling heavily relies upon well- 
developed patterns of social organization (Lee, 1992: 129). Indeed, 'despite its 
name, snowball sampling does not inevitably lead to an inexorably growing mass 
of contacts but rather ( ... ) to a slow and uneven accretion of additional data 
points'(Lee, 1992: 128-129). 
In conjunction with this approach, in order to facilitate the development of a 
heterogeneous and representative sample, judgment sampling was incorporated 
into my research standpoint. In this instance, 'informants are selected for study 
according to a number of criteria established by the researcher' (Burgess, 1984: 
55). In this piece of research, the following criteria were identified: gender, age, 
marital status, educational level, occupation in home-country, rural / urban origin, 
immigration status, length of residence in the UK, familiarity with the English 
language and society prior to arrival in the UK and pre-arrival presence / absence 
of network of relatives or friends in the UK. I was also compelled to exercise 
opportunistic sampling, 'the process whereby field researchers find informants 
who provide them with their data, the researcher selecting individuals with whom 
it is possible to cooperate' (Burgess, 1984: 55; Honigmann, 1982). 
Snowball samolinq in practice 
The process of developing my network of contacts amongst the Iraqi Kurdish 
community began by approaching, in Newcastle, my first fieldwork city, the main 
organizations working with, for and alongside this particular group, asking them to 
introduce me to their Iraqi Kurdish colleagues or acquaintances. In this way, I met 
an Iraqi Kurd working for the One Stop Shop in the North East who in turn 
99 
presented me to three of his friends, the latter, at a later stage, introducing me to 
their own friends, some of whom were living in Birmingham. I also met, via the 
One Stop Shop, a couple of Iraqi Kurds who had been significantly involved in 
trying to set up a Kurdish association in Newcastle. As in the preceding case, 
these individuals eventually introduced me to their own friends and 
acquaintances in Newcastle. Additionally, I made contact with the director of the 
North East Iraqi Community Association, based in Middlesborough, who was 
equally able to introduce me to his Iraqi Kurdish acquaintances in Newcastle. 
Finally, I relied on the support of an Iraqi Kurdish friend I had initially worked with 
in Iraqi Kurdistan, who, at the time of my fieldwork, was residing in the North 
East. He put me in contact with several of his acquaintances in Newcastle and 
Birmingham. I repeated the same strategy in Birmingham, approaching the main 
refugee agencies and organizations, meeting their Iraqi Kurdish employees and 
asking them to introduce me to their friends and acquaintances. Furthermore, I 
spoke to members of the Iraqi Kurdish Community of the West Midlands, based 
in Birmingham, and developed a further network of contacts thanks to their 
support and assistance. In Birmingham, I also contacted the Iraqi Kurds that had 
been recommended to me by those I interviewed in Newcastle. 
I endeavored throughout the fieldwork process to interview a heterogeneous 
group of individuals, asking the Iraqi Kurds I knew to introduce me to persons 
possessing specific characteristics that were not as yet represented in my 
existing sample. Despite successfully developing a broad network of contacts, 
finding Iraqi Kurds who were prepared to be interviewed, who possessed 
sufficient time as well as a good level of English was challenging and 
consequently sample variety had to be sacrificed, occasionally, for opportunism. 
The close ties existing between some members of the Iraqi Kurdish community 
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throughout the UK significantly facilitated the functioning of the snowball sampling 
technique in my research. 
Characteristics of mv sample of Iraai Kurds 
I undertook 38 tape-recorded semi-structured interviews with asylum seekers and 
refugees in Newcastle and Birmingham between October 2003 and January 
2004, spending two months in each city. 
Regarding the personal characteristics of this sample, 79% (30) were men and 
the remaining 21% (8) were women (Table 3.1). Concerning individuals aged 
below 18, it is important to note that I decided, before beginning my fieldwork, to 
focus only on accompanied minors because unaccompanied minors are not 
actually subjected to the dispersal policy as asylum seekers. In my sample, 45% 
(17) of those interviewed were aged, at the time of the interview, between 20 and 
29 years old and 42% (16) were aged between 30 and 39 years old. A propos 
marital status, 66% (25) were unmarried or widowed and 34% (13) were married. 
Amongst the 13 interviewees who were married, 70% (9) were residing in the UK 
with their spouse whilst for 30% (4), their spouse was living outside of the UK. 
Vis-&-vis the educational level of the individuals in my sample, 14 of the 38 failed 
to inform me of their educational level. Of the remaining 24 Iraqi Kurds, 58% (14) 
undertook 14 or more years of education, 38% (9) undertook between 7 and 13 
years of education and 4% (1) undertook six years or less of education in their 
home-country. 
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of my sample of Iraqi Kurds 
Personal 
characteristic 
Category Number Percentage 
Gender Male 30 79 
Female 8 21 
Age (years) 20-29 17 45 
30-39 16 42 
40-49 5 13 
Marital status Unmarried or widowed 25 66 
Married 13 34 
Of those married Residing in UK with spouse 9 70 
Spouse living outside UK 4 30 
Education (years) 6 or less 1 4 
7 to 13 9 38 
14 or more 14 58 
Profession in Professional occupations 13 36 
home country Owned or managed private businesses or involved 10 28 
in import/ export trade 
Skilled tradesmen 6 17 
Other 7 19 
Level of spoken Good 20 53 
English 
Medium 8 21 
Poor 10 26 
Immigration status Asylum seeker 17 45 
Refugee 21 55 
Length of asylum 6 months or less 5 14 
application 
process at time of 7 months to 2 years 10 28 
interview 2 years 1 month to 3 years 7 21 
3 years 1 month to 4 years 8 23 
4 years I month to 5 years 5 14 
Residential Chosen by government via dispersal 26 68 
location in UK 
Chosen by asylum seeker 10 32 
Of those Via ad hoc dispersal 6 23 
dispersed 
Via interim measures or NASS 20 77 
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On the subject of occupation in their home-country, two of the 38 Iraq! Kurds 
interviewed were full-time students. Out of the remaining 36,36% (13) possessed 
professional occupations (e. g.: accountant, doctor, journalist, barrister, teacher, 
social worker, lecturer); 28% (10) owned or managed private businesses or were 
involved in import/export trading; 17% (6) exercised a skilled trade (e. g.: barber, 
carpenter, electrician, farmer, mechanic, shoemaker); and 19% (7) worked in the 
administrative and secretarial field, sales, retail and customer service, the military 
and the arts or -possessed elementary occupations. On the topic of English 
language proficiency, 53% (20) had a good level, 21% (8) possessed a medium 
level and 26% (10) had a poor level of English. 
Moreover, at the time of the interview, 55% (21) of my sample of Iraqi Kurds were 
refugees, the remaining 45% (17) being asylum seekers. Regarding the duration 
of the asylum application process, at the time of being interviewed for this piece 
of research, three did not provide sufficient information. Out of the remaining 35, 
14% (5) waited six months or less, 28% (10) waited between seven months and 
two years, 21% (7) waited between two years one month and three years, 23% 
(8) waited between three years one month and four years and 14% (5) waited 
between four years one month and five years. Out of 38 Iraqi Kurds interviewed 
for this research, 68% (26) had directly experienced dispersal, 23% (6) being 
dispersed via the ad hoc dispersal arrangements and 77% (20) via the interim or 
NASS dispersal scheme. There was insufficient data for two interviewees. The 
remaining 32% (10) Iraqi Kurds interviewed either chose to forsake state-funded 
housing thereby residing in the homes of relatives or friends or opted to migrate 
voluntarily to a dispersal locality, primarily Birmingham. 
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In sum, my sample of Iraqi Kurds consisted, in its majority, of relatively young 
(87% aged between 20 and 39 years old), unmarried or widowed (66%), refugee 
(55%), males (79%). Moreover, in the main (58%), this group had at least 
completed secondary school and exercised a professional occupation, 
possessed a managerial position or worked in the field of export/import trading in 
their home-country (64%). Generally, they possessed a good level of English 
language proficiency (53%). Customarily, their application for asylum lasted, at 
the time of the interview undertaken for this research, between seven months and 
four years (77%). Further information regarding my sample can be found in 
Appendix Two. 
The representativenes of a research sample is of concern to the quantitative and 
qualitative researcher alike. Indeed, the extent to which a sample is typical of the 
wider population enhances or decreases the generalisability of the study's 
findings. With this in mind, an assessment of the representativeness of my own 
sample in this study is presented below. Unfortunately, given the lack of 
systematic, national statistical data regarding Iraqi Kurds or even Iraqis, it is 
difficult to evaluate the representativeness of my sample. The only apparently 
relevant information is that provided by Heath, Jeffries and Lloyd (2003) and Kirk 
(2004). Incidentally, the degree to which the experiences of Iraqi Kurds are 
representative of the experiences of other asylum seekers and refugees currently, 
residing in the UK is discussed elsewhere, within the context of a broader 
analysis of case study research. 
Regarding gender, the only approximately comparable national statistical data 
available is by Heath, Jeffries and Lloyd (2003) and concerns the total number, 
including dependents, of asylum applications made by Iraqis in 2002, the latter 
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being the earliest date for which this type of information is available. This data 
reflects that the proportion of male applicants (93%) significantly exceeds that of 
female applicants (7%). One may affirm from this comparison that my sample is, 
at least, broadly representative of the imbalance that exists in the Iraqi gender 
ratio amongst the current asylum seeker and refugee population in the UK. 
As far as educational levels are concerned, it is insightful to refer to a skills audit 
of refugees in the UK undertaken by Kirk (2004). Kirk's (2004) sample data 
relating to the number of years of education possessed by male and female Iraqi 
refugees reveals that 26% had received no education at all, 35% had received 
six years or less, 24% had acquired between seven and twelve years, 8% 
achieved between 13 and 15 years and another 8% attained 16 or more years. 
One may assert, from this comparison, that my sample is overly weighted 
towards the more educated portion of the group under study. 
Concerning occupation, Kirk's (2004) research is equally useful, particularly her 
data on the occupations of those Iraqis who were working prior to coming to the 
UK, which shows that 32% of her sample were employed in skilled trades, 24% 
as managers and senior officials, 10% in elementary occupations, 9% in sales 
and customer services and 7% in professional occupations. One can conclude, 
from this review, that my sample seemingly represents, excessively, the more 
qualified section of the Iraqi Kurdish asylum seeker and refugee population. 
Unfortunately, there is no way of identifying the representativeness of the 
proportion of married and unmarried individuals as well as the share of refugees 
and asylum seekers in my sample since there is no publicly available data for the 
Iraqi Kurdish population as a whole regarding both these topics. 
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Several factors possibly contributed to my sample of Iraqi Kurds apparently 
representing an older age distribution and a more well-educated and more 
professional set of individuals than the average of the current Iraqi asylum seeker 
and refugee population in the UK, as reflected in Heath, Jeffries and Lloyd (2003) 
and Kirk's (2004) research. Firstly, it is possible that the initial contacts I made, in 
the early stages of my fieldwork in both Newcastle and Birmingham, with well- 
educated Iraqi Kurdish 30-39 year old professionals working in the main refugee 
organizations, led the remainder of my sample group, through the process of 
snowballing, to be somewhat over-dominated by these traits. Indeed, as 
remarked upon earlier, snowball sampling can, at times, produce a relatively 
homogeneous sample 'rather than providing linkages to others whose social 
characteristics are different' (Lee, 1992: 132; Granovetter, 1973). Secondly, since 
I opted not to use an interpreter, I was heavily reliant throughout my fieldwork 
upon Iraqi Kurds who possessed a good level of English language fluency. 
Importantly, it would appear that there exists significant links between age, level 
of education, occupation in the home-country and level of English language 
proficiency in the host-country. Certainly, those Iraqis currently between 30 and 
39 years of age and above seem to be better educated than those aged between 
20 and 29 years old, given the seemingly superior educational opportunities 
available to all in Iraq during the former group's childhood and adolescence. 
Since English is taught at school in Iraq, the better the education people receive 
and the longer they remain in education, the greater their proficiency is in English 
on leaving Iraq and the quicker they will improve their standard of English in the 
UK. Finally, a precondition to exercising a professional occupation is necessarily 
to have been in education for many years and as it has already been noted, the 
greater the latter, the better an individual's knowledge of English is likely to be. 
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It is very difficult to assess the degree to which my sample of Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees is representative of the total population of the 
group under study. Nevertheless, in comparison with Heath, Jeffries and Lloyd 
(2003) and Kirk (2004), it would appear that my sample overly represents the 
perspectives and views of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees who are 30 
years old and above, well educated and who in their home-country exercised a 
professional occupation. It is also probable that my sample contains an over 
representation of good English speakers. Finally, it is very likely that those most 
willing to be interviewed were those who had successfully negotiated the UK's 
asylum system. These findings, regarding the typicality of my sample, are 
unsurprising given that the snowball sampling technique is a non-probability 
sample method where initial and ensuing contacts with members of the study 
group are largely accidental. 
The size of my sample, 38 Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees, was partly 
guided by Glaser and Strauss' (1967) principles of 'theoretical sampling'. Indeed, 
they maintain that 'the researcher only interviews as many people as are needed 
in order to "saturate" the categories being developed and then turns to the next 
theoretical issue and carries out the same process over again' (Bryman, 2000: 
117). It felt, during the fieldwork process, that I went beyond Glaser and Strauss' 
(1967) 'saturation' point, the data from my later interviews in the two cities under 
study largely containing information that had already been collected and gleaned 
from previous, earlier interviews. The repetition of ideas and perspectives in the 
interviews definitely strengthens the conviction I possess concerning the 
conclusions of my findings. My relatively large sample size is also the product of 
using the interviews as a semi-formal means of developing and broadening my 
network of Iraqi Kurdish contacts, the chances of encountering an individual, via 
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the person interviewed, whose main traits were distinctive from other members of 
my sample increasing the more extensive my group of contacts became. 
Undoubtedly, the decision to interview a comparatively large number of Iraqi 
Kurds somewhat compromised the depth of the personal relationship with each 
individual. However, as a young, single female researching a predominantly 
young, single' male group, I remained aware of the ambiguous signals I might 
project if I were to develop closer friendships with those under study and 
consequently, I opted for a less profoundly personalised approach in my 
fieldwork. I attempted, in any case, to meet each interviewee two to three times, 
whenever time permitted. 
It is important to stress that the majority of my sample were refugees because 
they were the group with whom it was easiest to communicate in English, given 
their greater length of residence in the UK. Refugees were also more confident 
participating in the research than asylum seekers since the former possess a 
greater degree of stability in their lives and therefore are more likely to trust a 
host-community member. The refugees in my sample were a great asset to the 
research because they were able to reflect on their past experiences as asylum 
seekers as well as discuss the changes that had occurred in their lives since 
becoming a refugee. 
8 In this thesis, those referred to as single are men or women who are unmarried, widowed or 
married but without their spouse residing with them in the UK. 
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3.1.3 Interviewing national policy makers, local service providers, Kurdish 
community workers and Kurdish businessmen 
Four national agencies, two London boroughs and one local voluntary sector 
organisation, based in London, as well as fifteen local organisations, based in 
Newcastle and Birmingham also participated in this piece of research, members 
of these entities being interviewed using a semi-structured approach. Six Kurdish 
community associations and restaurants were also approached in London and 
Birmingham. As discussed in chapter four, there is a very small Kurdish 
restaurant in Newcastle as well as a Kurdish community association. The latter, 
however, has a small membership, no premises and is largely inactive. Thus, in 
total, I approached twenty-eight organisations, in Newcastle, Birmingham and 
London, between October 2003 and March 2004, and undertook 36 tape- 
recorded semi-structured interviews with members of these agencies. 
Three high-ranking officials from NASS, the Home Office's Integration Unit and 
the Local Government Association (LGA) were interviewed because of their 
organisation's crucial role in formulating and implementing dispersal and 
integration policy. These individuals provided the researcher with an invaluable 
official, and at times self-critical, national perspective on the government's NASS 
and interim dispersal programme as well as its emerging refugee integration 
scheme. The head of policy as well as a community officer at the Refugee 
Council's head office in London were also interviewed in order to obtain a 
national perspective on asylum seeker dispersal and refugee integration, albeit 
from a more voluntary sector, community-based stance. Two lead housing 
officers in two London boroughs and one lead provider of a NASS-funded 
emergency accommodation service for asylum seekers, offered by a voluntary 
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sector organisation based in the capital, were interviewed. These organisations 
were approached because of their first-hand experience of the circumstances 
and events leading up to the government's introduction of the national dispersal 
programme. 
In the dispersal localities, a variety of agencies assist asylum seekers and 
refugees throughout all the stages of their asylum application and dispersal 
process. Fifteen local organisations in Newcastle and Birmingham, corresponding 
to the principle agencies servicing the needs of this group in these two case- 
study cities, were selected to be involved in this piece of research. It was 
important to collate the knowledge and views of these organisations, their local 
perspectives being markedly different to those of the Iraqi Kurds. Indeed, the 
latter present the standpoint of those directly experiencing the dispersal policy 
and the process of integration whilst the former portray the point of view of those 
trying to locally implement the dispersal policy and/or assist those subjected to it 
as well as foment the integration process. An additional benefit in interviewing 
members of organisations, as well as asylum seekers and refugees, is that both 
groups possess different spheres of knowledge. Indeed, discussions with 
members of the agencies enhance the researcher's understanding of the national 
and local formulation and implementation of the dispersal policy whilst 
conversations with the Iraqi Kurds can improve the researcher's appreciation of 
the importance of accessing local co-ethnic social bonds, for instance. On the 
occasions when the spheres of knowledge of both groups overlap, there are 
opportunities to triangulate the various findings (Bryman, 2000: 48). 
Thus, four long-standing members of staff at the North East Refugee Service 
(NERS), in Newcastle, and one at the Refugee Council, in Birmingham, were 
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interviewed, these two organisations encountering asylum seekers on a daily 
basis as part of their provision of the NASS-funded One Stop Service. Five lead 
housing officers at the Asylum Units in Newcastle's and Birmingham's City 
Council were also interviewed, these two agencies offering public sector NASS- 
contracted housing to dispersed asylum seekers. In addition, in the case study 
dispersal areas, a community services refugee advisor from a housing 
association and the manager of a privately-run housing company were 
interviewed. Both these organisations provide NASS-contracted accommodation 
to dispersed asylum seekers and are therefore frequently in contact with this 
client group. Moreover, four lead advisors were interviewed from three voluntary 
sector organisations that specialise in supporting asylum seekers and refugees in 
Newcastle and Birmingham. A further two asylum seeker caseworkers based at 
more generalist voluntary sector agencies were also interviewed. The opportunity 
arose, in the North East, to meet a Diversity Officer, based at one of the city 
councils, who possessed extensive experience of the current race relations 
situation in Newcastle. Thanks to this opportunity, the researcher developed her 
appreciation of the community cohesion issues surrounding asylum seeker 
dispersal and refugee integration in Newcastle. The challenges encountered by 
asylum seekers and refugees when seeking employment were explored during 
interviews with two advisors and one economic strategist based at Connexions, 
at an ESOL provider institute, and a Regional Development Agency respectively, 
in Newcastle and Birmingham. These organisations are seeking to remove 
asylum seeker and refugee barriers to work. 
Finally, four lead managers or caseworkers of four Kurdish charitable community 
organisations based in Birmingham and London were interviewed as well as the 
owners of two privately-run Kurdish restaurants in Birmingham. The semi- 
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structured interviews undertaken with this group of individuals were very 
informative and interesting, their perspective on dispersal and integration being 
different to that of the local service providers and the dispersed Iraqi Kurds. 
Certainly, they were very deeply involved in the specific circumstances of Iraqi 
Kurds. Moreover, the Kurdish community workers and businessmen, unlike the 
dispersed Iraqi Kurds, were able to locate the personal experiences of their co- 
ethnics within the broader framework of national governmental policy. 
3.1.4 A case study: Iraq! Kurds 
The difficulty of studying the experiences of all asylum seekers and refugees, 
given the national, ethnic and socio-economic heterogeneity of this group 
encouraged me to adopt a case study approach where I focused my research 
upon one set of individuals, namely Kurds from Iraq. I chose this group because 
of my existing knowledge of Kurdistan and Iraq, since I worked as a research 
officer on a DfID-funded project in Iraqi Kurdistan (1999-2000). 1 envisaged that 
having directly witnessed the lives of members of this group as well as 
encountered their cultural and religious mores in their home-country this would 
facilitate my understanding of their experiences in the UK. Moreover, I considered 
that my familiarity with Kurdistan and Iraq would assist the development of a 
personal rapport between the Iraqi Kurdish interviewees and myself during the 
fieldwork process. Finally, keeping in mind that the profile of migrant groups is 
constantly changing, Iraqis, a proportion of whom are Kurds, currently constitute 
a significant share of the total population of asylum seekers and refugees in the 
UK and thus, I judged that a study focusing on Iraqi Kurds would be valuable for 
policyrnakers and academic researchers alike. Certainly, according to Home 
Office asylum statistics (Heath, Jeffries and Lloyd, 2003), 17% of all asylum 
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applications lodged in 2002, excluding dependents, were made by Iraqis, the 
largest nationality group that year. 
3.1.5 Comparative research 
Benefits of comparisons 
I have undertaken comparative research in this study, contrasting the 
experiences of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees residing in Newcastle 
and Birmingham. Prior to discussing my choice of fieldwork cities, I first wish to 
briefly delineate the principal reasons for adopting a comparative approach. 
Firstly, comparative research enables the researcher to potentially challenge 
'background assumptions' through the production of findings located in different 
socio-economic contexts (Gouldner, 1971 in May, 2001: 208). Moreover, 
comparisons can be used to elucidate differences, show the uniqueness or 
similarity of phenomena as well as reveal what is universal (Scheuch, 1990 in 
May, 2001: 209). In a similar vein, May (2001: 209) notes that 'comparisons 
enable us to consider the macro factors which influence social and political 
change and the micro factors peculiar to each social setting'. Finally, Burgess 
(1984: 181) affirms that comparisons can be used for theory testing. Certainly, as 
will be illustrated below, the comparative aspect of my research plays a vital role 
in the testing of my hypotheses. 
Choice of fieldwork cities 
Regarding my fieldwork sites, I chose two dispersal cities that presented 
contrasting traits and characteristics in all four main domains of integration 
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chosen for this study, namely housing, employment, social bridges and social 
bonds, in order to assist the process of testing my hypotheses. Moreover, I 
sought localities that were typical of a certain cluster of characteristics (Woods, 
1979: 268 in Bryman, 2000: 90) in order that 'other researchers can then 
examine comparable cases which belong to other clusters of characteristics' 
(Kennedy, 1979 in Bryman, 2000: 90). Thus, I opted for Newcastle which 
possesses a large amount of vacant dwellings, particularly in the social rented 
sector and relatively limited employment opportunities. Newcastle also has a 
small community of recently arrived Iraqi Kurds and host-society members that 
are generally unaccustomed to residing alongside Black and Minority Ethnic 
groups and refugee communities. I also chose Birmingham which, in contrast, is 
typified by a comparatively small proportion of empty housing and a greater 
degree of work prospects. Birmingham also has a large group of newly settled 
Iraqi Kurds as well as host-society members that are accustomed to living in a 
multicultural environment. 
Importantly, this piece of research does not seek to analyse the divergences that 
exist between Iraqi Kurds' experiences of integration in the dispersal localities 
and their integration circumstances in non-dispersal areas. Instead, the focus of 
this study is to explore in depth the significantly different integration experiences 
encountered by Iraqi Kurds in their respective dispersal localities. This particular 
focus justifies the reason for only choosing dispersal areas as fieldwork sites and 
also explains the absence of a 'control' sample of non-dispersed Iraqi Kurds 
residing in London, for instance. Moreover, as is argued in the following chapters, 
it is very possible that a relatively high proportion of asylum seekers and refugees 
will be permanently residing outside of their traditional areas of settlement. 
Consequently, there is a priority need to build a strong knowledge base 
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surrounding integration for this group in their new settlement localities (see also 
Castles et al, 2002: 158). As part of this endeavour, studies such as this thesis 
can be compared to the large amount of existing research on refugee settlement 
in traditional residential localities such as London and other parts of the South 
East of England. 
3.2 Data analysis and presentation 
The data analysis process began as the researcher wrote reflective notes during 
and after the fieldwork on the emerging themes relevant to the hypotheses. On 
completion of the fieldwork, the 74 taped semi-structured interviews were 
transcribed, producing approximately 740 pages of text. An Access database 
containing the Iraqi Kurds' socio-economic profiles was also created (see 
Appendix Two). This database was subsequently used as a reference tool to 
support the analysis of the interview transcripts. Nvivo software was used to 
ensure the systematic review of the references made in the interview transcripts 
to dispersal, employment, housing, social bonds and social bridges, the five 
dominant themes of the thesis. The range of circumstances and perspectives that 
emerged from the Nvivo searches were then summarised. Similar standpoints 
were grouped together and the most informative and representative quotes were 
identified. The writing-up stage constituted a dynamic extension of the data 
analysis process, the theories continuing to evolve, during the writing. 
All the names of the Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees interviewed for 
this piece of research have been changed. However, the degree of anonymity 
offered to the policy makers, local service providers, Kurdish community workers 
and Kurdish businessmen who participated in this study varies depending on 
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their personal preferences. The names of those interviewed have been removed 
although, on some occasions, the work posts and the organisations to which they 
belong are specified (see Appendix Three for further information). Citations from 
the interview transcripts appear in the text of this thesis followed by the number of 
the paragraph in the transcript where the citation originates. 
3.3 The effect of the researcher on their own research 
The personal traits of the researcher, that is their age, gender, ethnic origin and 
personality, as well as their point of view on the subject under study all exercise 
an important influence on the varied components of their research, namely the 
data collection process (interviewing and sampling), data analysis and the 
interpretations of the subjects' standpoint (Bryman, 2000: 74) and finally, the 
overall conclusions of the study (May, 2001: 137; Redfield, 1955: 126 in Bryman, 
2000: 75). Indeed, as Scott (1990) maintains, it is impossible for the researcher to 
separate himself as an individual Wth a particular personality and life experience 
situated within a specific time-space context, from himself/herself as a 
supposedly neutral, detached researcher. Indeed, 'one frame of meaning can 
only ever be understood from the standpoint of another. There can be no 
presuppositionless knowledge' (Scott, 1990: 31). With this in mind, it would seem 
beneficial, for the readers of this thesis, to clearly present my view of the effect I 
am likely to have had on my own research. 
In this particular study, it would appear that my gender exercised an impact on 
the interview exchanges. Certainly, I feel that the intimacy of the relationship 
between the interviewees and myself could have been more developed had the 
subjects been, in their majority, women or at least married men accompanied by 
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their wives. Instead, most of the interviewees, out of opportunism rather than my 
personal choosing or preference, and because of their percentage in the total 
Kurdish population, were single men and during the interview process, I 
occasionally felt uncomfortable, aware, at varying times to varying degrees, of 
how those being interviewed might wrongly interpret my interest in their personal 
circumstances. Despite my unease, commonly, the single men I interviewed were 
respectful, treating me, it seemed, more like a sister than a potential girlfriend. 
Additionally, I maintain that asylum seekers and refugees often are active agents 
who are able in creative and surprising ways to modify the constraints they are 
under to their own advantage rather than always being victims of circumstances 
beyond their control, a portrayal that is often presented particularly by some 
voluntary sector organisations working in this field. Finally, I am aware that 
researchers 'are engaged in interpretations of other people's interpretations' 
(Geertz, 1973 in Bryman, 2000: 79). Thus, presenting the perspectives of Iraqi 
Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees on the dispersal policy and integration 
effectively involves the amalgamated portrayal of the way in which the group 
under study views this subject, my interpretation of how they view this topic as 
well as my construction of their interpretation for the academic and social policy 
community (Wagner, 1981: 3 in Bryman, 2000: 80). 1 have endeavoured to 
analyse my interview data keeping these specific concerns in mind. 
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3.4 Ethical considerations 
3.4.1 Interviewing asylum seekers and refugees 
ý12 Semi-structured interviews and the researcher-Qarticii)ant relatioaah 
The use of semi-structured interviews, and the researcher's subsequent 
4nearness' or 'closeness' to the subject of study, can place the researcher in an 
awkward position. Indeed, personal relationships are likely to develop between 
the researcher and the researched. However these human relationships are not 
normal ones, they are entered into for a very specific purpose, the collection of 
data. Furthermore, the researcher is un-naturally powerful, firstly, because she 
can choose when to withdraw from the participant's 'world' and terminate the 
relationship and secondly, because it is likely for the participant to divulge more 
personal information than the researcher, given the initial purpose of the 
relationship. Unavoidably, the dividing line between 'professional' relationship 
and friendship often becomes blurred as the researcher is forced to choose 
whether she will discuss her personal life with the participant. If a friendship does 
develop, if the exchange becomes more equal, another dilemma appears: to 
what extent does continuing the research constitute an exploitation of that 
friendship? The British Sociological Association (BSA) offers a possible solution 
by stating that research relationships should be based upon, above all, mutual 
trust and respect (BSA, 1992: 704), emotions I have tried to encourage 
throughout the fieldwork process. 
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Individual riclhts and freeiv aiven informed consent 
The BSA states that any research participant has several clearly defined rights. 
Firstly, s/he has the right to refuse to participate and be excluded from the final 
product of the research, at any point before, during or even following completion 
of the fieldwork. Indeed, a person's agreement to participate does not constitute 
a once-and-for-all consent. Secondly, s/he can demand that the researcher 
ensures the anonymity of those involved in the research. Thirdly, s/he also has 
the right to affirm that confidentiality must be respected and any sharing of the 
data must be previously discussed with the participants. Under the Data 
Protection Act, the researcher is obliged to use pseudonyms and remove any 
information, which might identify individuals (BSA, 1992: 707). Furthermore, a 
research participant has the right to give his/her individual informed consent to 
participate in the research. Indeed, care must be taken that the 'gatekeeper' does 
not abuse his/her power and coerce people into participating in the research 
(BSA, 1992: 704). Finally, given the researcher's experience and understanding 
of the broader environment she works in, the investigator must be responsible for 
'considering the effects of someone's involvement and the consequences of their 
work or its misuse for those they study and other interested parties' (BSA, 1992: 
705). Anticipated problems should be shared with potential participants. The 
ethical dilemma arises when the researcher desperately requires the co- 
operation of participants in order for her study to be realised, in which case, 
despite good intentions, she is likely to bend the rules to her advantage. 
Furthermore, one cannot ignore the existence of a hierarchy of consent. Indeed, 
a subordinate refusing to co-operate with a researcher risks angering his/her 
superior and can thus be coerced into participating (Dingwall, 1980: 878). 
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Awareness of these issues is important and the researcher must endeavour to 
create opportunities for individuals to freely decline or consent to participate in 
their research. Finally, consent must be informed by ensuring that the participants 
understand the purposes of the research (Bulmer, 1980: 60). Issues raised in this 
section were respected and no related problems occurred during the research 
process. 
Causinci 'unnecessarv anxietv' (BSA, 1992: 705) 
Interviewing asylum seekers and refugees can be very problematic. Firstly, it is 
probable that they have already been submitted to numerous interviews by home 
and host-country governmental officials and these exchanges might have been 
accompanied with physical, emotional or psychological abuse. It is important, as 
a researcher, to be aware that the seemingly innocuous setting of an interview 
might conjure up distasteful past experiences for the interviewee. Whilst the 
questions I asked in the semi-structured interviews did not refer to the possibly 
traumatic experiences of the group under study in their host-countries, the 
subjects discussed were potentially depressing for the interviewee. For this 
reason, I made every effort to ensure that the interviewee's emotional state at the 
end of the interview was at least the same as before the interview began. It is 
important to note that the lack of an answer to a question or an unwillingness to 
expand on a particular issue is not necessarily a sign of indifference, disinterest 
or lack of knowledge o. r understanding on behalf of the interviewee. Instead, it 
might be the result of fear, suffering or unfamiliarity with voicing thoughts on 
particular subjects, especially if the language of communication during the 
interview is not the mother tongue of the interviewee. Finally, the researcher must 
act sensitively when asking individuals to take part in her research, remembering 
120 
that they might feel obliged or forced to participate, out of politeness or fear that 
their asylum application might suffer negative consequences if they do not show 
willingness to co-operate. All the points broached in this section were 
incorporated into the fieldwork process and respected by the researcher. 
Creatinci 'false hopes' (BSA, 1992: 705)? 
The researcher must be sensitive not to create unrealistic expectations amongst 
those being interviewed. For this reason, the researcher is responsible for clearly 
presenting her motives for undertaking the interview, informing the interviewee of 
the potential impact or non-impact of the research on themselves and on the lives 
of other asylum seekers and refugees and explaining that the impact of research 
on society's institutions and people is neither assured nor immediate. It is 
important to reflect upon who is really helping whom during the research process, 
whether it is the researched or the researcher, and the extent to which the parties 
involved are aware of and comfortable with this. I made sure that these concerns 
were integrated into my fieldwork design. 
3.4.2 Undertaking research on an emotionally charged and sensitive topic 
According to the BSA's statement of ethical practice, a researcher is faced with 
two conflicting responsibilities. On the one hand, she is responsible for protecting 
the interests of those involved in or those affected by the study she is 
undertaking. On the other hand, the researcher is responsible for 'accurately' and 
'truthfully' presenting her research findings (BSA, 1992: 703). The conflict arises 
when the publishing of research results has adverse effects on those studied, the 
problem potentially being all the more severe when the topic is emotionally 
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charged and sensitive. Indeed, how does the researcher decide what data to 
consider and what information to disregard, especially when the most interesting 
material is that which the participants are reluctant for the researcher to publish? 
The BSA's response to this dilemma is for the researcher to recall that the goal of 
social science research, like that of any other science, is to improve knowledge 
but that goal in itself does not enable the researcher to override the rights of 
others (BSA, 1992: 704). The study I have undertaken has incorporated these 
concerns into its research design and the research process. 
The following chapter, the first of four that focus on the research findings, 
appraises the short and long term impact of the dispersal policy on Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees' participation in local, co-ethnic social bonding. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IMPACT OF THE DISPERSAL POLICY ON THE CO-ETHNIC SOCIAL BONDS 
OF IRAQI KURDISH ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES 
In this chapter, the impact of the dispersal policy on Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
and refugees' participation in co-ethnic social bonding is analysed. Social bonds 
constitute one of the four aspects of the integration process focused upon in this 
thesis. They are 'connections within a community defined by, for example, ethnic, 
national or religious identity'. My study of Iraqi Kurds focuses upon co-ethnic 
social bonds, rather than co-national or co-religious social bonds, given the 
apparent unifying effect, for this group, of the former over the latter. Importantly, 
developing social bonds does not lead, on its own, to integration into the wider 
society. It is also necessary for an individual to engage, amongst other things, in 
social bridging as well as access adequate employment and suitable housing 
(Ager and Strang, 2004a). 
In this chapter, the following hypothesis is tested: the contemporary UK dispersal 
policy exercises a negative impact on the social bonds of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees because this policy sends this group to localities 
were there are no settled co-ethnics. In order to proceed with the assessment of 
the validity of this claim, the benefits expressed by the Iraqi Kurdish asylum 
seekers and refugees interviewed regarding social bond development are 
presented. Following this, the reasons why Iraqi Kurds bond based on ethnicity 
rather than nationality or religion are discussed. Next, explanations are given for 
focusing on the impact of the dispersal policy on the integration of dispersed 
asylum seekers rather than on asylum seekers in general. The impact of the 
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dispersal policy on firstly, the local co-ethnic social bonds of dispersed asylum 
seekers and secondly on those of dispersed refugees is then explored. These 
two groups have been examined successively rather than together because the 
relationship of dispersed Iraqi Kurds to the dispersal policy changes both 
significantly and abruptly on receipt of their refugee status, those possessing the 
latter status being far less constrained by the policy than those who are asylum 
seekers. This distinction has also enabled me to consider on the asylum seeker 
side, the short term impact and on the refugee side, the long term effect of the 
dispersal policy. 
4.1 The value of social bonds 
Social bonds are highly valuable to the successful dispersal of asylum seekers 
and refugees. For instance, research on the dispersal of refugees to Glasgow 
recommends that Te-housing should take place with the establishment of viable 
informal support networks among refugees' (MacFarland, 1994: 22). Similarly, 
the non-governmental organisations on the government's consultative 
'Stakeholders' Group' advocate that the development of co-ethnic communities, 
in other words, social bonds, is crucial to successful dispersal and settlement 
(Asylum Rights Campaign, 1999: 24; see also Stg Deb Co, Immigration and 
Asylum Bill, 16 th March 1999). Moreover, an asylum seeker or refugee is heading 
towards integration when s/he is engaging in local social bonding (Hale, 2000). 
Indeed, the development of a sense of belonging to a sub-set of persons enables 
him/her to adjust to the different host-country culture (Duke et al, 1999). 
According to Ager and Strang, without identification to a specific sub-group, 
integration becomes assimilation (2004a: 19). 
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4.1.1 Social bonds facilitate initial settlement 
According to Carey Wood et al (1995), one quarter of the refugees interviewed 
for her study observed that the most useful source of help for new arrivals were 
members of their own community group. Similarly, 'most asylum seekers do not 
come to us or anyone else first; they go to their own community. That is where 
they look for support (Refugee Councill at Stg Co Deb, Immigration and Asylum 
Bill, 16t' March 1999). This finding is reflected in my own research. Certainly, the 
development and/or presence of social bonds amongst asylum seekers facilitates 
their settlement and assists the process of familiarisation with their host-country 
during the first days and months of their stay in the UK, especially when those 
who are newly arrived are not familiar with the host-country's national language, 
system and cultures. Armanc, for instance, went to a friend's house on arrival in 
the UK because 'if you go somewhere for the first time, you should have 
someone to guide you to the different places and help you with things. I just 
stayed with my friend for one month and then my eyes opened' (Armanc, para 
187). 
4.1.2 Social bonds assist the formation of a familiar cultural and physical 
environment 
The involvement of individuals in social bonds provides them with support as well 
as cultural familiarity and continuity in their relationships and in their physical 
environment (Ager and Strang, 2004a: 7; Wahlbeck, 1999: 167). My interviews 
with Iraqi Kurds reflect that possessing friends who 'have had the same problems 
like us' in their country of origin (Casim, para 227 & 343) and also in their host- 
country constitutes a significant source of emotional and psychological support. 
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Delav, for instance, emphasises the challenges that asylum seekers face, given 
the unpredictability of their future, and the comfort they can obtain from local 
social bonds, remarking that 'during this period of time when you are an asylum 
seeker, you don't know what your future is, you are struggling from thinking about 
what is going to happen to you. Am I going to get refugee status or not? What 
should I do? There is no plan for your life. If you are near your community, you 
will be less stressed and less depressed because you are talking with your 
community, your friends, visiting people' (Delav, para 272). Also, the sharing of a 
common culture can draw friends closer together especially when the pervasive 
host-society culture is very different to that which the newly arrived asylum 
seeker or refugee is accustomed to. Social bonding within a community can also 
stimulate mutual solidarity as well as alleviate poor mental health by lessening an 
individual's sense of alienation, isolation and depression (Ager and Strang, 
2004b: 11). Hazo, for example, notes that 'thanks to the large Iraqi Kurdish 
community in Birmingham, if I am in hospital here, for three or four months, I will 
always have two to three people in the hospital with me' (Hazo, para 60-62). 
Secondly, as a result of co-ethnic clustering and social bonding, the physical 
environment of a host-country area can change, as specific needs and 
preferences are identified and met, resulting in the quasi re-creation of the home- 
country setting at a local level (Van Kempen and Van Weesep 1997 in Wren, 
2003). Indeed, as remarked upon by Bendewar, 'when we are in Birmingham, it's 
like we're in Iraq' (Bendewar, para 24). Access to areas that resemble the country 
of origin assists individuals with their settlement process and their identification 
with their host-society. 
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4.1.3 Social bonding offers opportunities for employment 
Furthermore, the presence of social bonding supports individuals with the 
process of searching for employment and securing work (Boswell, 2001: 32; 
Wilson, 2001: 64; Home Office, 2005a: 54; Wahlbeck, 1999: 167). Indeed, a 
person can become more aware of his/her employment opportunities and more 
successful at obtaining a job if s/he is able to seek guidance, from a co-ethnic, 
regarding the sector of the labour market where s/he can realistically find work. 
Joining a broader network of co-ethnic contacts who will inform him/her of 
existing local informal or formal vacancies also helps considerably. In addition, 
the language barrier can be more easily overcome, thanks to the assistance of 
the co-ethnics who are proficient in English. Indeed, in my interview with Hazo, 
he observes that 'with the large Iraqi Kurdish community in Birmingham, if I can't 
speak English, I can ask one of the Kurds to find me a job somewhere' (Hazo, 
para 60-62). Certainly, an individual's lack of social bonds tends to lead to his/her 
isolation, a phenomenon that can foment this person's socio-economic 
deprivation (Van Mulier, 1982 in Arnoldus, Dukes and Musterd, 2003: 37). 
4.1.4 Socially bonded individuals impart advice to one another 
In addition, the existence of social bonds amongst asylum seekers and refugees 
can help this group address and resolve problems associated with their access to 
immigration advice, cash-support or benefits and housing, health and education 
services (Wilson, 2001: 64; Boswell, 2001: 32; Home Office, 2005a: 54; 
Wahlbeck, 1999: 167). Social bonds are particularly important in this context 
given that refugees tend to prefer drawing on the resources of their own 
communities rather than using official agencies (Wren, 2003: 67; Wahlbeck, 
127 
1999: 266-267). My research shows that socially bonded individuals with English 
language skills interpret and translate for those who lack that aptitude. Moreover, 
the co-ethnics who have already experienced a similar problem empathise, offer 
guidance and even financially support their fellow countrymen. Kereng, reflecting 
on the changing character of Birmingham states that 'in 1999 and 2000, 
sometimes Birmingham didn't have an interpreter and you had to wait a week or 
two for one to be found in another city. But now lots of Kurds in Birmingham 
speak English. If a new person comes to this city, it's very easy for him now' 
(Kereng, para 173). 
Moreover, medium to large concentrations of socially bonded individuals facilitate 
the growth of community charitable associations as well as the development of 
culturally-specific restaurants and coffee shops, which, respectively constitute 
formal and informal meeting places where individuals in need of some form of 
support can meet and seek guidance. Also, the presence of a sizeable socially 
bonded community in a locality increases the chances of the particular group 
having co-ethnic contacts working in mainstream agencies and organisations, 
these individuals potentially offering, at a service provision level, a social bridge 
between the incoming group and the host-society. Delav, summing up some of 
the practical support co-ethnics can provide one another, notes that 'through your 
community, you will be told what to do, how to get education, how to register with 
a GP. Also each interpreter costs El 5 per hour to go with the client to interpret for 
him. But when you are with your community, someone will come with you 
voluntarily' (Delav, para 246 & 256). 
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4.2 Social bonding based on ethnicity rather than nationality or religion 
Ager and Strang (2004a: 4) refer to social bonds as being connections within a 
community defined by. an ethnic, national or religious identity. Importantly, 
according to literature on Kurds from Iraq and my interviews with Iraq! Kurds, it 
would appear that this group shares, above all else, a common Kurdish identity. 
Prior to exploring the components of this identity, it is noteworthy that whilst Iraqi 
Kurds are defined in this thesis as an ethnic group, the ethnic lineage itself is 
largely imagined (McDowall, 1992). 
According to Griffiths (2002: 128-129 & 47), Kurdish identity has been elaborated 
over the course of centuries and is based on territory and tribal culture. Iraqi 
Kurds are certainly united by their shared dream of acquiring greater 
independence from their country of residence, whether in the form of a pan- 
Kurdish nation-state or federalism. Furthermore, Kurdish identity appears 
'reactive in character, stemming from their history of oppression' (Griffiths, 2002: 
128). This is apparent in Iraqi Kurds' rejection of their Iraqi national identity, the 
latter being the product of the pervasiveness of Kurdish nationalism amongst this 
group but also the result of the persecution they have experienced from the Iraqi 
state. The most recent form of Kurdish persecution has been perpetrated by the 
now deposed Iraqi government (Lazier, 1996; McDowall, 1996: 357; Griffiths, 
2002: 61). Importantly, the Kurds'feelings of animosity towards the Iraqi state are 
customarily transferred onto Arab Iraqis, the ethnic group in Iraq which is most 
closely associated with the Iraqi government. Thus, for many, being Kurdish 
involves being anti-Arab. Erdehan illustrates this phenomenon noting that'we are 
Kurdish, everything is different from Arabic people. All of the Kurds, we don't 
want to live with the Arabs. Saddam has killed a lot of our people' (Erdehan, para 
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267). Dijwar, recounting his personal experience of developing friendships with 
Iraqi Arabs, also exemplifies the close ties that exist, for many Kurds, between 
being Kurdish, opposing the Iraqi government and being anti-Arab. Indeed, he 
remarks that 'I went to University for one year and I had the same idea as other 
Kurds, oh, Arabs are our enemies, I don't want to talk to them. Once, one of my 
friends introduced me to many Arabs who were opposing the Iraqi government 
and I realised that they are nice people, and we had good friendships. But I 
received very strong criticisms from my Kurdish friends because they said that I 
was a traitor, I had betrayed them' (Dijwar, para 99). Delav, elaborating further on 
the relationship between Iraqi Kurdish identity and Iraqi Arabs, observes that 'we 
want to be different from the Arabs because our dream is that by being different 
from them, we will get our independence. Arab culture feels like it has been 
imposed upon Kurdish culture' (Delav, para 450). 
Following on from this point, Delav also emphasises the apparent relationship 
that exists between nationalism, violence and Kurdish identity, remarking that'the 
only way to practice our culture in Iraq was gun culture. If you want to be Kurd, 
you should be a peshmerga, take a gun and go to the mountains, amongst the 
fighters, to fight against the enemy. That's the only thing in all my life where I 
have seen that we are practising our cultural identity. We didn't come in an 
academic way to practice our culture, our dance, our dress, making our food. We 
have forgotten all of this because of the occupation, the Arabisation, we have 
been a second class citizen in Iraq' (Delav, para 356). Significantly, religion is not 
a fundamental aspect of Kurdish identity. Indeed, 'even though the vast majority 
of Iraqi Kurds are Muslims, religion is not a truly uniting factor. Kurds have 
accepted Islam with piousness and devotion to duty, but in a highly personal 
manner, with little thought given to Islam in a political or socially unifying sense' 
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(Stansfield, 2003: 38). McDowall even argues that religious belief plays no part in 
Kurdish distinctiveness (1992: 13). 
Whilst Iraqi Kurds share a common Kurdish identity, their co-ethnic friends and 
acquaintances in the UK tend to originate from the same geographical area of 
Iraqi Kurdistan and/or the same Iraqi Kurdish political party. Ziryan notes, for 
instance, that 'my friends are from Suleimaniyah9. We have other friends from 
Duhok but because they have a different accent... This is not something racist 
but you can't be happy because they don't know you. Sometimes you talk about 
your city and talk about your life, do you remember that day in Suleimaniyah, oh 
yes, where were you at that time? He can be more friendly than someone who is 
from a city far away. He is Kurdish but... ' (Ziryan, para 169). This trend reflects 
the continuing tribal nature of Kurdish society as well as the importance and 
value of territory for Kurds. Dijwar, further developing ideas of Kurdish identity, 
notes that 'for Pakistanis, it's religion that ties them together. But for us it is not 
religion because in general we are not religious because we think that this 
religion comes from Arabs and we are nationalists and reject them. We don't 
want to hear anything in Arabic. Few people pray here, and people even make 
fun of them, which is very surprising. What ties us together is the nationalist idea 
but even that, it is not mature enough in my country. We are more related to our 
parties, the KDP or the PUK mainly, and the parties are based on tribes. It's 
actually not parties, it's modern tribes (Dijwar, para 145). Dijwar continues, 
linking tribalism to territory and politics noting that 'tribalism, it's related to the 
9 In Iraqi Kurdistan, there are three main regions called governorates. In each, there is a 
governorate centre or city. The three governorate cities are Suleimaniyah, under the authority of 
the PUK, and Erbil and Dohuk, both of which are under the authority of the KDP. The KDP and 
the PUK also govern their respective governorates. 
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area. The KDP represents more traditional values and the PUK say that they are 
more modern but the same principle applies' (Dijwar, para 149). 
Dijwar also discusses the meaning, purpose and necessity of tribalism in Iraqi 
Kurdish society as well as regional variations. He notes that 'tribalism is loyalty to 
a tribe, it's a necessity in some areas in my country because where there is no 
law and order, you have to protect yourself. You have to be tied to some families. 
Some leaders of these tribes, like in Dohuk, they make decisions, they have a 
Council and this decision is compulsory, like a law. Even when it's against the 
law. The Council's decision is much stronger than the Court's decision. 
Sometimes they need to negotiate between the tribes. There is extreme loyalty 
from people who belong to the tribe towards the tribe. If a person rebels, s/he will 
be isolated, an outcast. One time a girl and a boy from two different tribes, they 
had a sexual relationship and they found out so the two tribes said OK, each one 
should kill his or her 'criminal'. Even they can make decisions of life and death. 
They are really really strong. If there is a proper police authority, they could not 
do this. The strength of tribalism varies from area to area. For example, in my 
city, it's not that strong, but if you go to Dohuk, there are placards above shops 
and offices that say that the person who owns this is son of the person who is 
from such a tribe. I went there to see a friend once. When you talk to someone in 
Dohuk, they ask you which tribe you are from, which family you are from. It's very 
important. Actually, I am from a very famous tribe but I don't use it' (Dijwar, para 
153-159)". 
10 Here, Dijwar appears to be referring to 'traditional' tribalism as opposed to the 'modem' 
tribalism that is linked to Iraqi Kurdish political parties. Thus, traditional tribalism varies 
regionally across Iraqi Kurdistan. However, it would seem that the principle of tribal loyalty to one 
of the political parties is present across all the Iraqi Kurdish regions. Refer to Bruinessen (1992) 
for further discussions of tribalism and politics in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
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4.3 Focussinci on dispersed asvium seekers 
Prior to examining the impact of the dispersal policy on co-ethnic social bonds, it 
is important to explain and substantiate the reasons for primarily focusing my 
discussion of asylum seekers on those who are dispersed. 
4.3.1 Dispersed and subsistence only asylum seekers 
The centre of my research is dispersed asylum seekers because the impact of 
the dispersal policy on the integration of this group is direct and significant. 
Certainly, these individuals are profoundly tied to their dispersal locality, their 
right to state-funded housing being revoked if they fail to accept the 
accommodation provided to them in their designated dispersal area. In contrast, 
the dispersal policy's direct impact on the integration of subsistence only asylum 
seekers, a population which constitutes, in the case of NASS and as at 
December 2003,38% of the supported asylum seekers (Heath, Jeffries and 
Purcell 2004: 18)11, is non-existent. Indeed, these persons possess no state- 
imposed ties to a designated locality, their accommodation being provided, 
instead, by relatives or friends anywhere in the UK. According to Home Office 
Asylum Statistics, the majority of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers on NASS 
subsistence only support (73%) actually reside in Greater London and the rest of 
the South East, the exact areas that the dispersal policy aims to draw asylum 
claimants away from. 
The RDS figures for the numbers of asylum seekers in receipt of NASS support include 
dependants. 
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It has been observed by the Iraqi Kurds interviewed that some co-ethnic asylum 
seekers elect to leave their dispersal locality even if they are then obliged to 
change their support arrangements to subsistence only support and secure 
accommodation with relatives or friends. An Iraqi Kurd working for an 
employment advice service in Birmingham raises this issue, noting that 'the 
dispersal policy doesn't work because people don't like to be forced to live 
somewhere they don't like. I have seen many people who have left NASS 
accommodation despite knowing that if they leave that accommodation without 
NASS' permission they will lose their benefit but still they are willing to move to 
somewhere where they can find people from their own community' (Connexions, 
para 267). Certainly, amongst the Iraqi Kurds interviewed for this research, 
sixteen of the twenty-seven dispersed Iraqi Kurds had moved to another locality 
within twelve months of their initial dispersal, some exercising their freedom to 
choose their residential location, others following the granting of their request to 
relocate by the dispersal authorities or changing their support arrangements. 
Robinson (2003a) has also undertaken research on this topic. He has concluded 
that secondary migration rates constitute 18-20% of the cohorts of dispersed 
asylum seekers who have been waiting 18 months for a decision on their asylum 
application. Moreover, he asserts that the majority of the secondary migration is 
to London, Birmingham and Manchester. He claims that it is initiated by 'racist 
victimisation, a sense of being isolated from their fellow countrymen, the absence 
of key infrastructure and the feeling that they are exposed and vulnerable 
because of visible differences' (Robinson, 2003a: 145). In addition, Robinson 
(2003a) observes that secondary migrants fail to plan their mobility and instead 
rely upon 'snippets of advice and gossip', being customarily attracted to cities 
where people from their own country, region and/or culture reside (Robinson, 
2003a: 145; Robinson, forthcoming). 
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Since the inception of the contemporary dispersal policy, some subsistence only 
asylum seekers will not have kith or kin in Greater London or the South East, 
their co-ethnic contacts being based instead in a dispersal area. In these 
instances, the dispersal policy exercises an indirect impact on the integration of 
subsistence only asylum seekers. For instance, on arrival in Dover, Bendewar 
contacted a co-ethnic friend asking him for assistance and help. This 
acquaintance promptly offered him accommodation in his own home in 
Birmingham, his dispersal city. Having no offers from other acquaintances and 
having been informed by his friend of the advantages and benefits of residing in 
Birmingham, Bendewar chose to receive subsistence only support and moved to 
this city, as a result having access to the same environment that his friend had 
been given access to via dispersal. Bendewar remarks 'I didn't rely on the name 
of the cities, I followed what my friend recommended. He said come to 
Birmingham, it's very nice' (Bendewar, para 60 & 66). Similarly, Cenik and her 
husband as well as Erdehan moved to Birmingham and Coventry respectively as 
subsistence only asylum seekers, the former having arranged to live with a 
cousin (Cenik, para 15), the latter having decided to reside with a friend 
(Erdehan, para 17). 
4.3.2 Self-dispersed asylum seekers 
It was observed in the course of the fieldwork that a trend developed, from 2001 
onwards, whereby some newly arrived Iraqi Kurds deliberately applied for asylum 
in the dispersal areas recommended to them by their relatives and friends rather 
than regularise their situation in London or at their port of entry. This pattern of 
behaviour is used as a means for this group to pro-actively influence their place 
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of residence whilst remaining entitled to dispersed state-funded housing. 
Although it is not guaranteed that they will receive accommodation in their 
chosen locality, there is a possibility that they will be successful in affecting at 
least the regional location of their dispersal. A similar phenomenon has been 
observed in the Yorkshire and Humberside region (Wilson, 2001: 12). 
A Kurdish businessman describes the trend of asylum seeker self-dispersal to 
Birmingham noting that 'at the start of the dispersal programme, a lot of asylum 
seekers were trying by any way to persuade the dispersal officers to send them 
to London. When they found that there was no way for them to go to London and 
keep hold of their benefit entitlements, they started talking about the West 
Midlands with its job opportunities. This is why there are two dispersal 
programmes, one that is done by the government and a second that is done 
voluntarily by the asylum seekers themselves who are looking for work and they 
keep coming to the West Midlands' (Kurdish restaurant 2, para 11 &13). He 
continues, saying 'I can't imagine that a lorry goes as far as Birmingham without 
stopping. They were coming deliberately, they were hearing through their 
cousins, their friends who told them to come here. They wanted to make sure that 
they will be accommodated in Birmingham' (Kurdish restaurant 2, para 89-95). A 
Kurdish asylum caseworker, substantiating the businessman's standpoint, adds 
that 'when Iraqi Kurds first started coming to the UK, they were dispersed to 
Birmingham. After that, when people knew that dispersal also happened from 
Dover to other cities, all our friends and relatives, they gave us a call and we told 
them and advised them not to go to Dover immigration, come to Birmingham and 
from here you have a good chance to stay in Birmingham' (Birmingham Kurdish 
association, para 444). 
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The impact of the dispersal policy on the integration of self-dispersed asylum 
seekers varies depending on the dispersal authorities' response and its outcome. 
The reaction to this phenomenon can fluctuate substantially any time depending 
on the changing availability of dispersal accommodation in the dispersal city, its 
region and in the other dispersal locations across the UK as well as on the 
particular practice in place regarding the acceptability of dispersing asylum 
seekers inter-regionally once they have already travelled to a dispersal area. The 
impact of the dispersal policy on the integration of those who are dispersed inter- 
regionally closely equates with the impact of the dispersal policy on the 
integration of dispersed asylum seekers. Indeed, whilst initially exercising their 
freedom to choose their place of residence, this group's liberty is withdrawn and 
its effect is annulled as the dispersal authorities relocate them to a designated 
location far from the dispersal area they initially migrated to, voluntarily. In 
contrast, the impact of the dispersal policy on those who are dispersed intra- 
regionally or who succeed in securing state-funded housing in their city of choice 
strohgly compares with the impact of the dispersal policy on the integration of 
subsistence only asylum seekers. Mokan voluntarily migrated to Birmingham, 
choosing this city because of the large size of its Kurdish community. He notes 'I 
arrived near Birmingham in a lorry and after that I was sent to a hostel in 
Birmingham. I was very happy to come to this city because in Kurdistan, we know 
that there are a lot of Iraqi people in Birmingham' (Mokan, para 17 & 25). Mokan 
was scheduled for dispersal to Newcastle from Birmingham, however his poor 
health and the receipt of his refugee status both released him from the 
constraints of dispersal. He observes 'they told me, go to Newcastle but what 
should I do in Newcastle? I was sick, I had backache. I told them, I can't go to 
Newcastle. They told me if you don't go to Newcastle, and you stay in 
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Birmingham, you will get no house. Then, I got my refugee status from the Home 
Office. I was very happy about that' (Mokan, para 3). 
4.3.3 Re-dispersed asylum seekers 
It appears that another asylum seeker strategy has developed which also aims to 
minimise the isolating effects of this group's dispersal without compromising their 
entitlement to state-funded dispersal accommodation. Indeed, a trend has 
emerged whereby on arrival in a dispersal destination containing a very small 
community of co-ethnics, some disappointed and dissatisfied newly arrived Iraqi 
Kurdish asylum seekers take the initiative to return to Dover and re-apply for 
asylum and dispersal with the hope that on this second occasion they are sent to 
a more suitable location. A Kurdish businessman explains, remarking that 'on 
many occasions there were recently arrived asylum seekers who jumped on the 
bus and arrived at their destination point, for example, Stoke-on-Trent and he 
found it very grey and he didn't find anyone so he came back to Dover to be 
dispersed again for a better opportunity' (Kurdish restaurant 2, para 89-93). The 
impact of the dispersal policy on the integration of these re-dispersed asylum 
seekers is very similar to that of standard dispersed asylum seekers. 
4.3.4 Covert and temporary voluntary migration between dispersal localities 
It would seem that some dispersed asylum seekers residing in the less 
economically active regions of the UK but who are nevertheless keen to maintain 
their right to state-funded dispersed housing, covertly migrate five to six days at a 
time to other UK regions. These individuals travel to localities where employment 
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opportunities are more widely available, sleeping at the homes of relatives or 
friends in these economically buoyant areas. In order to avoid forfeiting their 
entitlement to state-funded housing by leaving a dispersed property totally empty 
for more than six days, individuals sharing the same dwelling tend to take turns in 
absenting themselves. Indeed, a community services refugee advisor notes that 
in Newcastle 'for a number of asylum seekers, we weren't sure whether they 
were actually living in the accommodation because they seemed to be away an 
awful lot. They were obviously away working and Birmingham was one of their 
destinations' (Housing association, para 43). The dispersed asylum seekers who 
are able to effectively undertake covert temporary migration between dispersal 
localities, on a regular basis, are less affected by the dispersal policy than those 
who have followed a more traditional and orthodox dispersal route. Nonetheless, 
this set of individuals is more affected by dispersal than subsistence only asylum 
seekers. 
The development and practice of these strategies, self-dispersal, re-dispersals, 
and covert temporary voluntary migration between dispersal areas by some 
newly arrived Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is indicative of this group's ability to 
become empowered. In the process, they overcome, to a degree, the isolating 
effects of being dispersed on a no-choice basis to a locality containing a small co- 
ethnic community all the while maintaining their entitlement to state-funded 
housing. Significantly, an employment advisor remarks upon the effect these 
various asylum seeker strategies have on the overall distribution of this group 
across the UK. He notes that 'whereas the largest area of dispersal is the North 
West of England, the West Midlands is probably the largest region of arrival, 
including dispersal and arrivals through other means' (Employment, Specialist 
voluntary agency 2, para 3). 
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4.4 The impact of the dispersal policy on the co-ethnic social bonding of 
Iraqi Kurdish asvlum seekers 
4.4.1 Asylum seekers dispersed before 2001 In contrast to asylum seekers 
dispersed from 2001 onwards 
It would appear that the contemporary UK dispersal policy most negatively 
impacts upon the local co-ethnic social bonds of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
who were dispersed before 2001. For those dispersed from 2001 onwards, 
however, the policy exerts an increasingly less negative effect on this group's 
social bonds. According to the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, preceding 2001, few Iraqis 
had actually been dispersed and therefore those who were residing in the 
dispersal localities were small in number and consequently were more 
susceptible to being isolated from other co-ethnics, particularly since the majority 
of the more established co-ethnic community traditionally reside in London and 
the South East. Delav notes, reflecting upon his experiences in Birmingham in 
1999, at the beginning of the arrival of new Iraqi Kurds to this city, that 'we 
couldn't do anything, we would all go to town, to Victoria Square, to see each 
other and we have been very happy when we saw each other there. Until we find 
a way amongst ourselves' (Delav, para 272). 
However, in 2000, the quantity of new Iraqi applications for asylum rose sharply 
(from 1,800 in 1999 to 7,475 in 2000) (Heath, Jeffries and Purcell, 2004) and the 
total number of dispersals taking place increased. The number of new Iraqi 
asylum applicants also augmented in 2001 (6,705) and 2002 (14,570). The 
ensuing higher proportion of Iraqi Kurds amongst the total dispersed asylum 
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seeker population combined with the overall larger number of dispersals 
occurring led to the formation of spontaneous rather than policy engineered co- 
ethnic language clusters in many of the dispersal locations. The trend for NASS 
to concentrate dispersed asylum seekers in a relatively small number of localities, 
a seemingly unintended consequence of solely using the criteria of housing 
availability and affordability in the selection of dispersal destinations, also 
contributed significantly to the development of language clusters in the dispersal 
areas. Attracted by the benefits of the concentration of Iraqi Kurds in these areas, 
co-ethnic subsistence only asylum seekers and refugees subsequently began to 
migrate voluntarily to these areas. 
By 2001, the watershed year, groups of co-ethnics were accumulating in the 
dispersal localities providing the basis for greater social bonding. Kereng, 
reflecting the views of the other Iraqi Kurds interviewed in Birmingham, notes that 
'now you can phone Iraq, you can work, you can see people, you can give 
presents to people for your family in Iraq. People can help you read the English 
letters you receive. Everything is easy here. There are restaurants, two/three 
coffee shops. If you have a problem, you can go there. You can also go to the 
Refugee Council, there are some Kurdish people working there. There is a 
Kurdish association. But before there wasn't all this. Now if a new person comes 
to Birmingham, it's very easy for him' (Kereng, para 69 &173). Similarly, 'when 
other Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers came, after us, it was very easy for them 
because we spent six months to find a college and register. When new asylum 
seekers arrived, they just slipped in. In two or three days, they knew everything. 
You want to buy a mobile? OK, the cheapest mobile is in that shop, in that place, 
I will take you. You want to make a phone call to Kurdistan, OK, that's the way 
you do it. If they had been somewhere new, with no Iraqi Kurds living there 
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already, it would take them 6-8 months to find out what to do' (Delav, para 272). 
This phenomenon, that social bonding and settlement is harder for the first 
arrivals in a new area than for subsequent co-ethnic groups, has also been noted 
by Boswell (2001: 32) in her comparative study of the German and UK dispersal 
policies, migrant networks and the knowledge and experience individual 
members possess developing and growing over time. 
Importantly, it is possible to argue that the impact of the dispersal policy on the 
co-ethnic social bonding of asylum seekers could also be most detrimental for 
those who were dispersed via the strictly implemented NASS scheme, rather 
than via the more lenient interim programme, the former customarily unreceptive 
to asylum seeker destination preferences. However, the timing of dispersal is 
actually of greater significance to co-ethnic social bonding prospects than the 
scheme under which an individual is dispersed, those sent to their dispersal 
destination prior to 2001, regardless of the programme through which they were 
receiving support, being more isolated from their co-ethnics than those sent from 
2001 onwards. 
The relative lack of assistance provided by established Iraqi Kurds in the 
dispersal areas orecedina 2001 
Significantly, in the cases where there were longstanding settled Iraqi Kurds in 
the dispersal locality, this group provided relatively little assistance. According to 
the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, there were approximately fifty co-ethnics who had 
resided in Birmingham for ten to thirty years. Whilst clearly this group represents 
a very small proportion of the existing Iraqi Kurdish community in this city, 
estimated at 10-12,000, in 1999-2000, there were still very few newly arrived co- 
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ethnics and one would anticipate that the established Iraqi Kurds would have 
approached and assisted them. Kereng and Rojdar, who were dispersed to 
Birmingham in 1999, observe that there was no Iraqi Kurd they could rely on who 
could facilitate their initial settlement by assisting with translating and interpreting, 
explaining the workings of the labour market or advising on immigration, benefits, 
housing and English language training (Kereng, para 65; Rojdar, para 127). With 
lack of English proficiency constituting the most significant barrier to initial 
settlement, Kereng remarks that in Birmingham, in 1999, 'you had a problem but 
you could not make progress'until you could get an interpreter. Sometimes 
Birmingham didn't have an interpreter, the authorities had to call London or 
another city. Sometimes you had to wait a week or two' (Kereng, para 173). 
The lack of assistance provided by the settled Iraq! Kurds to the new arrivals in 
Birmingham, pre-2001, is, in my view, the product of the combination of several 
factors. Firstly, both groups are likely to have been unaware of each other's 
presence during the early stages of the implementation of dispersal given the 
large size of the city of Birmingham and the small numbers of Iraqi Kurds being 
dispersed to this locality. 
Secondly, both sets of individuals originate from different socio-economic 
backgrounds. Indeed, according to the interviews with Iraqi Kurds, those who 
came to the UK between the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 
1990s tend to be well-educated, middle to upper class families, originating from 
the main urban areas, who were and still might be politically committed to the 
Kurdish cause. In contrast, those who came from the late 1990s onwards are, in 
the main, moderately educated, lower class, young single men. They are aged 
between 16 and 30 years old and originate from the rural areas of Kurdistan. 
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Some took part in the civil war, between the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties, the 
KDP and the PUK, for economic reasons rather than political conviction. 
Regarding the generally low to moderate level of education of the latter group, a 
Kurdish asylum caseworker explains that these individuals 'had no opportunity to 
be educated. The Iraqi government wasn't building schools in the villages, 
because they considered the villages to be part of the army' (Birmingham Kurdish 
association, para 202). Similarly, a Kurdish organisation in London observes that 
the high levels of illiteracy amongst the latest group of Iraqi Kurdish arrivals to the 
UK is a product of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and hundreds of Kurdish villages 
being destroyed by the Iraqi government during the Anfal campaigns (February to 
August 1988). This trend is also the consequence of the Kurdish civil war (1994- 
1997) and generally an emphasis on the value of work rather than education 
(London Kurdish association 2, para 73). Since the families of the newly arrived 
Iraqi Kurds differ in their socio-economic background to the families of the more 
established co-ethnics, it is unlikely for members of either group to be related to 
or acquainted with one another. Thus, in a culture where support is 
predominantly provided through family ties and acquaintances rather than by a 
welfare state backed by an active voluntary sector, it is improbable that large 
scale informal support that cuts across socio-economic categories is provided. 
Thirdly, according to the recently settled Iraqi Kurds, there exists an emotional 
and cultural distance between both groups of co-ethnics because of the amount 
of time elapsed since the established Iraqi Kurds last resided in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Indeed, 'It's twenty years ago that they have seen your life back home. They have 
been changed. They help but they are not that interested' (Hazo, para 96). A 
newly arrived Iraqi Kurd remarks that 'they are Kurdish-English and we are 
Kurdish-Kurdish' (Birmingham Kurdish association, para 428). Finally, it would 
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seem that the group of longstanding Iraqi Kurds have their own share of 
problems and difficulties to deal with, making it harder for them to support others. 
'The established families they have their own life, they don't have time to spend 
with us. They have problems, they couldn't integrate with this society, still' 
(Birmingham Kurdish association, para 428). 
4.4.2 Dispersal areas containing a large versus a small co-ethnic group 
Concerning solely the population of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers who were 
dispersed from 2001 onwards, it is noteworthy that the dispersal policy still has a 
varying impact upon this group's social bonds. Indeed, those who are sent to 
areas possessing a comparatively large co-ethnic group where opportunities for 
social bonding are plentiful are less detrimentally affected by the dispersal policy 
than those sent to localities containing a relatively small co-ethnic group, the 
experience of social bonding being less pronounced. Birmingham and Newcastle 
have been used to illustrate both types of dispersal localities, the former being 
characterised by a large community of co-ethnics and the latter being typified by 
a small group of Iraqi Kurds. 
The social bonding of dispersed Iracii Kurdish asylum seekers in Birmingham, 
city gossessing a large co-ethnic grou 
Post-2001, newly arrived Iraqi Kurds who reside in Birmingham have access to a 
large group of recently settled co-ethnic asylum seekers and refugees, who 
would have arrived in the city a few years or a few months earlier. Certainly, 
according to the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, this city currently hosts the largest 
community of recently established Iraqi Kurds in the UK, that is co-ethnics who 
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have arrived in the last four to five years. The Iraqi Kurdish population in 
Birmingham was estimated, by the Iraqi Kurds interviewed in 2003/2004, as 
consisting of between 10-12,000 individuals. Certainly, according to Phillimore 
(2005: 7,17), Iraqis constitute the largest group of asylum seekers (19.9%) and 
the second largest group of refugees (23.3%) in the West Midlands 12 . 
Incidentally, the West Midlands appears, in general, to contain large numbers of 
recently established asylum seekers and refugees. Indeed, Phillimore's research 
concludes that 9,604 asylum seekers and 44,260 refugees were identified as 
living in the West Midlands at the end of 2004. The largest concentration of 
asylum seekers (3,792) and refugees (1,486) was in Birmingham. She has also 
identified that the number of refugees in the region will increase to 69,865 by the 
end of 2007 (Phillimore, 2005: 7,15). Furthermore, Phillimore states that 
Birmingham's asylum seeker population covers 36 wards with the main 
populations located in Soho (621), Aston (419), Ladywood (405), Edgbaston 
(320) and Nechells (282). Birmingham's refugee population is spread across 34 
wards with concentrations of population in Soho (188), Nechells (165), 
Sparkbrook (137), Handsworth (132), Small Heath (103) (Phillimore, 2005: 9,16). 
Scott-Flynn (forthcoming) has suggested that there are between 500 and 2,000 
failed asylum seekers in Birmingham (Phillimore, 2005: 12). 
The significant concentration of Iraqi Kurds in Birmingham can be explained in 
several ways. Firstly, Birmingham is overall a favoured dispersal destination for 
NASS, 6% of their dispersed asylum seekers, across all nationalities, residing in 
12 Importantly, London continues to accommodate the largest concentration of Iraqi Kurds in the 
UK, regardless of their time of arrival in the country. This population is estimated, according to 
my interviews, at 3045,000 individuals. It was also asserted that there are between 100-130,000 
Iraqi Kurds in the UK, in total. 
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this city in 2003 (Heath, Jeffries and Purcell, 2004: 60). In addition, according to 
the Home Office's asylum statistics, in 2002 and 2003, the region receiving the 
largest proportion of the Iraqi, NASS-supported asylum seeker population was in 
fact the West Midlands, hosting 26.5% and 26.6% of this group respectively. In 
2001, whilst Yorkshire and Humberside was the region in receipt of the highest 
amount of this same population, 21% of the Iraqi, NASS-supported asylum 
seekers were hosted by the West Midlands. 
Moreover, Birmingham has become a pole of attraction for Iraqi Kurdish self- 
dispersed asylum seekers, subsistence only asylum seekers and refugees 
because of its multicultural atmosphere as well as the employment opportunities 
located in the West Midlands region as a whole. Both of these subjects, the 
multiculturalism of Birmingham and the employment prospects in the region, are 
discussed in more depth in chapters five and six. Furthermore, the existing size 
of the Iraqi Kurdish community is attractive to other co-ethnics, in itself, given that 
the more substantial a co-ethnic community is, the more support can be provided. 
Indeed, access to a sizeable co-ethnic community like the one in Birmingham 'is 
going to make things much easier for me. But if you are 10 people in Glasgow, 
you cannot do the parties, you cannot find a job so easily, you cannot get as 
much help as you can get here. From 10,000 people you can get a lot of help. 
What can you do with 10 people? They need help themselves, how can I expect 
them to help me? Whenever there is a large community, people want to go there 
because there is more support, more is happening there' (Hazo, para 60). 
Similarly, 'newly arrived Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers jump on the dispersal 
buses voluntarily, when they go to the areas where they heard that there are 
other Kurds, like in Birmingham. They can find support, a guide, someone who 
has been here for longer than them' (Kurdish restaurant 2, para 89-95). Certainly, 
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common socio-economic backgrounds as well as shared experiences of current 
Iraqi Kurdish events and crises and migration to the UK help create a strong bond 
with the recently arrived co-ethnics and instils amongst the newly settled Iraqi 
Kurds a willingness to assist and help their fellow countrymen. Thus, it has been 
observed that in Birmingham, recently arrived Iraqi Kurds post-2001 'can find 
support, a guide, someone who has been here for longer than them' (Kurdish 
restaurant 2, para 89-95). In addition, in contrast to London where the co-ethnic 
population is very diffuse 13 , the majority of Iraqi Kurds based in Birmingham 
reside in several neighbouring'wards, making it easier for the Iraqi Kurdish 
community to provide and seek assistance and help. 
Significantly, an important element of co-ethnic support and social bonding in 
Birmingham, particularly for new arrivals, takes place in the eight recently opened 
Kurdish restaurants and caf6 bars. Most of these are located in Handsworth, 
where, according to the Iraqi Kurds interviewed in Birmingham, informal, and on 
occasions formal, guidance can be sought as well as companionship and 
friendship. Reflecting the tribal nature of Kurdish society, the restaurants tend to 
be frequented either by people from the area of Erbil, one of the major cities of 
Iraqi Kurdistan, or Suleimanlyah, the other principal city. Importantly, tribal 
identity, territory and politics are closely interlinked in Iraqi Kurdistan. Thus, the 
restaurants also tend to be frequented either by individuals who identify with the 
KIDP, one of the main Kurdish parties whose regional government in Iraqi 
Kurdistan controls the Erbil area, or by persons who associate with the PUK, the 
other principal Kurdish party. The latter controls the Suleimaniyah area. As 
Ibrahim notes, 'even here in Birmingham, there are special cafes for the people 
13 Iraqi Kurds in London live primarily, in Hackney, Haringey, Ealing, Manor House, Wood Green C, (London Kurdish association 3, para 15), Brixton, Islington, Enfield, Wembley, Sheperd's Bush 
and Acton (London Kurdish association 1. para 55). 
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from Erbil and special cafes for the people from Suleimaniyah' (Kurdish 
restaurant 2, para. 63). 
At the time of my fieldwork, the Salahaddin (the name has been changed to 
protect the anonymity of the restaurant) was certainly the largest of the Kurdish 
restaurants / caf6 bars / meeting places in Birmingham. Privately funded by 
relatives of one of the Kurdish owners, this restaurant offers Kurdish meals in a 
designated family eating area. It also offers coffee and sweets in a men only, 
smokers' snooker room as well as formal guidance in a separate office. There is 
also a shop selling Kurdish music, etc ... that is attached to the restaurant and a 
car park with a capacity for 60-70 cars (Kurdish restaurant 1, para 177 & 185). 
Since re-opening in October 2003, 'this is a place where people can receive 
guidance, where the importance of having a driving license, not carrying a knife, 
not taking drugs and not racketeering can be stressed. There are a lot of Kurds in 
Birmingham, some of them are still young people, they have no one to guide 
them. I try to show them how to live. If you leave these people alone, they will do 
bad things, they need an advisor. The Salahaddin is like a club, if they have 
nothing to do, they will just chat on the street, they may cause problems' (Kurdish 
restaurant 1, para 55,165,181). 
Birmingham also contained a recently formed charitable Kurdish association, the 
only currently active co-ethnic community organisation in the West Midlands, 
situated in Handsworth (Gernaz, para 233), where reliable information and formal 
advice is offered concerning asylum, benefits and social welfare issues. The 
formation of this association developed from a series of meetings convened by a 
group of newly arrived Iraqi Kurds to which members of the existing co-ethnic 
community in Birmingham were also invited. Hazo, the current president of the 
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organisation, reflects upon these initial meetings, noting that 'it was a new thing 
even for those who had been here a long time. They had never seen this before, 
fifty Iraqi Kurds sitting together in the UK, in Birmingham especially' (Hazo, para 
5). However, this organisation is in its infancy and severely under funded, despite 
having received, in the past, financial assistance from HACT and the Midlands 
Refugee Council (Anik, para 13). At the time of my fieldwork, the Iraqi Kurdish 
association in Birmingham possessed only one paid employee, a part-time 
caseworker, the Management Committee being entirely composed of volunteers. 
Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, according to the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, it would 
appear that the current role and significance of this organisation for their co- 
ethnic community is limited. 
Certainly, as implied by Hazo's astonishment, refugee community organisations 
(RCOs) have customarily been based, until recently, in London. Indeed, 
Robinson (1999a) notes that in 1998-1999,88% of all RCOs recognised by the 
Refugee Council were located in the capital because traditionally, at least in the 
case of the group under study, it is in London that the majority of the settled Iraqi 
Kurds are based. Importantly, dispersal and the subsequent residence of some 
Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees in other parts of the country is not in 
itself sufficient to ensure the immediate formation of co-ethnic RCOs in these new 
areas of settlement. Indeed, for a community to be ready to form an association, 
it is first necessary for at least some of its co-ethnic members to be relatively 
financially secure, that is, engaged in some form of permanent employment 
(London Kurdish association 2, para 29). If unemployed or temporarily employed, 
individuals are likely to be preoccupied with looking for permanent work (Durya, 
para 167), might suffer from poor mental health and self-esteem and therefore 
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can find it challenging, both financially and mentally, to spend unpaid time, 
energy and effort setting up as well as financing a charitable organisation. 
It would also appear, according to the Iraqi Kurds interviewed in Birmingham, that 
the concept of voluntary work is not present in Iraqi Kurdistan and therefore a 
degree of familiarisation with this form of activity is required. Gernaz raises this 
particular issue, remarking that customarily, 'when you tell someone that you are 
working voluntarily for the Kurdish people they won't believe you. They will think - 
what are you getting from it? Why doesn't he go to the cinema to see a filmT 
(Gernaz, para 229). Secondly, it is essential for a minimum of a community's co- 
ethnic members to possess a degree of permanence in terms of their future 
residence in the UK. Certainly, asylum seekers and even individuals with 
Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR) possess an uncertain future in their host- 
country and this lack of security is both worrying and stressful, usually making 
this group unprepared and sometimes unwilling to invest in their new life, as well 
as that of their own co-ethnic community. Anik, an asylum seeker who volunteers 
on the Management Committee for the Kurdish community association in 
Birmingham, illustrates this phenomenon. She remarks that 1 would like to set up 
something for women but the problem is that I am not settled and I have a 
problem with my status so I don't know where I am going to be tomorrow so I 
can't think clearly' (Anik, para 9). Moreover, it is fundamental that some co-ethnic 
members of the Iraqi Kurdish community residing in a dispersal locality possess 
the skills as well as the experience to found and run a charitable association. For 
instance, the ability to undertake fundraising and to manage paid and unpaid, 
voluntary staff is important. Finally, it is crucial for a minimum group of co-ethnics 
in a community to develop an understanding of and commitment to the charitable 
aims of any association that is set up. Indeed, political and business ventures 
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need to be channelled into more suitably appropriate projects, activities and 
endeavours. Unfortunately, at the time of my fieldwork in Birmingham, an 
insufficient proportion of Iraqi Kurds possessed these necessary skills. 
Significantly, the difficulty in forming, developing and establishing a Kurdish 
association must be situated within the broader context of the political 
fragmentation and division existing amongst Iraqi Kurds in general 14 . Lano, 
employed by a Kurdish organisation in London explains, stating that'one problem 
with the Kurds is that we do not get along together. In the UK alone, there are 33 
Kurdish organisations, mainly based in London. If a funding organisation decides 
to give funding to one Kurdish organisation the whole 33 organisations will apply 
for iV (London Kurdish association 2, para 27). 
In light of the current relative weakness of the Kurdish community association in 
Birmingham, it is important to recall, that the restaurants mentioned earlier are 
primarily run as businesses rather than charitable organisations, their prominence 
in the city thus not resolving the need for a larger and more influential altruistic 
Kurdish community organisation. An Iraqi Kurd from one of the community 
organisations in London, is even wary of some of the recently opened Kurdish 
restaurants in Birmingham. He notes that 'in this city, there is a large number of 
Iraqi Kurds earning money but the majority are illiterate, they can't send a fax, 
they can't reserve a ticket and these restaurants, they operate like agencies, they 
are multi-purpose, they do all the work for them, they transfer money, they sell 
CDs, they do everything. Then those running the restaurants might use people as 
well, some nasty things are going on because there are many people in 
Birmingham earning money but who don't know the system. A proper community 
14 For more information on the contemporary political divisions existing amongst Iraqi Kurds, 
consult Stansfield (2003). 
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organisation with two to three staff is needed in this city so that people can 
approach an organisation that is not profit based but rather service based' 
(London Kurdish association 3, para 99 & 103). It was not possible to test the full 
validity of these claims. Clearly, however, the Iraqi Kurdish community in 
Birmingham is potentially vulnerable to abuse by unscrupulous co-ethnic 
businessmen, the absence of a strong and effective charitable community 
association presenting them with no alternative but to approach the restaurant 
and caf6 bar owners for advice and guidance. Reflecting the possible exposure 
of this group to- deceitful co-ethnics, a Kurdish businessman, -the owner of 
another restaurant in Birmingham, observes that 'wherever Iraqi Kurdish asylum 
seekers and refugees find someone who can speak English and understand and 
give them some advice, they come because they don't have any alternative' 
(Kurdish restaurant 2, para 21). 
A further indication of the importance of establishing a stronger Kurdish 
community association in Birmingham is that, on the basis of my fieldwork, Iraqi 
Kurds seem to prefer approaching a co-ethnic community association for advice 
and support rather than arrange an appointment with a service provider working 
for an unfamiliar mainstream agency or organisation. Indeed, the director of a 
public housing organisation servicing Kurds observes that 'Kurds come to us 
rather than going to an organisation which doesn't understand their background. 
That's why we have a huge demand on our services but we don't have the 
means of offering them what they need. Community centres are very important' 
(London Kurdish association 1, para 67). Similarly, the national co-ordinator of 
the Refugee Integration Forum states that'refugee community associations seem 
to be the organisations that refugees know, they trust them and they will go to 
them' (para 34). 
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As discussed previously, the longstanding established Iraqi Kurds residing in 
Birmingham pre-2001 offered relatively little assistance to their newly arrived co- 
ethnics. However, this pattern changed from 2001 onwards, in response to the 
large growth in the number of dispersed and settled Iraqi Kurds in Birmingham. 
The most common type of support now offered by this group to their newly 
arrived co-ethnics is formal in nature. Indeed, they tend to provide assistance and 
advice as part of their profession, being either employed as asylum seeker and 
refugee support workers in local government or voluntary and charitable agencies 
or self-employed as translators and interpreters. According to the Iraqi Kurds 
interviewed in Birmingham, practical, advisory and translating support, offered 
informally on a voluntary and friendship basis, is usually extended to those Iraqi 
Kurds who are directly related to the longstanding established co-ethnic 
community. 
The social bondina of dispersed Iracii Kurdish asvium seekers in Newcastle, a citv 
containina a small co-ethnic qrou 
From 2001 onwards, newly arrived Iraqi Kurds who reside in Newcastle have 
access to a small group of recently settled co-ethnic asylum seekers and 
refugees, who would have arrived in the city a few years or a few months earlier. 
According to Yardil (para 123), the current population of Iraqi Kurds in Newcastle 
totals 700-800 individuals, with people reaching Newcastle via dispersal or as a 
result of intra-regional migration from more hostile dispersal localities in the North 
East. At the time of my fieldwork, there existed one small Kurdish restaurant in 
Newcastle (Yardil, para 103), some Iraqi Kurds also meeting up occasionally in a 
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Turkish cafd in the city'to play pool and hang out' (Ziryan, para 165). There is no 
longstanding established Iraqi Kurdish community in Newcastle. Finally, there is a 
Kurdish association. However, at the time of my fieldwork in this city, and based 
on my interviews with Iraqi Kurds residing there, it appeared that the association 
had a small membership, no premises and was largely inactive. A community 
advisor, substantiating as well as elaborating upon these views, notes that 'the 
Kurdish community organisation does not function particularly well. The group, 
however, has worked hard. They organised a big party for Newroz, with two 
famous singers. The war in Iraq broke out three days before Newroz which 
dampened the atmosphere at the party. But it did go ahead and it was the first 
self-organised event' (NERS One Stop Shop, para 91). Other activities or 
initiatives do not appear to have taken place since this event. 
The challenges involved in setting up a Kurdish community association in 
Newcastle 
It is important to note that the Iraqi Kurdish community and the voluntary sector in 
Newcastle encountered many difficulties in the process of setting up a community 
organisation. Firstly, as is the case amongst any group of Iraqi Kurds, there were 
ideological divisions and conflicts over the role of politics in the running of the 
community association. Some maintained that the organisation should only 
provide support to members of their political party, whether this be the KDP or the 
PUK, whilst others argued that the association should be politically neutral and 
provide assistance to all Iraqi Kurds in Newcastle, regardless of their political 
affiliation. It would appear that the latter view has emerged from a feeling of deep 
disillusionment with the objectives and activities of the main Kurdish parties. 
Reflecting the view of this sub-group in Newcastle, Naso notes that 'you need to 
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feel free. The KDP and the PUK made a mess of organising and running Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Now we are in the UK, why do we have to associate with one of them? 
Why do we have to have a father to whom we ask for everything? I prefer to be 
independent. The idea behind the Kurdish association is to have somewhere to 
just sit down, have a cup of coffee, have a chat, if you have a problem, it can be 
solved. It's not about exchanging political views, the Kurdish association is not 
the place to do that' (Naso, para 409-411 & 441). Dozdar, remarking upon the 
disillusionment of some Kurds with their political parties, observes that 'you see 
everything going the wrong way, nothing is true in politics. In other places, politics 
are used for the benefit of the country and of people, but it is not the case in my 
country' (Dozdar, para 191). Other members of the Iraqi Kurdish community in 
Newcastle have found it difficult to detach themselves from their identification 
with one of the main political parties because of their past experiences in their 
home-country. Rengo illustrates the enmity that exists between KDP and PUK 
members. He notes that 'I like Kurdish politics but I don't like the KDP, they like 
money too much. The Kurdish people in Iraq are very very hungry but the KDP 
have kept their wealth to themselves' (Rengo, para 89-91). Similarly exemplifying 
the fractions that exist within the Iraqi Kurdish community, Dijwar emphasises 
that'people will think the association is PUK or KDP; they might be from the PUK 
so they will say we shouldn't go to the KDP organisation... The nationalist 
programme is not mature enough, it's fractured' (Dijwar, para 145). 
The existing divisions within the Iraqi Kurdish community in Newcastle appear to 
have been deepened by the prospect of the association acquiring a development 
fund from the Home Office. A community advisor explains the procedure, noting 
that 'all the organisations I work with, the first thing we do with them is apply to 
the Home Office for their RCO development fund which is specifically there for 
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their start up costs for small organisations. From that, they get E5,000. It's a one 
off payment' (NERS One Stop Shop, para 29-31). Two of the Iraqi Kurds 
interviewed in Newcastle have remarked that one of the difficulties encountered 
when trying to set up the community organisation in this city was tied to the 
competition that existed amongst the Kurds for this fund. Indeed, Naso remarks 
that 'it didn't work because they all thought that they could get some money from 
the Home Office funding, they thought they could get away with it, take the 
money and run away' (Naso, para 415). Similarly, Dozdar notes that 'there were 
problems because -of -money, they thought about the benefits they could get' 
(Dozdar, para 18 1 ). 
The challenges involved in setting up an Iraqi Kurdish community association in 
Newcastle are best illustrated by discussing the two meetings that took place in 
the lead up to the election or designation of the organisation's Management 
Committee. The initial meeting, jointly organised by Iraqi Kurds and members of 
voluntary sector organisations, appears to have ended up with first, a military- 
style 'coup' and second, a riot. A community advisor, who was present at the 
meeting, explains that 'the Iraqi Kurds insisted that the police be present. I 
thought that this was to protect them from local residents, if necessary, but the 
police were there in fact to maintain order amongst the Iraqi Kurds themselves. 
One hundred and fifty people attended the meeting. Everyone had brought their 
supporters. There ended up being a 'coup'. I was asked to leave, and when I 
came back, the Kurds on the platform that were there when I left had gone, and a 
new lot were lined up. For the actual elections, there were twelve candidates. All 
of the election process had to be seen by everyone, it had to be done 
democratically. As some of the candidates gained an advantage, a riot in the 
meeting began' (NERS One Stop Shop, para 77-87). An asylum caseworker was 
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also present at the meeting. She argues that 'Iraqi Kurds, they are full of vision, 
enthusiasm but they fight amongst themselves, and that's not just arguing. I had 
to be escorted out of the meeting' (Specialist voluntary agency 3, para 171). 
Likewise, Naso states that 'I was there but I left. There was a riot. They wanted to 
settle all their differences and it wasn't the place to settle differences' (Naso, para 
247). Dozdar, remarking upon the manner in which the Management Committee 
was formed, remarks that 'the election of the Committee was all based on 
relations, it was not an election. I know you and you know me, we come in, we 
make a deal. They asked me to step forward as a candidate but I said no, when I 
saw what was happening. Most people left, like Naso, because they could not 
see any progress. They just walked out. Because of Pishtiwan, I respected him, I 
stayed' (Dozdar, para 177). It would appear that a second meeting was arranged. 
A community advisor, emphasising the neutrality of the eventual leader of the 
association, notes that 'this meeting was supposedly with just the twelve. People 
seemed to agree on the twelve, the difficulty was electing a portion of those 
twelve. Everyone was to meet at the Monument, in the city centre, and the 
meeting would take place in a secret location. At that meeting, those who were 
eventually elected were politically neutral and independent' (NERS One Stop 
Shop, para 89). 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to ascertain with certainty, based on my 
interviews, whether the democratic approach was suggested by local service 
providers and voluntary sector members or by the Iraqi Kurds themselves. 
Retrospectively, however, the Iraqi Kurds interviewed certainly viewed the 
adoption of this approach as a mistake. The imposition of this unfamiliar political 
model onto an already fractured group appears to have fuelled rather than 
attenuated their divisions, leaving the existing Kurdish association in Newcastle 
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with minimal support from its co-ethnic population. Dijwar certainly appears to 
explain that the riot originated from Iraqi Kurds' unfamiliarity and discomfort with 
democratic principles. He notes that'someone said to me, we have elections and 
you have to come because we will support you. I was a solicitor in my country 
and people know my father. I didn't want to go because I sensed that something 
wrong would happen. The election was a disaster because we are not coming 
from a country that is based on democracy and elections. Democracy is not in the 
political system' (Dijwar, para 139-141). Naso, discussing how leaders are 
usually chosen in his community, states that 'I don't think it's a good way to do it, 
to set it up by election. It's never been done. It's about people who are 
committed' (Naso, para 249). It would appear that members of the voluntary 
organisations also came to understand and accept the 'Kurdish way'. A 
community advisor, for instance, remarks retrospectively that 'Pishtiwan is not 
necessarily a democratically elected representative, but he is able to speak about 
Kurdish issues and he is an expert' (NERS One Stop Shop, para 95-97). 
Interestingly, the difficulties encountered in Newcastle in setting up a Kurdish 
community association were not apparent to the researcher in Birmingham. It is 
possible that the presence of the private Kurdish restaurants, for KDP and PUK 
members, and the support these meeting places offered, diffused the pressing 
need to have access to a Kurdish association in Birmingham. As a result, those 
who were committed to setting up a charitable Kurdish association encountered 
less opposition from the various conflicting camps. Furthermore, the 
Management Committee in Birmingham might not have been aware of the Home 
Office's E5,000 development fund available to new organisations. Consequently, 
the problems surrounding the competition for this resource were not present. 
Moreover, Iraqi Kurds in Birmingham might have enjoyed greater freedom, from 
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the voluntary sector and local service providers, concerning the way in which the 
Management Committee was chosen. 
Significantly, in Newcastle, there is no established Iraqi Kurdish community and, 
according to Arenan (para 61), people who have arrived recently'are not thinking 
about forming an organisation, they are more concerned about getting on with 
their lives or making plans to go back to Kurdistan'. This state of affairs was 
certainly viewed as stunting the development of a Kurdish association by one of 
the Iraqi Kurds interviewed in Newcastle. Indeed, Naso recounts the difficulties 
he encountered in finding an experienced, appropriate and willing leader who 
would be accepted by the Iraqi Kurds. Incidentally, the following comments 
reiterate one of the fundamentals of Kurdish identity, namely that being Kurdish 
involves being anti-Arab. Naso states that 'there is a chap, he was the head of 
the Iraqi Association in Middlesborough, he has been here since the 1970s, he 
fled the Ba'ath regime and he has been hunted by members of the Ba'ath party 
here in the North East. I nominated him, he is the best one, he knows about 
everything, he can contribute and he is not a person who is doing it to gain some 
money. But the Kurds in Newcastle, they said that he is Arab and he does not 
speak Kurdish so how can he represent the Kurd, how can he be the co- 
ordinator? But we need him to run the association, it's a big responsibility. The 
one who runs the association should know about fund raising, he has experience. 
He has stability in his life, he knows about Halabja, why don't we let him? His 
father sacrificed himself for the sake of the Kurds and now, people turn around 
and say that he is Arab. That guy was full of motivation. We said he was Kurd, 
but he can't speak Kurdish. Why? Because in the past he was forcibly moved 
from the place he used to live to the South of Iraq and there, they all speak 
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Arabic, it's circumstantial, it's not that he wanted to learn Arabic' (Naso, para 419 
& 427). 
Newcastle's lack of popularity amongst Iraqi Kurds 
It would appear that the overall lack of popularity of Newcastle amongst Iraqi 
Kurds arises primarily from the North East's low availability of employment 
opportunities and the antagonism directed towards the group under study from 
the host communities in this locality. The latter two issues are discussed 
extensively in chapters five and six. Furthermore, Newcastle is not as favoured a 
destination for NASS dispersals as Birmingham. The ensuing relatively small size 
of the Iraqi Kurdish community in Newcastle constitutes, in itself, a disincentive, a 
Kurdish asylum caseworker observing that 'Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers don't 
want to go to the North of England, not because we don't like it but because there 
is no large Kurdish community there and everything is new for us. We have to 
stay with our friends for a while to become familiar with the system' (Birmingham 
Kurdish association, para 124). Anik, an asylum seeker living in Birmingham who 
was initially dispersed to Stockton, in the North East, illustrates the challenges 
that may be encountered by those Iraqi Kurds who reside in a locality with a small 
or non existent co-ethnic community. She remarks that 'it was so difficult for me 
living in the North because I would never see anyone from my community and I 
was very new. Even if I wanted to ask about something, I couldn't find a friend or 
a colleague, or somebody who could speak my language. For example, I didn't 
know the offices, I didn't know the market, I didn't know anything. They put me in 
front of a station, I never knew how to use trains because we don't have such 
things. I speak English but whom should I ask, and ask what? I was given a ticket 
and I can read and I can speak but still it was difficult. I was so nervous that I 
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wouldn't reach the place on time, and then I would be responsible because they 
told me if you don't go there tonight, I will be responsible, I was so scared, I was 
so nervous. Just imagine if you can't read, you can't speak, he is not educated, 
he comes to this country and then he has to take care of those things ' (Anik, 
para 261). 
4.4.3 The significance of the gender, marital status and age of those who 
are dispersed 
The impact of the dispersal policy on the social bonds of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers is increased in some instances and mitigated in others 
depending upon the gender 15 , marital status and age of those who are 
dispersed. 
The impact of the dispersal policy on the co-ethnic social bonding of asylum 
seekers is made worse by being female and improved by being male. The 
significant gender imbalance amongst the latest group of Iraqi Kurdish arrivals to 
the UK (from 1998 onwards), with men by far outnumbering women, placed in the 
context of an Iraqi Kurdish culture where male-female friendships are firmly 
proscribed outside of marriage, significantly decreases the chances for women to 
develop co-ethnic social bonds in comparison to men (Firyal, para 67-71). The 
other Iraqi Kurdish women interviewed support this view. The more limited 
opportunities that refugee women possess to socially bond, compared to men, 
has been previously noted in other research (Refugee Council and British Red 
Cross, in Home Office, 2005a: 26). 
15 For infortnation on asylum seeker and refugee women in general, refer to Dumper (2002), 
Ceneda (2003; 2004), Refugee Council (2005b). 
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Combining gender and marital status, being a single dispersed woman increases 
the detrimental effect of dispersal on their social bonds more than being a 
married woman accompanied by her spouse. This phenomena occurs because 
the former are less numerous than the already small group of women and tend to 
associate primarily with other single women. Certainly, according to the single 
Iraqi Kurdish women interviewed, common ground is difficult to identify with 
married women accompanied by their spouse given their differing socio- 
economic and even cultural backgrounds. Additionally, married women 
accompanied by their spouse benefit from limited spare time to meet and 
socialise with single women, the former's focus being primarily their life with their 
children and husband. Indeed, 'mostly the other Kurdish women came with their 
family and their mind is occupied with their husband and those things. They are 
not in a position to pay back a visit, go shopping because normally our women, 
once they get married, they don't have anything personal for themselves' (Anik in 
Gurzi, para 144-152). Furthermore, single women tend to clash, culturally, with 
the majority of their co-ethnic community, this phenomenon adding to their sense 
of isolation. Single female dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers in the UK tend 
to originate from wealthier families and possess a higher level of education as 
well as more liberal ideas than the other dispersed Iraqi Kurdish women. Thus, 
the former maintain that women should be able to rely upon themselves, appear 
in public places and engage in friendships with women of other nationalities and 
backgrounds without this having repercussions on their reputation and the 
honour of their family. Anik, a single woman who lives in Birmingham, notes that 
'when I go shopping, I have to watch what I wear. When I was in Kurdistan, I 
never paid attention to those things because whatever they say, they know my 
family, it's not like they can misinterpret it. Here, they will say that she is living 
alone, look at what she is wearing. Who knows what she's doing. They can 
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misinterpret everything you do. I am very careful here because I don't have my 
family with me. The single Kurdish women here, in Birmingham, we are afraid, 
and that's why we are very careful and we just talk to each other and that's it' 
(Anik in Gurzi, para 158 W 63-176). As a result, Anik adds, 'I have contact with a 
few Kurdish men, those who I know already and who are educated. But with the 
rest of the people, I am not so into it. It's so difficult to find a friend here, very 
rarely can you find a woman and you can't talk to the uneducated men even if 
you want to, maybe his mentality won't accept it. You just can't be open, you just 
have to keep everything for yourself. I just take some measures to be careful until 
I get my asylum decision or know where I am' (Anik, para 45 & 139). 
On another occasion, Anik recounts that 'once I had a meeting with a man who 
came from London, regarding the work of an organisation I volunteer for. I 
couldn't invite him to my home because of what the Kurdish community might say 
so I told him that I would meet him in the city centre. I chose a very public bar so 
that everyone can see that I am sitting seriously with the man. Soon I saw one 
Kurdish guy, he'd been coming and going just to show me I saw you'. He sat 
down opposite our table for awhile. One hour later I looked up and the Kurdish 
man was standing there, watching. The man from London noticed that this 
Kurdish man was looking at me and asked me if he was my boyfriend. I was very 
embarrassed. Here, there is no one to support me. This guy in the coffee shop 
that was watching me, I couldn't tell him, stop it, you are not allowed to do this. 
He could then say bad things, and what could I doT (Anik in Gurzi, para 163- 
176). 
In turn, being a dispersed married woman accompanied by their spouse 
augments the harmful effect of dispersal on their social bonds more than being a 
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single man or a married man accompanied by their spouse. This is tied to the 
former's experience of the gender-specific division of chores and tasks, 
particularly common amongst middle to lower class Iraqi Kurds, that mainly 
confines married women to the domestic sphere of their home. Indeed, married 
men tend to be tasked with resolving welfare and immigration problems and with 
looking for and securing work, approaching, in the process, fellow co-ethnics for 
advice and help whilst married women are commonly responsible for house- 
bound tasks namely the upkeep of the home and child nurturing and rearing. The 
way in which the daily tasks are distributed amongst men and women is based 
upon the premise that a woman's honour is fragile and that it is most effectively 
protected by secluding her in the home, thereby sheltering her from the potential 
threats that non-related men circulating in the public arena might pose. This 
division of labour does not constrain married women's social life in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, since each resides in an area where they have relatives and existing 
friends who can visit them in their homes. However, this pattern of work does 
lead to a pronounced experience of isolation when living abroad, in a locality 
containing few pre-dispersal relatives or acquaintances. As Firyal notes, 'the 
women are trying to make friends and relationships with each other but it's not a 
very public thing. It has to be through meetings and they are not very organised, 
there is no way for them to meet' (Firyal, para 67-71). Importantly, it would 
appear that the men tend to oppose women's attempts to break out of their 
isolation, observing and judging their behaviour and activities if these are situated 
beyond the expected cultural norms. According to Enwa, women in turn feel 
observed and socially controlled by their co-ethnic men (Enwa, p4ra 127 & 147). 
Cenik who lives in Birmingham with her husband states that 'when I go out, 
maybe one of the Kurdish men sees me, they will say, look, she is going out. I 
saw her twice today, three times in a week, maybe she is not good. I would like to 
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work but I can't, maybe the Kurds say something. Everything is limited. In my 
country, if there is gossip about me, it's not important because my family knows 
me, they don't believe anyone but here in the UK, my family are not here to see 
what I do, so if they hear gossip about me, they will not know what to believe' 
(Cenik, para 193 & 203). 
Being a dispersed married man accompanied by their spouse intensifies the 
negative efiect of dispersal on their social bonds more than being a single man'6. 
Indeed, the former appear to strongly prefer the companionship of other married 
men and yet the predominant majority of the Iraqi Kurdish asy lum seeking 
population as well as those dispersed are single men (London Kurdish 
association 2, para 115 & 119). Interestingly, the finding, in this research, that the 
negative impact of the dispersal policy on the co-ethnic social bonds of Iraqi 
Kurdish dispersed asylum seekers is intensified by being a married man 
accompanied by their spouse and lessened by being a single man is distinctive. 
Similarly, albeit to a lesser degree than gender and marital status, the age of 
dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers affects the impact of the dispersal policy 
on their co-ethnic social bonds. Indeed, being aged 40 and above increases the 
harmful impact of the dispersal policy on their social bonds, more so than being 
aged between 21 and 29. The former encounter fewer opportunities for social 
bonding because of the demographic traits of the dispersed co-ethnic population, 
in 2002,74% being aged between 21 and 29 and 20% between 30 and 39 
16 In this case, the single men category includes unmarried and widowed men as well as married 
men whose spouse and children do not currently reside with them in the UK. The married men 
category corresponds to those men who are accompanied in the UK by their spouse, with or 
without their children. 
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(Heath, Jeffries and Purcell, 2004) 17 . This finding corroborates anecdotal 
evidence, the Refugee Council noting that 'from experience we know that older 
people are more likely to face isolation and loneliness' (Refugee Council, 2004d: 
16). These trends, regarding marital status, gender and age illustrate that a 
person's contact with a co-ethnic community does not necessarily overlap with 
their access to fulfilling co-ethnic social bonds. 
In sum, the hypothesis that the dispersal policy wields a negative impact on the 
social bonds of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers because this policy sends 
this group to localities where there are no settled co-ethnics categorically applies, 
in particular to those dispersed before 2001. Significantly, the dispersal policy 
should also have detrimentally affected co-ethnic social bonding from 2001 
onwards. However, in practice, certain unforeseen and unplanned circumstances 
occurred at this point in time and alleviated the policy's negative effects. Indeed, 
in 2000, following a significant rise in the quantity of new Iraqi applications for 
asylum, an increase in the total number of dispersals and NASS' tendency to 
disperse asylum seekers to a relatively small number of localities, spontaneous, 
non policy-engineered, co-ethnic clusters began to form in the dispersal areas. 
Thus, from 2001, the dispersal authorities were increasingly'sending asylum 
seekers, albeit largely unintentionally, to areas containing groups of settled co- 
ethnics and consequently, for those asylum seekers dispersed from this date 
onwards, the dispersal policy exercises a less negative impact on their social 
bonds, relative to its effect pre-2001. Notwithstanding this improvement, for 
asylum seekers dispersed from 2001 onwards, the impact of the dispersal policy 
on their co-ethnic social bonding can still be harmful, particularly for those who 
are sent to areas containing a relatively small Iraqi Kurdish group, Newcastle's 7- 
17 The percentages are from the total number of Iraqis aged 21 and above. Cý 
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800 co-ethnics being viewed as insufficient and Birmingham's 10-12,000 Iraqi 
Kurds as highly satisfactory. It is noteworthy that the impact of the dispersal 
policy on the co-ethnic social bonds of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is 
experienced by individuals as either more or less detrimental, depending on their 
gender, marital status and age. Certainly, women suffer the negative effect of 
dispersal more than men; single women, married women and men accompanied 
by their spouse endure the negative consequences more than single men; and 
those aged 40 and above as well as those aged between 30 and 39 suffer the 
negative impact of dispersal more than those aged between 21 and 29. 
4.5 The impact of the dispersal policy on the co-ethnic social bondinq of 
dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees 
4.5.1 Dispersed refugees who move away from their dispersal locality 
following the receipt of their authorisation to stay in the UK 
The dispersal policy ceases to affect the local co-ethnic social bonding of 
dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees who leave their dispersal area following the 
receipt of their authorisation to remain in the UK. Dispersed refugees are freer to 
leave their dispersal locality than dispersed asylum seekers, the former, unlike 
the latter, possessing the right to move and choose their place of residence 
without this decision affecting their welfare entitlements. Significantly, this was 
indeed the case until July 2004, date when the Asylum and Immigration Act 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc ... ) 2004 received Royal Assent. Indeed, section 11 
of this Act amends the homelessness provisions in the Housing Act 1999 by 
stipulating that a refugee develops a local connection with the local authority in 
the locality he was dispersed to as an asylum seeker. Thus, from July 2004 
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onwards, dispersed refugees who wish to secure social housing are only entitled 
to make an application in their dispersal locality. It has not been possible to 
capture the experiences of those affected by this new measure in my fieldwork, 
the latter coming to a close in March 2004. Unfortunately, there is no statistical 
data available on the residential location of dispersed refugees across the UK 
and therefore it is impossible to quantify the proportion of this group who relocate, 
and by extension the percentage whose co-ethnic social bonds are no longer 
affected by the dispersal policy". However, it has been possible, based on my 
fieldwork, to identify the characten stics and circumstances of the dispersed 
refugees who are most and least likely to move following the receipt of their right 
to remain. 
Prior to presenting these traits, it is necessary to note that the dispersal policy 
indirectly impacts upon the local co-ethnic social bonds of some of the dispersed 
refugees who leave their dispersal locality following the receipt of their permission 
to remain in the UK. The social bonds of the dispersed refugees who move to 
another dispersal locality rather than relocate to the South East of England, a 
non-dispersal region, are impacted upon by the dispersal policy in a similar way 
as the dispersed refugees who remain in their initial dispersal area. However, the 
effect is less negative because it is likely that the former group chose another 
dispersal area as their new residence because, amongst other things, of the 
greater social bonds available to them there. 
18 For a discussion on the deficiencies of UK asylum and refugee statistical data, consult Stewart 
(2004). 
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The characteristics and circumstances of the disoersed refuaees who are most 
and least likely to move following the receipt of their right to remain 
Firstly, concerning age, the dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees who are most likely 
to relocate after the receipt of their right to remain in the UK tend to be under 40 
years old, the most mobile group seemingly being those aged between 21 and 29 
years. This set of individuals is more prone to move away because 
psychologically they are ostensibly more responsive to and comfortable with new, 
unfamiliar environments as well as change. Moreover, it would appear that this 
age group is more actively searching to rebuild their life and establish themselves 
in the UK than those aged 40 and above. Additionally, their physical health and 
energy levels tend to be superior. Significantly, those aged 40 and above are 
aware that their employment prospects, in their dispersal area as well -as 
elsewhere, are minimal, compared to those aged between 21 and 39 (Refugee 
Council, 2004d: 16; Refugee Council and British Red Cross, in Home Office, 
2005a: 26). Indeed, employers generally prefer younger workers. 
Moreover, those aged 40 and above possess greater difficulties in acquiring a 
good level of English language proficiency. They also find it more challenging to 
adapt to an unfamiliar labour market and/or accept jobs that lie well below their 
qualifications and home-country work experience. As a result, this group's 
reluctance to move is strengthened by knowing that their employment 
opportunities elsewhere in the UK are no better than in their current dispersal 
locality. For instance, Mezdar, a refugee living in Newcastle states that I can't 
work here, I cannot re-train, I am too old for that. So that is why the North or the 
South of England, it is all the same for me' (Mezdar, para 9). Similarly, Nebez has 
also settled in Newcastle following the receipt of his status because I am 41 
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years old, there isn't any work for me and I am not young enough to work in the 
pizza shops' (Nebez, para 163). 
It is noteworthy that Iraq! Kurdish men who are aged under 40, especially those 
aged between 21 and 29 years old, are most likely to develop lasting amorous 
relationships with host-community members residing in their initial dispersal 
locality. Indeed, significant proportions amongst this age group are single on their 
arrival in the UK and find it easier to adapt to the host-society. Consequently, 
some persons who are under 40 are as likely to settle in their dispersal locality as 
individuals aged 40 and above. 
Considering marital status alone, it would seem that all dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
refugees possess a propensity to relocate following the receipt of their permission 
to live in the UK. Certainly, single men may tend to move away from their 
dispersal locality because they possess no dependents and it is also relatively 
easy for them to obtain accommodation elsewhere in the UK, temporarily or 
permanently, in the abode of an acquaintance. Single women may also be 
inclined to relocate since they benefit from having no dependents and, as 
discussed earlier, they are likely to possess less social bonds in their dispersal. 
locality. Those members of this group who do leave their dispersal locality most 
generally settle in Greater London where the majority of the co-ethnics 
possessing a similar socio-economic background to their own reside. It is notable 
that single women are liable to encounter more difficulties in securing 
accommodation with acquaintances than single men because of concerns over 
their honour being damaged if they reside in a dwelling alongside single men. 
Anik, for instance, notes that 'I have an aunt who lives in London but it is not 
possible for me to go there. You know the state of the houses there and she is 
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living with her son because she needs someone to take care of her, she is about 
70 years old, and it's not proper for me to live there with him' (Anik, para 95). 
Similar to the case of single women, married men and women accompanied by 
their spouse, but with no children, tend to experience less social bonding in their 
dispersal area than single men who have no dependants. Therefore some 
members of this group have a propensity to leave their dispersal locality, shared 
accommodation with acquaintances being nevertheless more difficult to 
encounter than for single men, a married couple, particularly in Iraqi Kurdish 
culture, requiring more privacy and space. Importantly, married men and women, 
with no children tend to possess greater chances of acquiring social housing 
elsewhere in the UK than singles. The latter are prone to reside, when able to 
obtain their own housing, in a private sector rented dwelling. Entering this part of 
the housing market constitutes a challenge because of this group's difficulty in 
finding a landlord who accepts housing benefit claimants as well as raising the 
funds necessary for a deposit". Importantly, social housing is highly sought after 
amongst Iraqi Kurds. Oubat, for instance, highly values his opportunity to 
possess this form of housing. He observes that 'I have been very lucky, I got a 
council house after waiting for only five months. Normally it is very difficult to get 
this kind of house' (Qubat, para 7). Similarly, Erdehan refers to his council flat 
and the accumulation of household possessions when accounting for his 
settlement in Birmingham, noting in addition, that the Kurds who leave this city 
tend to do so prior to applying for accommodation. Indeed, he remarks that 'I 
applied for this flat and they gave it to me within two months, then I bought things 
19 The Audit Commission suggests that rent guarantee and deposit schemes should be developed in 
response to these problems (Audit Commission, 2000a: 53). 
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and I stayed here. But those people who leave Birmingham, they hadn't applied 
for a house, they left immediately' (Erdehan, para 339). 
Finally, married men and women with children, although perhaps less free to 
leave their dispersal area than the other groups mentioned because their children 
might be settled in school, may still choose to leave their dispersal area, this set 
of individuals having less social bonds in their dispersal locality than single men. 
Significantly, some parents would like their children to grow up in an Iraqi Kurdish 
Muslim environment, an aim that requires relocating to the principal 
concentrations of Iraqi Kurds in the UK (Connexions). As in the case of married 
men and women with no children, sharing an abode with acquaintances living 
elsewhere in the host-country tends to be difficult because of the greater need 
this group has for space as well as privacy compared to singles. Concomitantly, 
this set of individuals is more likely to be entitled to social housing than singles or 
even married men and women accompanied by their spouse, with no children. 
Gender, considered in isolation from age or marital status, does not appear, on 
the basis of my fieldwork, to influence whether or not individuals are likely to 
leave or remain in their dispersal locality following the receipt of their refugee 
status. 
Concerning levels of English language proficiency, it would appear that those 
refugees benefiting from a good standard of English are as likely to settle in their 
dispersal locality or alternatively move away as those possessing a poor level of 
English. The determining factors, in this instance, are rather the spatial location of 
employment opportunities as well as that of co-ethnic English speakers. Those 
refugees who possess a good level of English will remain in their dispersal area if 
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jobs are available in the area, regardless of whether or not there are co-ethnic 
English speakers in that locality willing to help them find work as well as mediate 
and interpret for them in the workplace. On the other hand, if the work prospects 
in the dispersal locality are poor, this group will relocate elsewhere: In turn, those 
refugees who have a poor level of English will only settle in their dispersal locality 
if labour is in demand in the area and there are locally based co-ethnic English 
speakers prepared to assist them. In contrast, if the employment opportunities in 
the dispersal area are limited, this set of individuals will move 20 . 
Dispersed refugees' access to formal work whilst being asylum seekers appears 
to influence the degree to which they are prone to stay in their dispersal area or 
move away following the receipt of their immigration status, those applying for 
asylum before July 2002 being permitted to work formally and those registering 
afterwards being prohibited. Certainly, refugees who as asylum seekers were 
permitted to obtain formal work and were successful in securing it are more prone 
to settle in their dispersal area since firstly, they might be able to continue 
working in the formal job they had when they were asylum seekers. In addition, 
they are likely to have acquired, throughout the duration of their asylum 
application, a degree of familiarity with the opportunities available to them in the 
local labour market. They are also prone to possessing a network of local 
professional contacts, developed whilst they were working. These factors can 
facilitate the finding of a future formal job in their current dispersal area. 
Moreover, this group's overall capacity to become formally employed is 
significantly enhanced by the opportunity they had, as asylum seekers, to 
develop a portfolio of formal work experience as well as improve their English 
20 According to my fieldwork, the dispersal scheme under which refugees were dispersed, as LI 
asylum seekers, does not seem to influence their likelihood of relocating or settling in their 
dispersal locality after receiving their right to remain in the UK. Cý 
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language proficiency whilst working alongside host-community members, the 
latter being a far less common occurrence when employed informally. This 
group's improved employability is likely to enhance their overall ability to obtain 
formal work locally. In contrast, refugees who as asylum seekers were not 
entitled to seek formal employment are more inclined to leave because firstly, 
they are not in formal employment, on receipt of their immigration status. 
Furthermore, they have not had the same opportunity as the previous group to 
familiarise themselves with the workings and prospects of the local, formal labour 
market as well as develop suitable professional contacts. In addition, their 
employability is customarily low since they possess no formal work experience to 
date in the UK and have had few opportunities to improve the level of their 
English language proficiency beyond the classroom environment of the ESOL 
lessons. As a result, this group tends to be more obliged to relocate and rely on 
the assistance of more informed co-ethnics residing elsewhere in the UK. It is 
noteworthy that some of the refugees who accessed formal work as asylum 
seekers also leave their dispersal locality in search of employment prospects 
elsewhere, all the while relying upon the formal work experience they gained and 
the opportunity they possessed to practice their English as asylum seekers. 
The date dispersed refugees are granted their permission to remain in the UK 
influences the extent to which this group is inclined to remain in their dispersal 
locality or relocate. Those individuals who were granted their refugee status prior 
to 2001 are most prone to relocating, customarily moving to the South East of 
England, particularly Greater London, since at that time, the number of Iraqi 
Kurds living in the dispersal localities was very low. In contrast, those persons 
who were given their refugee status from 2001 onwards are more likely to stay in 
their dispersal area given the larger size, by then, of the co-ethnic population in 
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the dispersal localities. It is notable that some of this latter group of refugees 
leave their dispersal area, despite having access locally to a sizeable co-ethnic 
group, because it is difficult to obtain work or they wish to live near a close 
relative or friend, explore another dispersal locality or experience life in the 
famous and prestigious capital city. 
The traits of the dispersal locality in which dispersed refugees reside affect the 
degree to which they are prone to stay in their dispersal area or move away. 
Indeed, dispersed refugees are most likely to relocate firstly, if formal 
employment prospects in their dispersal locality are low. Reflecting upon the 
centrality of work, Delav remarks that his place of residence in the UK is purely 
dependent on the location of his job, noting that 'where I live in the future 
depends on work. If I continue to have a job in Birmingham, I will stay here. If not, 
I will go where there is work for me' (Delav, para 69). A Kurdish asylum 
caseworker, noting that lack of work constitutes a significant driver of migration 
away from the initial dispersal locality, observes that 'there are too many refugees 
living in Birmingham and not enough formal work. The employment agencies in 
Glasgow, the rest of the Midlands, they have a better choice. So, after a few 
years, once the Kurds know how to travel, how to get accommodation, how to 
approach the other branches of the employment agencies in Bristol, Manchester 
or Southampton, when they speak a bit more English and they have their refugee 
status, some of them, they leave Birmingham because they want to find a job and 
a better life' (Birmingham Kurdish association, para 54). Similarly, Erdehan 
remarks that 'there are many jobs in Birmingham but there are also many young 
men, including refugees, wanting to work. More of my friends who came with me 
to Birmingham have now left to another city in search of work, only some have 
stayed' (Erdehan, para 85 & 339). The manager of a voluntary sector agency, 
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presenting the case of refugees who were dispersed as asylum seekers to 
Newcastle, observes that 'there is a problem for refugees everywhere in gaining 
employment but there is high unemployment in the North East so it is even more 
difficult to get jobs. That is why there is still a drift back to London and other cities 
where they think there will be more employment opportunities' (Manager, 
Voluntary agency B, para 65). Naso, referring specifically to Iraq! Kurdish 
refugees, notes that 'the majority leave Newcastle because they want to find work 
and there are not many jobs here. They have links all over the country, they go 
down to Birmingham, Coventry, Southampton, Ipswich, Peterborough. When they 
hear there is a job in a certain area, they will apply for it' (Naso, para 85 & 339). 
Secondly, dispersed refugees are most prone to leave if the group of locally 
resident co-ethnics is small, the ensuing potential for social bonding, examined 
earlier, and its accompanying benefits being minimal. Thirdly, dispersed refugees 
are most inclined to move away if the host-community is monocultural, 
particularly if the dominant group is white British, because this set of 
circumstances lends itself most often to host-community antagonism towards 
refugees. Finally, dispersed refugees most commonly depart when their dispersal 
locality is relatively small, its size customarily limiting the demand for labour and 
making this group more visible to potentially hostile host-community members. In 
contradistinction, dispersed refugees are most prone to stay in their dispersal 
locality if formal work opportunities in their dispersal area are relatively high, if the 
set of locally resident co-ethnics is adequately large, if the host-community is 
multicultural and if the dispersal area itself is relatively large. 
Importantly, the level of deprivation in dispersed refugees' residential wards does 
not appear to affect the geographical mobility of this group, most asylum seekers 
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and refugees across the UK residing primarily in highly deprived wards. 
Moreover, whilst Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees express clear 
housing preferences, namely for under-occupied, well-maintained self-catering 
shared houses or flats rather than overcrowded, dilapidated, full-board hostels, 
the housing traits of a dispersal locality do not appear to influence the spatial 
mobility of this group. Employment prospects, instead, take precedence followed 
by size of co-ethnic group, ethno-cultural traits of host-community members and 
size of the dispersal locality. 
The location of obtainable social or private sector housing or of accommodation 
made available by a relative or friend in their home affects the degree to which 
refugees are likely to stay in their dispersal area or move away. Certainly, 
refugees who possess housing or accommodation opportunities elsewhere in the 
UK move there if their dispersal locality's traits are unsatisfactory, in the terms 
examined above and the characteristics of their area of destination are suitable, 
particularly with regards to employment opportunities. Similarly, refugees who 
have housing or accommodation offers in their dispersal locality will contemplate 
settling there if the latter's characteristics are more satisfactory than the traits of 
any other areas in the UK where they might be able to obtain an abode. 
Finally, the time dispersed refugees spend in their dispersal area as asylum 
seekers influences the degree to which they are inclined to remain or leave their 
dispersal locality. Those who resided there as asylum seekers for a short period 
of time, for six months or less, feel less settled and familiar with the locality and 
consequently are more prone to relocate, on the condition that employment 
prospects and social bonds in particular are considered better in the destination 
locality. Conversely, dispersed refugees who, as asylum seekers, resided in their 
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dispersal locality for a long period of time tend to experience a greater sense of 
attachment to this area. As a result, they are less likely to move away, providing 
that work opportunities and social bonding in particular are viewed as more 
adequate in the dispersal locality, compared to elsewhere in the UK. Illustrating 
this latter phenomenon, Hazo notes that 'it is difficult to move from here. I came 
to Birmingham in 1997. After one year I got my status and I had learnt English. 
By then, I knew a lot of things about this city. I knew where everything was, the 
Refugee Council, the shops, the government offices, the colleges. Why should I 
make the decision to go to London? It will take me another year to know where 
the places are that I need for my life. If there is no specific reason, why should I 
moveT (Hazo, para 74). As Lane remarks, 'it's not easy to change again and 
start from the beginning' in a new city (Lane, para 55). 
On the basis of this discussion, it would seem that dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
refugees aged between 21 and 29 years old, who resided, as asylum seekers, for 
a comparatively short period of time, in a relatively small dispersal locality 
characterised by low employment opportunities, a small co-ethnic group and a 
monocultural host-community and who have housing available for them 
elsewhere in the UK in a locality suitable to their needs are most inclined to 
relocate on receipt of their permission to stay in the UK. As a result, it is likely that 
the local co-ethnic social bonds of this group cease to be affected by the 
dispersal policy. Some of the dispersed refugees interviewed left their dispersal 
area on receipt of their permission to stay in the UK. Gernaz, for instance, states 
that he moved to Birmingham from Newcastle as a refugee 'because there is a 
large community of Kurds here' (Gernaz, para 375). 
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Conversely, it would appear that dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees aged 40 and 
above, who accessed formal work as asylum seekers, who were sent to their 
dispersal locality from 2001 onwards and resided, as asylum seekers, for a 
comparatively long period of time, in a relatively large dispersal area typified by 
comparatively high employment prospects, a large co-ethnic group and a 
multicultural host-community and who have housing available for them in their 
dispersal area are most prone to remain in their dispersal locality on receipt of 
their authorisation to remain in the UK. 
Consequently, it is likely that the local co-ethnic social bonds of this group 
continue to be impacted upon by the dispersal policy. Several of the dispersed 
refugees that participated in my research remained in their dispersal area 
following the receipt of their authorisation to stay in the UK. Erdehan, for 
example, notes that 'Birmingham is good for us now, I feel like it's my country 
because anything I want, I can do it. I don't have any family in the UK but I have 
some friends in Birmingham, they are like family, like brothers and uncles' 
(Erdehan, para 137 & 225). In the same way, Bendewar, remarks that 'we like 
living in Birmingham, it's got refugees and asylum seekers. When we're here, it's 
like we're in Iraq, you see lots of people just like yourself, of your own religion. 
And whatever you do, they don't say anything about it' (Bendewar, para 24). 
Equally, Sabar notes that 'all my friends in Newcastle help me. We go on holiday 
together to Scotland. But in Birmingham, there are too many people and it is very 
dirty, there are also a lot of problems with Kurds. There are also a lot of Afghanis 
and Albanians, sometimes they are fighting over drugs. Some Kurds are selling 
and taking drugs. It is not nice. Innocent people are dying for money' (Sabar, 
para 91). 
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4.5.2 Dispersed refugees who remain in their dispersal locality following the 
receipt of their permission to stay in the UK 
The main changes that occur on receipt of an individual's refugee status, for 
those who stay in their dispersal locality, are as follows: a greater sense of 
security and permanence regarding residence in the UK, the granting of a formal 
work permit and the need to obtain alternative housing. Importantly, dispersal 
accommodation is only provided to new refugees for 28 additional days, following 
the receipt of their permission to remain in the UK. It would seem, however, that 
these changes do not affect the local co-ethnic social bonds of dispersed 
refugees who settle in their dispersal area and consequently, the impact of the 
dispersal policy on this aspect of integration is identical to the effect the policy 
had on these same individuals when they were asylum seekers. Thus, the 
dispersal policy exerts a harmful impact on the social bonds of dispersed Iraqi 
Kurdish refugees who were dispersed and received their permission to remain in 
the UK before 2001. However, for those dispersed refugees who were granted 
their authorization to stay in the UK from 2001 onwards, the dispersal policy has 
a less negative impact on their social bonds, relative to its effect pre-2001. 
Despite this amelioration, for the latter group of dispersed refugees, the impact of 
the dispersal policy on their co-ethnic social bonding can still be negative, 
especially for those who are sent to localities possessing a comparatively small 
Iraqi Kurdish group. 
It is significant that the impact of the dispersal policy on the co-ethnic social 
bonds of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees is, as in the case of asylum seekers, 
experienced by individuals as either more or less damaging, depending on their 
gender, marital status and age. Indeed, women aggravate the effect of dispersal 
181 
more than men; single women, married women and men accompanied by their 
spouse worsen the influence of dispersal more than single men; and those aged 
40 and above as well as those aged between 30 and 39 intensify the negative 
impact of dispersal more than those aged between 21 and 29. 
To sum up, the hypothesis that the dispersal policy wields a negative impact on 
the social bonds of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees is incorrect if applied to 
those who depart from their dispersal area following the receipt of their 
authorisation to stay in the UK. However, the hypothesis is valid for the dispersed 
refugees who settled in their dispersal locality after they have received their 
permission to stay in the UK, the impact being identical to that of dispersed 
asylum seekers. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the impact of the dispersal policy on dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees' participation in co-ethnic social bonding has been 
examined. As a means of directing my analysis, the following hypothesis has 
been tested: the contemporary UK dispersal policy exercises a negative impact 
on the social bonds of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees 
because this policy sends this group to localities were there are no settled co- 
ethnics. It has been concluded firstly, that the dispersal policy wields a negative 
impact on the social bonds of those asylum seekers who were dispersed before 
2001 because at that time, the dispersal authorities were sending this group to 
localities where there were no settled co-ethnics. However, as a result of 
changes taking places in 2000, from 2001 onwards the dispersal authorities were 
increasingly sending asylum seekers, albeit largely unintentionally, to areas 
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containing groups of settled co-ethnics and consequently, for those asylum 
seekers dispersed from this date onwards, the dispersal policy exercises a less 
negative impact on their social bonds, relative to its effect pre-2001. 
Notwithstanding this improvement, for asylum seekers dispersed from 2001 
onwards, the impact of the dispersal policy on their co-ethnic social bonding can 
still be harmful, particularly for those who are sent to areas containing a relatively 
small Iraqi Kurdish group. It is noteworthy that the impact of the dispersal policy 
on the co-ethnic social bonds of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is 
experienced by individuals as either more or less detrimental, depending on their 
gender, marital status and age. Secondly, it has been concluded that the 
dispersal policy ceases to affect the local co-ethnic social bonding of dispersed 
Iraqi Kurdish refugees who leave their dispersal area following the receipt of their 
authorisation to remain in the UK. Finally, it would appear that the main changes 
that occur on receipt of an individual's refugee status do not affect the local co- 
ethnic social bonds of dispersed refugees who settle in their dispersal area. 
Consequently, the impact of the dispersal policy on this aspect of integration is 
identical to the effect the policy had on these same individuals when they were 
asylum seekers. 
Importantly, the way in which time shapes the Iraqi Kurds' experiences of social 
bonding constitutes a recurring theme in this chapter. Firstly, over time, an 
individual's immigration status may change, from being an asylum seeker to 
being a refugee. The latter phenomenon transforms an individual's capacity and 
potential for social bonding, the right to move away from his/her dispersal locality 
and closer to relatives or friends being granted on receipt of his/her refugee 
status. Conversely, over time, an individual's sense of belonging in and 
attachment to a particular dispersal area may increase, as his/her network of co- 
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ethnic contacts grows and the quality of his/her co-ethnic relationships deepens. 
Iraqi Kurds' co-ethnic community building, in the form of Kurdish restaurants and 
associations, may also develop substantially over time. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to be aware that the type of co-ethnic companionship that Iraqi Kurds 
require fluctuates over time, intensive advisory and explanatory support 
customarily needed at the beginning of their stay in the UK followed, for instance, 
by company and camaraderie later on. Significantly, the effects of the passage of 
time are not automatically experienced in a uniform manner amongst Iraqi Kurds, 
women seemingly having less time than men to put down roots in their dispersal 
locality as well as build co-ethnic friendships and participate in co-ethnic group 
gatherings. Similarly, the length of time co-ethnics; reside in proximity to one 
another, in the UK as in their home country, does not necessarily strengthen their 
bonds. Indeed, certain class or socio-economic cleavages existing within the 
group remain unaffected by the passage of time. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IMPACT OF THE DISPERSAL POLICY ON THE SOCIAL BRIDGES OF IRAQI 
KURDISH ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES 
In this chapter, the impact of the dispersal policy on dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees' social bridging is examined, social bridges being 
one of the four features of the integration process centred upon in this thesis. As 
reviewed in chapter two, social bridges consist in constructive, friendly and 
respectful relationships with non-co-ethnics (Ager and Strang, 2004a: 4). An 
asylum seeker or refugee is on course towards integration when, in addition to 
developing local, co-ethnic social bonds, s/he is also contributing to the building 
of social bridges. 
In the subsequent discussion, the following hypothesis is examined: the current 
UK dispersal policy wields a negative impact on the social bridges of dispersed 
Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees because this policy sends this set of 
individuals to areas where the perceptions and attitudes of host-community 
members towards them are hostile. To facilitate the appraisal of the soundness of 
this assertion, the actual prevalence of hostility and enmity rather than social 
bridging between host-community members and Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
and refugees is presented. Next, the impact of the dispersal policy on firstly, the 
social bridges of dispersed asylum seekers and secondly on those of dispersed 
refugees is investigated. My reasons for focusing on dispersed asylum seekers 
rather than on asylum seekers in general and my justifications for examining the 
impact of the dispersal policy on asylum seekers separately from its effect on 
refugees are presented in chapter four. 
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5.1 The prevalence of hostilitv and antaqonism over social bridqes 
On the basis of my fieldwork, it would seem that the interactions Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees experience with non-co-ethnics are customarily 
characterised by hostility or indifference. The enmity they witness varies from 
outright physical aggression and verbal abuse to antagonistic jokes. Hostility 
towards the group under study is most frequently expressed by teenagers, who 
are perhaps less socialised into polite behaviour, whilst the inhospitality of adults 
is most usually carried out, although not exclusively, in a state of drunkenness. 
The most welcoming non-co-ethnic group tends to be the elderly, possibly 
because they have more time and value the opportunity to interact socially with 
others. 
Sabar recounts a series of unfortunate encounters with host-community 
antagonism that originated from the owner of the hotel where he was residing in 
Blackpool, noting that 'every day she asked me why have you come to England? 
You are a problem. You come for money, you must stay in the hotel if not you will 
be deported' (Sabar, para 5). He continues, observing that one night, 'at 
10.30pm, the owner called the police and told them that asylum seekers were a 
threat to her hotel. The police booked a ticket for me to go to Newcastle at 12arn 
the next morning and told me to leave the hotel. This happened mid-January 
2000, so it was very cold. We asked the police where we could stay, we could not 
sleep the rest of the night on the street. In the end we slept at the train station' 
(Sabar, para 5). Similar incidents have been reported to the House of Lords. 
Certainly, Baroness Howells of St David's (Equal Opportunities Director, 
Greenwich Racial Equality Council) notes that 'sometimes it is claimed that 
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alleged discrimination on racial grounds and acts of racial harassment have been 
committed by the hotel or bed-and-breakfast owners who receive asylum 
seekers' (HIL, 7 th July 2000, col. 1758). Importantly, the Home Office recorded 
2,000 racial attacks between April 2000 and September 2002, one hundred of 
which were in Sunderland (Burrell, 2002 in Robinson, 2003a: 146). Sustained 
violence was also recorded in Hull in August 2000 and the Sighthill area of 
Glasgow witnessed seventy recorded attacks in the previous fourteen months. 
Moreover, the BBC (2001) reported that six hundred asylum seeker residents in 
Birmingham in November 2001 had moved to this city in order to avoid 
harassment in Scotland and the North of England (Robinson, forthcoming in 
Robinson, 2003a: 146). 
The enmity expressed by non-co-ethnics towards Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
and refugees can be viewed as the product of resentment felt towards this group 
for their residence in the UK and the ensuing rights and benefits they are entitled 
to. Alternatively, according to the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, it can constitute a 
response to this group's perceived and/or real distinctive political and religious 
home-country views and beliefs. A lack of standardisation, nationally, regarding 
asylum seeker entitlements, particularly prior to the introduction of NASS, 
combined with inaccurate media reporting confuses members of the host- 
community and compounds the latter's feelings of being treated unfairly by local 
or central government (Audit Commission, 2000c). As Wren remarks, antagonism 
arises when 'small, previously ethnically homogeneous communities are 
presented with groups of asylum seekers and refugees who are perceived to be 
benefiting from preferential resource allocation whilst using facilities funded 
through the local taxation system' (Wren, 2003: 65). Boswell clearly summarises 
the origin of host-community hostility directed towards the group under study, 
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noting that it can 'be attributed to a combination of underlying socio-economic 
insecurity generated by economic modernisation and social fragmentation, and 
the channelling of these insecurities into racism and xenophobia, mainly through 
media coverage and political mobilisation' (Boswell, 2001: 28). Alternatively, 
since asylum seekers reside overwhelmingly in some of the most deprived cities 
and wards of the UK, the aggressive or violent behaviour perpetrated against 
Iraqi Kurds can, on some occasions, be part of a more widespread phenomenon 
directed to all and sundry. Indeed, a service provider in Newcastle observes that 
da lot of our problems are with harassment from locals, sometimes it's not 
specifically racist, just harassment in general, everyone is getting it. But then at 
other times, some people are saying 'go back to your own country' (Support 
worker, Housing, City Council 1, para 29). The Iraq! Kurds interviewed for this 
research have referred to this ambiguous phenomenon, some perceiving every 
act of hostility addressed towards them as targeted antagonism. Dijwar remarks 
'we became very sensitive to this issue, so if anything happens, even if it is a 
normal thing, we just interpret it as racism' (Dijwar, para 79). Some Iraqi Kurds 
respond negatively to the host communities' apparent and/or genuine 
unfriendliness, thereby potentially fuelling further acts of hostility from the 
receiving society. 
Importantly, members of the dominant ethnic group, that is white British", are not 
the sole perpetrators of the antagonist acts. Indeed, members of the various BME 
groups are also implicated. It would seem, according to the local service 
providers interviewed in Newcastle, that these individuals resent the renewed 
hostility extended towards them from the white British community as a result of 
the latter's failure to distinguish between asylum seekers and refugees on the 
21 As opposed to white Irish or white Other, categories identified for use in the 2001 Census. 
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one hand and BME communities on the other. Alternatively and/or in addition, 
they dislike the shift in attention, amongst governmental and charitable agencies 
as well as some members of the public, from BME issues to asylum seeker and 
refugee concerns. 
Finally, it is necessary to stress that the existing relative lack of social bridging is 
seemingly self-perpetuating, the original obstacles to its growth being 
strengthened by its ongoing limited development. Stereotypes are perpetuated 
because of the absence of opportunities for asylum seekers/refugees and host- 
community members to meet in constructive places and at effective times. This 
trend deepens the misunderstandings, misconceptions and feelings of enmity 
towards one another. A regional economic strategist in Newcastle notes that 'you 
have people who don't necessarily look like you, that you've read things about in 
the newspaper. If there are no opportunities for people to meet and talk to one 
another, then it breeds fear, misunderstanding and ignorance. Host-community 
members have said I don't like asylum seekers living anywhere near me but they 
have actually never met them and talked to them' (Regional Development 
Agency, para 87). 
5.2 The impact of the dispersal Policv on the social bridainq of disDersed 
Iraqi Kurdish asvlum seekers 
5.2.1 Asylum seekers dispersed from 2001 in contrast to asylum seekers 
dispersed before 2001 
It would seem that the dispersal policy impacts more detrimentally upon the 
social bridging of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers who are dispersed from 2001 
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onwards rather than before 2001, the dispersal localities that asylum seekers are 
sent to from 2001 onwards containing host-community members whose 
perceptions and attitudes towards the group under study are more antagonistic. 
Prior to 2001, the impact of the dispersal policy on the social bridges of dispersed 
Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is less harmful, the hostility directed towards them 
at this time, in the dispersal localities from host-community members, being less 
prominent and tied primarily to their nationality. Indeed, before 2001, there were 
relatively small numbers of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees in the 
dispersal areas and the negative local and national media stories regarding this 
group were low-key. Gernaz notes, for instance, that 'when I went to Newcastle in 
May 1999,1 was amongst the first twenty new refugees. Some locals didn't 
understand when we said that we are refugees. They didn't hate us because they 
didn't know what was going on and the media wasn't like it is now' (Gernaz, paýra 
27). Instead, the hostility originated from the nationality of the group under study. 
Gernaz, reflecting the perspective of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, remarks that 
'pre-2001, the locals were asking us where we were from and when we said that 
we were Iraqis they thought we were like Saddarn Hussein. We needed time to 
explain to them that we are not like that. Some people didn't listen, some people 
didn't believe us. Some people actually were scared of us' (Gernaz, para 27). 
From 2001 onwards, however, the effect of the dispersal policy on the social 
bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is more negative, given the 
greater degree, in the dispersal localities, of antagonism directed towards this 
group by host-community members concerning their immigration status, their 
religion and their nationality. Certainly, in 2000, as discussed in chapter four, the 
number of Iraqi Kurds coming to the UK increased substantially as well as the 
190 
total number of dispersals. Negative media coverage subsequently soared and 
by skewing reality, it misinformed many host community members, leading to the 
development of widespread inaccurate views regarding the group under study. 
For instance, it became accepted by some that asylum seekers 'are getting 
everything whilst we locals are suffering in terms of getting access to our 
services' (Manager, Housing, City Council 1, para 39). Alternatively, 'asylum 
seekers are given a car, they own their house, they get free mobile phones' 
(Gernaz, para 363), 'they get C150 per week' (Kurdish restaurant 2, para 233). 
The role the media has played in damaging the reputation of asylum seekers 
amongst host communities should not be underestimated. As Gernaz notes, 
reflecting the views of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, 'it is very difficult for us to 
defend ourselves, to make people not believe the media and their daily negative 
stories about asylum seekers' (Gernaz, para 363 & 107). Moreover, from 2001 
onwards, in response to growing public concern, central government introduced 
several measures, most notably the removal of asylum seekers' right to work 
which aimed at curbing the number of new arrivals coming to the UK. This 
restrictive stance towards further asylum immigration, intentionally or 
unintentionally, strengthened host-community member enmity towards asylum 
seekers, helping the former feel justified in their perception that asylum seekers 
are 'living off tax payers money'. 
The combination of these factors led, from 2001 onwards, to an overall 
intensification across the UK, including in the dispersal localities, of host- 
community hostility directed towards asylum seekers. Gernaz, for instance, 
stresses, in keeping with the perspectives of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, that 'the 
words refugee and asylum seeker became like swear words' (Gernaz, para 107; 
Kinyaz, para 63). Similarly, Dijwar remarks that 'asylum seekers are compared to 
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gypsies, they are completely stigmatised, they are seen as people who come to 
abuse the English system, they are a germ, like a disease that has to be gotten 
rid of. It is shameful to say that you are an asylum seeker' (Dijwar, para 31). In 
the case of Iraqi Kurds, the increased antagonism from 2001 onwards from the 
host communities is not only based on the immigration status of this group, it is 
also related to their nationality and the latest war in Iraq as well as to their 
religion, 9/11 and the current worldwide fear of terrorism. Indeed, Dijwar argues, 
supporting the standpoint of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, that 'since the last war, 
there is a double discrimination, being an asylum seeker and from Iraq' (Dijwar, 
para 33). Similarly, Rojdar has observed that 'nowadays when I say I am from 
Iraq, they think you are Osama Bin Laden or Saddam Hussein. They think that 
you are Arab, that you are religious' (Rojdar, para 355 & 359). 
Potentially, given that opportunities for social bridging tend to be more numerous 
in ethnically diverse areas, the impact of the dispersal policy on the social 
bridging of asylum seekers could also be most detrimental for those who were 
dispersed via the interim dispersal scheme. The latter sent individuals to regions 
containing a high proportion of white British, namely the North West (92.17% 
white British according to ONS, 2001 a) and Yorkshire and Humberside (91.67% 
white British) (Audit Commission, 2000c: 17; Robinson, 2003a: 122). The NASS 
dispersal system, in contrast, whilst sending persons to regions containing a high 
percentage of this ethnic group, also disperses a significant number of individuals 
to relatively more multicultural regions. For instance, the West Midlands received 
18% of all dispersed asylum seekers, as of December 2003 (Heath, Jeffries and 
Purcell, 2004)22, the white British population totalling 86.15% of the total regional 
22 Regional distribution of asylum seekers (including dependants) in receipt of NASS CP 
accommodation, by government office region and local authority 
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population. However, the timing of dispersal is essentially of superior importance 
to social bridging than the scheme under which a person is dispersed, those sent 
to their dispersal destination prior to 2001, regardless of the programme through 
which they were receiving support, possessing greater potential for social 
bridging than those sent from 2001 onwards. 
5.2.2 Asylum seekers dispersed to monocultural areas compared with 
asylum seekers dispersed to multicultural localities 
It would appear that the dispersal policy impacts more detrimentally upon the 
social bridging of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers who are dispersed to 
monocultural rather than multicultural areas, host-community enmity in the 
monocultural dispersal localities being perceived by Iraqi Kurds as more 
offensive. Indeed, in this instance, it is not so much the presence of hostility that 
inhibits social bridging but rather the traits of the host-community members it 
originates from, the reasons upon which the antagonism is founded and the 
degree of ethno-cultural diversity in the dispersal area. My fieldwork in Newcastle 
and Birmingham has been used to exemplify both kinds of dispersal areas, the 
former being characterised by a monocultural host-community and the latter 
being typified by a multicultural host-community. 
The view that Newcastle is worse than Birmingham in terms of host-community 
enmity towards asylum seekers is widespread, even amongst Iraqi Kurds who 
have not resided in these two cities. Moreover, Iraqi Kurds who have resided in 
both Newcastle and Birmingham argue that host-community antagonism towards 
them tends to be worse in the former than in the latter. 
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Low ethno-cultural diversity in disl2ersal areas leads to high host-community 
hostility towards asylum seekers 
The relationship between low ethno-cultural diversity and high host-community 
hostility towards asylum seekers seems relatively straightforward. Indeed, 
individuals residing in a highly monocultural locality will be relatively 
unaccustomed to living in proximity to people who originate from a different 
ethno-cultural background to their own and they will possess fairly limited 
knowledge and experience regarding other ethno-cultural groups. Consequently, 
they are more likely to firstly, feel fearful and threatened by the settlement, in their 
area, of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees and to secondly, react in a 
hostile or unfriendly manner to their new neighbours. This set of individuals is 
also more susceptible to believing the sensationalist, negative media stories 
given that their personal and direct interactions and friendships with ethno- 
cultural groups different to their own are limited. Certainly, 'where communities 
are relatively ethnically homogeneous, a sudden and visible increase in the 
numbers of asylum seekers can provide a trigger for resentment and aggression' 
(Boswell, 2001: 26). 
Newcastle constitutes an accurate illustration of a monocultural city. Indeed, 
90.65% of its total population originates from the white British ethnic group, with 
Dene (89.5% white British), Elswick (72.27% white British), Fenham (87.73% 
white British), Grange (88.65% white British), Heaton (87.89% white British), 
Jesmond (87.23% white British), Moorside (75.66% white British) Sandyford 
(86.87% white British), South Gosforth (88.65% white British), West City (87.35% 
white British) and Wingrove (72.04% white British), being the only wards of the 
city where the BME population (including white Irish and white Other) exceeds 
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10% (ONS, 2001a). As would be expected in a monocultural locality like 
Newcastle, service providers note that there have been difficulties with some of 
the long-term residents. This has been the case, for instance in the Byker ward 
(93.24% white British) where 'they haven't had a big population of ethnic 
minorities before and locals aren't used to seeing people from different countries 
in their streets' (Support worker, Housing, City Council 1, para 9). The relatively 
more ethnically diverse areas of Newcastle, in the West End, that include parts of 
the Elswick, West City and Fenharn wards are, according to the Iraqi Kurds 
interviewed 7in this city, more welcoming and accepting. Indeed, in these 
localities, 'people feel more secure and freer because the majority are from Asia 
or are refugees. They go out, their own shops are there' (Naso, para 405 & 239). 
Nevertheless, the overall experience of host community hostility for the Iraqi 
Kurds residing in these more ethno-culturally diverse wards is not diametrically 
different to that of their co-ethnics living in the more monocultural areas of 
Newcastle. Indeed, whilst the former might feel accepted in the immediate vicinity 
of their home, they remain the target of host community antagonism when they 
spend time in the centre or elsewhere in the city. According to the Kurdish 
community workers interviewed in London, it would seem that Iraqi Kurds have 
been confronted with similar experiences in Hull. Illustrating this phenomenon, 
one of the Kurdish community worker remarks that 'Kurdish youngsters they call 
this city Hell. Really, I know people who say me and my friends, we couldn't go 
out in the streets. People used to beat them with stones or spit on their face' 
(London Kurdish association 3, para 45). 
Incidentally, whilst Newcastle's host-community is viewed as hostile, it would 
appear that this city is also considered the most multicultural locality of the North 
East region. Indeed, as noted by a regional economic strategist, 'Newcastle's 
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attitude is much more multicultural, it's relatively more tolerant than other places 
in the North East. Newcastle is probably the furthest we have got' (Regional 
Development Agency, para 91). It is especially the existence of two Universities 
in this city and their consequent cohort of foreign students 'who are relatively well 
accepted by the locals' (Manager, para 41 Housing, City Council 1) that seems to 
have attenuated, in relative terms, host-community enmity towards Iraqi Kurds. 
Certainly, the former have made the latter slightly less conspicuous to local 
residents. An indication of the attractiveness of Newcastle, as the capital of the 
region but also as the least hostile dispersal locality in the area, is the significant 
levels of intra-regional migration that take place, by asylum seekers with the 
permission of the dispersal authorities, from various nearby dispersal towns and 
villages. For instance, when Naso was dispersed to the North East in 1999, 'ten 
to fifteen asylum seekers were being transferred from Sunderland to Newcastle 
every day' in response to the antagonistic climate from the host communities in 
this dispersal locality (Naso, para 195 & 261). Sunderland, a town that hosts the 
BNP headquarters is renowned in the region for the antagonism with which its 
host communities have received asylum seekers (Support manager, Housing, 
City Council 1, para 13 & 33). Warzan, for instance, observes that the majority of 
'people in Sunderland weren't very nice to us. At school, our children were told 
why are you in England, why are you getting our houses, why don't you sleep on 
the streets? It was just like being in Iraq again, with Saddam Hussein' (Warzan, 
para 29 & 69). 
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High ethno-cultural diversity in dispersal areas leads to low host-communily 
hostility towards asylum seekers 
Following the logic ascribed to in the previous section, one can maintain that high 
levels of ethno-cultural diversity in dispersal areas lead to low degrees of host- 
community hostility towards asylum seekers. Birmingham is certainly highly 
ethno-culturally diverse, in relation to the other cities of the UK, 34.36% of its total 
population originating from different BME groups (including white Irish and white 
Other) (ONS, 2001 a), with one quarter of its wards being populated, in the 
majority (50% or more), by various BME communities. In keeping with the 
multicultural environment in Birmingham, host community antagonism in this 
dispersal locality appears to be less pronounced. For instance, Bendewar, 
reflecting the perspective of the other Iraqi Kurds interviewed in Birmingham, 
remarks that this city 'is multicultural, there are a lot of refugees and foreigners 
here. Whatever you do, they don't say anything about it' (Bendewar, para 24 & 
62). Warzan, who was originally dispersed to Sunderland and then relocated to 
Manchester, notes that he and his family 'love Birmingham because no one is 
knocking on our door or breaking our windows' (Warzan, para 239,267). 
Similarly, Birwaz stresses that 'because of the multicultural situation in 
Birmingham, nobody hates you, there are very few racist people in this city. We 
got a warm welcome here' (Birwaz, para 189). 
The apparent empathy Iraq! Kurds receive in multicultural Birmingham is 
increased, at least for some co-ethnics, by the presence in this city of individuals 
of Pakistani origin. Indeed, some of the members of the group under study have 
an instant 'sympathy with this BME community because of Islam, their shared 
religion and culture. Incidentally, the other ethno-cultural groups with whom the 
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Iraqi Kurds possess an immediate affinity (PersiansA ranians, other Kurds from 
Iran, Turkey and Syria, as well as some Arabic speakers) are in a minority in 
Birmingham. 
Whilst social bridging in monocultural locations is viewed by Iraqi Kurds as more 
difficult than in multicultural areas, at the same time, the group under study 
recounts, in the interviews, numerous experiences of host-community enmity in 
Birmingham. 
Host-community hostility in Birmingham is predominantly from the BME groups 
A Kurdish businessman offers an alternative depiction of Birmingham that 
contrasts with the idea of this city being a harmonious multicultural melting pot, 
as mentioned earlier. Indeed, he notes that 'when you mix yoghurt, salt, sugar 
and rice together it does not taste good. It is the same in Birmingham, there is a 
whole mix of people from everywhere and the product of the mixture is not good' 
(Kurdish restaurant 1, para 197). There certainly exists a relatively low degree of 
Iraqi Kurdish interaction with the white British community in Birmingham because 
of the predominance of ethno-culturally diverse wards in the city. An indication of 
this lack of contact is illustrated in this joke about Handsworth, one of the main 
residential areas of this group in this city, a Kurdish asylum caseworker 
remarking that in this area 'when you are just getting on the bus, there are no 
English people in the bus. When we see one English person in the bus, we say, 
look at this refugee, they have come to our area. Because in Handsworth, we are 
all foreigners, black, Asians, etc... You have to apply for asylum to come to 
Handsworth' (Birmingham Kurdish association, para 282). Consequently, the 
host-community hostility experienced by the group under study tends to originate 
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from members of BME communities. Indeed, the owner of one of the Kurdish 
restaurants remarks, reflecting the perspective of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed in 
Birmingham, that 'there are tensions between the different ethnic communities in 
Birmingham rather than between them and the main UK society' (Kurdish 
restaurant 2, para 111). Some members of the BME communities in Birmingham 
dislike the arrival and settlement of asyium seekers in the UK as well as the 
subsequent rights and benefits that this group is entitled to. For instance, Delav 
recounts hearing 'on an Asian radio, people saying why is it that asylum seekers 
dress better than us, they have a job, we don't have oneT (Delav, para 236). 
Others are averse to competing with asylum seekers and refugees for the 
attention and resources of government and charitable agencies as well as the 
general public. Delav stresses that 'there is some tension with the more 
established communities, they feel that those who are newly arrived take the 
position of the more settled ones, there is a competition between them' (Delav, 
para 226-228). 
More specifically, it would seem in Birmingham that host-community animosity is 
primarily undertaken by members of the Asian community23, the friction tied 
specifically to perceived and/or real conflicting political and religious views with 
Iraqi Kurds. Erdehan explains, supporting the standpoint of the majority of the 
other Iraqi Kurds interviewed in Birmingham, that 'we don't like Pakistanis. We 
hate Saddam, we know what he is doing but Pakistanis, when they are Muslim, 
they respect Saddarn because he is Muslim but they don't know that Saddam 
doesn't pray. Pakistanis like Saddam because he is anti-American, anti-England. 
Pakistanis see Kurds as Americans, they don't like us because we don't like 
23 1 raqi Kurds refer to this group as 'Pakistanis' but it seems it includes all Asians who are Muslim 
and sometimes other non-Muslim Asians. 
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Saddam' (Erdehan, para 359). Gernaz exemplifies this phenomenon, remarking 
that 'a friend of mine, on the Friday before the rally in London organised by the 
Stop the War Coalition, went to the mosque and prayed. He is the only one in his 
family to survive the chemical bombing done by Saddam. When he came out of 
the mosque, they told him that you have to come with us to the rally. My friend 
told them I want there to be a war, I want Saddam to be removed. An Asian guy 
said you are not a Muslim. My friend said, I just prayed, why are you accusing me 
of not being a Muslim? He said, you are not a Muslim because you are not 
against America and the UK. My friend does his praying from home now' 
(Gernaz, para 323). Based on my fieldwork, there exists a similar enmity between 
Iraqi Kurds and Arabs over the same issue. Politics aside, some Iraqi Kurds and 
individuals of Pakistani origin clash regarding the different ways in which they 
practice Islam, a phenomenon that foments antagonism between these two 
groups. A Kurdish asylum caseworker, for instance, remarks that 'Pakistanis are 
closer to us, we share the same religion and they are a bit familiar with our 
culture. But we are totally different from them. For me it is easier to integrate with 
English society rather than with Pakistani society. In order to be friendly with 
Pakistanis and their family you have to be a very strict Muslim' (Birmingham 
Kurdish association, para 274). 
The tense relationship that Iraqi Kurds have with, in particular, Asians in 
Birmingham is exacerbated by the relatively high status in UK society that the 
latter group has in contrast to the lower and lesser role they played in Iraqi 
society. Indeed, Asians tend to be the landlords for and employers of the Iraqi 
Kurds in Birmingham whereas in Iraq, it would have been the reverse. Erdehan 
notes that 'we are used to seeing Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, they came 
to Iraq to do low level work. Now, we see people from those same nationalities in 
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this country in a better position than us' (Erdehan, para 334). Moreover, those 
Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers who secure informal work in Birmingham are most 
likely to be employed by Asians given the ethno-cultural make-up of the city and 
in a context where undeclared work most commonly involves exploitation, 
working long hours for a salary below the minimum wage, resentment amongst 
the Iraqi Kurdish workers promptly develops towards their Asian employers. 
Whilst some Iraqi Kurds recognise that informal workers are exploited because of 
their vulnerable position in the labour market rather than because their employer 
is Asian, others take a different view. Delav, for instance, notes that 'Pakistani 
people are selfish. They want to get benefit from you. You should work and work 
very hard, 12 hours to pay you C1 5-20. The way they talk to you, brother, we are 
Muslims, but they use you, that makes a Kurd not recognise them as a Muslim' 
(Delav, para 366). 
Incidentally, the data relating to the interactions between Iraqi Kurds and 
individuals of Caribbean origin is minimal. There is no unequivocal relationship 
pattern between these two groups, some of those interviewed stating that these 
two sets of individuals lead separate and distinct lives, geographically 
overlapping in the same residential areas but not interacting extensively whilst 
others argue that they regularly quarrel. 
Birmingham, a city gerceived by some Iragi Kurds as monocultural 
It is important to note that half of the wards where the majority of asylum seekers 
in Birmingham reside are more than one third Asian 24 . For some Iraqi Kurds, the 
24 Main wards where asylum seeker population constitutes more than 6% of the total number of 
residents, according to Birmingham City Council data, May 2002 - Lozells and East Handsworth; 
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demographic predominance of this ethnic group in their residential area leads 
them to view Birmingham overall as monocultural rather than multicultural. This in 
turn directs some of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed to prefer those Birmingham areas 
that have a lower proportion of Asians or alternatively, they favour very ethnically 
diverse localities like some of those encountered in London. For instance, Jan, a 
recently arrived asylum seeker residing in Birmingham, prefers his current 
locality, Oldbury, which has a relatively low BME population compared to 
Handsworth 'where there are Pakistanis and Indians' (Jan, para 111-113). 
Similarly, Erdehan observes that 'there are people from lots of other countries in 
Handsworth and Bayswater, I don't like it, you don't see one English person, I 
prefer Edgbaston' (Erdehan, para 197 & 201). Likewise, Kereng notes 'I like 
Harborne, everything is English. You don't have lots of people from different 
countries' (Kereng, para 109). 
Ooportunities for social bridaina are still less numerous in monocultural disr)ersal 
areas than in multicultural disr)ersal localities 
Despite the existence of host-community hostility in Birmingham directed towards 
the group under study and notwithstanding the perception of this city, by some 
Iraqi Kurds, as monocultural, the overall experience of Iraqi Kurds' social bridging 
with the host-community in Birmingham appears more fruitful than that 
experienced by their co-ethnics residing in Newcastle. 
Firstly, enmity concerning Iraqi Kurds' right to live and claim asylum in the UK is 
far easier to dismiss when instigated predominantly by members of BME groups. 
Aston; Soho; Handsworth Wood; Nechells; Ladywood; Edgbaston; Perry Barr; Stockland Green; 
Selly Oak. The first five are one third or more Asian, according to Census 2001 data analysed by 
Birmingham City Council. 
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Certainly, the latter are viewed by Iraqi Kurds, regardless of the length of time 
they or their family have resided in the UK, as foreigners with as much of a right 
to reside in the UK as Iraqi Kurds. Similar hostility deriving primarily from white 
British individuals, however, who in contrast, are regarded as UK citizens, par 
excellence, is more difficult to bear. Secondly, antagonism between Iraqi Kurds 
and individuals of Pakistani origin is less threatening than the outright rejection of 
Iraqi Kurds' right to live and claim asylum in the UK by host-society members. 
Indeed, the hostility that exists between Iraqi Kurds and individuals of Pakistani 
origin is more based upon divergent politico-religious views as well as resentment 
of the former towards the latter's attainment of a higher socio-economic status in 
the UK compared to that customarily held by this group in Iraq. Finally, overall, 
Birmingham is not as demographically dominated by one majority ethno-cultural 
group as is the case in Newcastle. Rather, as Gernaz notes, reflecting the views 
of the other Iraqi Kurds interviewed in Birmingham, 'when you go out in this city, 
you see so many different colours, faces' (Gernaz, para 87 & 368). Indeed, 
several groups share the symbolic ownership of Birmingham and the divide 
between the 'outsiders' and the 'insiders' is less clearly and exclusively defined 
than it is in Newcastle. Gernaz states that in the latter 'every step of the way you 
need to watch out, you feel more like a stranger, out of the circle than you do in 
Birmingham' (Gernaz, para 87 & 368). It would appear that Iraq! Kurds 
consequently feel more empowered and invited to partake in belonging to 
Birmingham. Indeed, Gernaz, mirroring the perspective of the other Iraqi Kurds 
interviewed in Birmingham, observes that in this city 'you feel that you can say 
with the other groups the town that you are living in is my town as well because 
there are so many different people that nobody can say it's just my town' 
(Gernaz, para 87 & 368). As a result, the host-community hostility experienced by 
Iraqi Kurds in Birmingham decreases in significance, as the group under study's 
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sense of belonging to this city grows. A similar phenomenon has been observed 
in Islington where 'refugees felt that there were so many different groups and 
nationalities in the area that difference was not conspicuous, rather it was 
accepted as the norm' (Ager and Strang, 2004b: 5). 
5.2.3 Asylum seekers dispersed to small areas versus asylum seekers 
dispersed to large localities 
It would seem that the dispersal policy impacts more negatively upon the social 
bridging of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers who are dispersed to small rather than 
large localities. Certainly, the arrival of new individuals in a locality characterised 
by a small cohesive population has a greater perceived and real impact on local 
service provision and community dynamics than it would have in an area typified 
by a larger and less unified population. A similar trend has been encountered in 
Sweden where '75% of the hostile events directed towards asylum seekers and 
refugees were recorded in smaller towns and communities, not in the cities where 
most refugees live' (13jorgo, 1995 in Wren, 2003: 71). Remarking upon this 
phenomenon, a Kurdish businessman notes that 'life is more individualistic in the 
bigger cities so if you go to the smaller towns, you get more problems because 
you are more obvious. Small communities are always more together so they are 
having more phobias of having foreigners around them. But in a bigger town, you 
don't see that reaction as clearly. There are maybe individual reactions but not a 
lot' (Kurdish restaurant 2, para 229). Similarly, Hazo notes that 'the dispersal 
policy will not affect the big cities as much because if the population is five 
million, if you put ten refugees there, no one can see them. If you put one 
hundred asylum seekers in a village where the total population is two hundred, 
you can see them. It affects the other people's lives because the new people 
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need facilities, services, work. You have two hundred people in the village, you 
have one hospital, one doctor, two nurses but for three hundred people, you 
need to have two doctors, four nurses, a bigger hospital' (Hazo, para 52). 
5.2.4 Housing in overcrowded, full board hostel accommodation or housing 
in normally or under-occupied self-catering shared abodes 
It would appear that the dispersal policy impacts more detrimentally upon the 
social bridging of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers who are housed in full 
board hostel accommodation rather than self-catering shared housing because 
the former housing type customarily separates asylum seekers from the host- 
society. As noted by a local service provider in Newcastle, 'you don't shop in local 
shops because it's full board. You don't have any money to spend in the local 
community or to go out or to do anything that might help you integrate' (Manager, 
NERS One Stop Shop, para 115). In addition, when hostels accommodate large 
numbers of individuals, asylum seekers become highly conspicuous to host- 
community members, making the latter feel more fearful of the effect this new 
population might have on their access to local services and jobs. Certainly, in 
Newcastle, it has been observed that 'having people living in a hostel in large 
numbers does damage with the local population who tend to be fearful of large 
numbers in any one place, it flies in the face of all the efforts for integration' 
(Manager, NERS One Stop Shop, para 101). 
Similarly, it would seem that the dispersal policy impacts more negatively upon 
the social bridging of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers who reside in 
overcrowded abodes rather than in under or normally occupied dwellings, a 
phenomenon customarily experienced in some private-sector dispersal housing, 
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overcrowding leading to more neighbourhood noise and more household refuse. 
Overcrowding in asylum seeker properties foments antagonism from host- 
community members, as remarked upon by an asylum seeker housing lead 
officer who states that 'in Handsworth, in the Soho area in particular, there is a 
significant concentration of properties used for asylum seekers and overcrowding 
occurs there. Over-crowding means more noise, more rubbish and generally puts 
a strain on certain physical aspects of the services. Because the asylum seekers 
and refugees living there are perhaps not able to communicate, there is a break 
down of neighbourly type relations. Also, they are by definition transitory, they are 
not putting roots down and they are all single. It can be quite a significant blight 
on the area and it certainly feels like that to some of the settled BME groups in 
that area' (Housing, City Council 2, para 275). The origin of the overcrowding of 
some asylum seeker dispersal properties is fully discussed in chapter seven. 
5.2.5 Dispersal to predominantly deprived wards 
The harmful effect of the dispersal policy on the social bridging of dispersed 
asylum seekers is increased by this set of individuals being largely dispersed to 
highly deprived wards where residents experience a significant degree of 
generalised, untargeted harassment. The trend of sending asylum seekers to 
deprived wards is a product of the dispersal authorities prioritising housing 
availability and affordability over and above any other criteria when selecting the 
dispersal localities. Certainly, according to my fieldwork, almost half of the wards 
where asylum seekers tend to reside in both Newcastle and Birmingham are 
amongst the top 10% most deprived wards in England, the asylum seeker wards 
in the former overall being more deprived than those in the latter (DETR, 2000). 
This trend has already been identified in previous research, Boswell remarking 
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that 'asylum seekers have often been placed in hard-to-let properties, in inner-city 
areas characterised by high levels of unemployment and deprivation' (Boswell, 
2001: 25-26). Moreover, Wren, remarking upon the violent incidents that took 
place in Sighthill in Glasgow, stresses that 'accommodating significant numbers 
of asylum seekers in areas already experiencing social deprivation constitutes a 
high risk strategy and should be avoided' (Wren, 2003: 73). Reflecting upon his 
experience of living in a deprived ward, Arenan observes that the Elswick ward in 
Newcastle, amongst the top 1% most deprived wards in the UK 'is like Palestine 
sometimes, for every breath you take a brick is thrown through your window, 
there is fighting, robbery' (Arenan, para. 17 & 53). 
5.2.6 Possessing or lacking a work permit 
Interestingly, the negative effect of the dispersal policy on the social bridges of 
dispersed asylum seekers is heightened when this group possesses a work 
permit as well as when this set of individuals lacks a formal right to work. Asylum 
seekers who posses a right to work, that is those who applied for asylum before 
July 2002, have attracted host-community enmity because this set of individuals 
is perceived to be stealing jobs. Incidentally, during a period of economic growth, 
the formal workplace can constitute an effective cross-ethnic meeting site more 
suited to social bridging than ad hoc encounters on streets and in shops, pubs or 
nightclubs where interactions are most likely to involves antagonism or 
indifference. 
Asylum seekers who lack a formal right to work, that is those who applied for 
asylum after July 2002, have also been the targets of host-community hostility 
because, by relying on state benefits, they are viewed as 'scroungers'. Anik, 
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reflecting upon this trend, remarks that 'when they spend millions of money on 
asylum seekers, it makes people in the UK angry against asylum seekers. They 
have every right to be angry because they pay tax and the government spends 
their tax on asylum seekers. ( ... ) But that's the government's fault, not the asylum 
seekers' fault. If they let asylum seekers have a job, ( ... )I can study, I can have a 
job, I can pay for my house, for anything. I don't need their benefits' (Anik in 
interview with Gurzi, para 45). Likewise, Ziryan notes 'we can't work, we have to 
be on benefits and the taxpayers have to hate us and spit at us and say, what the 
hell are you doing in this countryT (Ziryan, para 107). Alternatively, asylum 
seekers without a work permit may enter the informal workplace, where the non 
co-ethnic interactions that occur are usually located within a context of 
exploitation, between the host-society employer and the asylum-seeking 
employee. Additionally, their participation in the informal economy can stigmatise 
this set of individuals, amongst members of the host-community, as criminal and 
immoral, a phenomenon that constitutes a further obstacle to the process of 
social bridging. Naso, remarking upon the phenomenon of informal work amongst 
asylum seekers, notes that 'I know many English people, they are on benefits 
and they work in the black economy but for asylum seekers it is forbidden, it is 
taboo. (... ) For asylum seekers, according to English people, it's twice as 
dishonest. Look at the hypocrisy of the system' (Naso, para 211). 
5.2.7 The significance of the gender, marital status, age and English 
language proficiency of those who are dispersed 
The impact of the dispersal policy on the social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers is amplified in some cases and alleviated in others depending 
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upon the gender, marital status, age and English language proficiency of those 
who are dispersed. 
Indeed, amalgamating gender and marital status, being a dispersed married 
woman accompanied by her spouse augments the harmful effect of the dispersal 
policy on their social bridges more than being a dispersed single man or a 
married man accompanied by his spouse. This phenomenon is tied to the 
married woman's participation, as examined in chapter four, in a gender-specific 
division of family chores that limits her spheres of interaction to the home. Single 
and married men, for whom social connecting in public areas is overall more 
culturally permissible, engage, when possible, with the host-community in the 
workplace or socially. Moreover, being a dispersed married woman accompanied 
by her spouse increases the negative impact of the dispersal policy on their 
social bridges more than being a dispersed single woman, the latter possessing 
more opportunities for social bridging. These connections most commonly take 
place within the confines of the home, the small number of single Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seeking women in the UK leading to their placement, by dispersal 
housing providers, in accommodation with female, asylum seeking non co- 
ethnics who customarily originate from the Middle East or Africa. Social bridging 
is difficult on the occasions when Iraqi Kurdish single women share their abode 
with non-Muslim women. Anik remarks, for instance, that 'I am not a very 
religious person but at the same time, it's my culture. I can't have a man in the 
house, I can't walk very freely, wearing anything, it's not acceptable. If you are 
from the same religion and the same area, even if you have differences still you 
can understand each other. Somebody coming from Africa, how can I expect her 
to know what my religion is about and how my society will look at things' (Anik, 
para 87-89). Single female relationships with host-community members outside 
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of the home are not always fully accepted by the broader Iraqi Kurdish 
community and therefore appear to remain relatively minimal. Enwa, for instance, 
remarks that 'there are a lot of Kurdish people in Birmingham but I don't like to be 
with them because even if they saw me with you, or a lady like you, they may 
explain it in a bad way. They want us to be just with the Kurdish community, not 
to have any relationship, even as a friend, with foreigners. They are observing 
Kurdish ladies here and it's a bad thing, it's difficult' (para 127 & 147). 
Significantly, it would seem that Iraqi Kurdish women's amorous relationships 
with non co-ethnics; are more strictly censored by co-ethnics than Iraqi Kurdish 
men's romantic ties. Enwa explains this trend, stating that 'the main reason is that 
we are stateless until now as Kurds. The Kurdish men, they are so scared. If they 
find every woman in Kurdistan has a relationship with a foreigner, maybe after a 
few years, there are no Kurdish people at all. It's honour. They think that 
Kurdistan, the geographical area, is their honour. To defend their land and their 
women is the same' (Enwa, para. 127-147). 
In turn, being a dispersed married man accompanied by his spouse amplifies the 
detrimental effect of the dispersal policy on their social bridges more than being a 
dispersed single man. According to the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, this trend is the 
product of the latter seemingly being more inclined to interact with host-society 
members of the opposite sex, given the virtual absence in the UK of unmarried 
co-ethnic women who originate from the same socio-economic and cultural 
background as themselves. Importantly, those Iraqi Kurds who possess the most 
opportunities for social bridging, single and married men accompanied by their 
spouse, are also most likely to become the targets of host-community hostility. 
Indeed, this group possesses greater exposure overall to host-society members, 
the younger male age groups, 29 and below, usually experiencing the most host- 
210 
community enmity because they are most easily identifiable by the general public 
as asylum seekers, given their age and gender, and are also most likely to be 
perceived as threatening. Supporting the view that, those aged 30 and above, 
especially those aged 40 and above, are less identifiable as asylum seekers, 
Mezdar notes that 'I have not had any problems with racism myself, perhaps 
because I am an older man and therefore I don't look like a refugee' (Mezdar, 
para 33). This phenomenon aside, age does not appear to significantly modify 
the impact of the dispersal policy on the social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers. Incidentally, irrespective of the image of asylum seekers and 
refugees amongst the public, in any society, individuals who combine youth, 
singleness and masculinity are generally perceived as more threatening than 
other demographic groups and therefore are more likely to attract enmity and 
hostility. Finally, possessing a poor standard of English and being able to 
communicate less effectively with host-society members magnifies the negative 
effect of the dispersal policy on the social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers more than having a good standard of English (Audit Commission, 
2000c). 
In sum, the hypothesis that the dispersal policy exercises a negative impact on 
the social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers because this policy 
sends this set of individuals to areas where the perceptions and attitudes of host- 
community members towards them are hostile is most accurate: 
a. from 2001 onwards 
b. in small & monocultural dispersal areas 
c. where significant numbers of dispersed asylum seekers are housed in full- 
board hostel accommodation and/or 
d. in overcrowded dwellings 
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In contrast, this hypothesis is less accurate: 
a. prior to 2001 
b. in large & multicultural dispersal localities 
c. where considerable numbers of dispersed asylum seekers reside in self- 
catering shared housing and/or 
d. in under or normally occupied abodes. 
It is striking that the impact of the dispersal policy on the social bridges of 
dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is made worse by this set of individuals 
being primarily sent to significantly deprived wards. Moreover, asylum seekers' 
possession as well as lack of a work permit can fuel host-community hostility 
towards them, thereby stunting their social bridging. Finally, the impact of the 
dispersal policy on the social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
is experienced by persons as either more or less harmful, depending on their 
gender, marital status, age and level of English. Certainly, married women 
accompanied by their spouse worsen the effect of dispersal more than single 
women and men; those aged 29 and below aggravate the influence of dispersal 
more than those aged 30 and above; and those possessing a poor level of 
English intensify the impact of dispersal more than those who have a good level 
of English. 
It can be observed from this discussion that some of the conditions that foment 
social bonds discourage the development of social bridges or vice versa. For 
instance, the period from 2001 onwards is most propitious for the social bonding 
of dispersed asylum seekers but also the most inauspicious for the social 
bridging of this group. Similarly, a real or perceived large co-ethnic community in 
a dispersal locality is most favourable for social bonding whilst being most 
unfavourable for social bridging. Nevertheless, whilst some states of affair work 
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against the development of either social bonds or social bridges, there are some 
instances where, given the right conditions, both forms of social connections can 
grow. A large co-ethnic community in a sizeable multicultural city constitutes a 
more promising setting for both social bonding and bridging than a large co- 
ethnic community in a small monocultural town. 
As mentioned in chapter four, exceptions exist, demonstrating the difficulty in 
offering a definitive appraisal of the impact of the dispersal policy. For instance, it 
has been suggested that the impact of the dispersal policy on social bridging is 
most negative post-2001, partly as a result of the war in Iraq and the stereotypical 
belief amongst many host-community members that all Iraqis are like Saddam. 
However, for a portion of the host-society, the televised reporting of the war in 
Iraq and the subsequent development of an awareness of Iraqi Kurds' 
persecution in that country re-established the reputation of this particular group 
as having genuinely experienced hostile discrimination. Oubat remarks that 
'before the war in Iraq, English people didn't believe me when I talked about the 
bad things that Saddam had done. During and after the war, they were watching 
what was happening in Iraq on TV and they started to see what Saddam had 
done and they started to believe me' (Oubat, para 39). Moreover, it has been 
asserted that the impact of the dispersal policy on social bridging is most 
detrimental in monocultural compared to multicultural dispersal areas. However, 
Gernaz, for instance, who has lived in both Newcastle and Birmingham, observes 
that his favourite home in the UK was in Newcastle because of the friendly 
neighbourly relationships that developed whilst he resided there (Gernaz, para 
267 & 275). He notes that 'there was an old lady, she used to come to visit me, 
she needed someone to talk to. It started when she was at the front door, she 
had two bags that she wanted to carry into her house and she couldn't do it. I 
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went and helped her out. The day after she brought me some cake. There was 
also a family, they had three teenage boys, they were so nice, coming to my 
house and watching TV' (Gernaz, para 271). 
5.3 The impact of the dispersal Policv on the social bridaing of dispersed 
Iraqi Kurdish refuqees 
5.3.1 Dispersed refugees who move away from their dispersal locality 
following the receipt of their authorisation to stay in the UK 
As in the case of social bonds, the dispersal policy stops directly affecting the 
social bridges of dispersed Iraq! Kurdish refugees who relocate following the 
receipt of their authorisation to remain in the UK. Certainly, dispersed refugees 
possess more freedom to depart from their dispersal area than dispersed asylum 
seekers, the former, in contrast to the latter, having the right to move and chose 
their place of residence without this choice influencing their welfare entitlements. 
Regrettably, there is no statistical data existing on the residential location of 
dispersed refugees across the UK and consequently, it is difficult to quantify the 
proportion of this set of individuals who move away, and by extension the 
percentage whose social bridges are no longer influenced by the dispersal policy. 
Nevertheless, it has been possible, thanks to my fieldwork, to demarcate the 
traits and circumstances of the dispersed refugees who are most and least likely 
to move following the receipt of their right to remain. These are outlined in detail 
in chapter four. 
Significantly, and similarly to social bonding, the dispersal policy indirectly 
influences the social bridges of some of the dispersed refugees who move away 
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from their dispersal area following the receipt of their permission to stay in the 
UK. Indeed, the social bridges of the dispersed refugees who relocate to another 
dispersal area, rather than move to the South East of England, a non-dispersal 
region, are influenced by the dispersal policy in a comparable way to the 
dispersed refugees who remain in their original dispersal locality. 
5.3.2 Dispersed refugees who remain in their dispersal locality following the 
receipt of their permission to stay in the UK a 
The impact of the dispersal policy on the social bridges of disoersed Iracii Kurdish 
refuciees is similar to that of dispersed Iracii Kurdish asvlum seekers 
The impact of the dispersal policy on the social bridges of dispersed refugees 
who remain in their dispersal area is similar, as in the case with social bonds, to 
the influence the policy had on these same persons when they were asylum 
seekers. This is partly the case because there is no immediately apparent or 
visible difference between an asylum seeker and a refugee. As Gernaz notes, 
reflecting the views of the majority of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, 'there is no 
change in the treatment you receive on the street, people don't know that your 
status has changed from asylum seeker to refugee' (Gernaz, para 367). In the 
cases where host-community members distinguish between asylum seekers and 
refugees, the latter status has been so discredited, by the media in particular, that 
the idea of genuine, deserving refugees actually existing is effectively very rarely 
encountered. As a result, limited respect from host-community members is 
gen6rated by asylum claimants becoming recognised by the state as possessing 
a valid right to asylum and residence in the UK. Certainly, the following changes 
that Ziryan anticipates when he obtains his refugee status are unlikely to be 
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realised solely on the basis of his change in immigration status. Ziryan notes that 
'once I have my refugee status, when I get married with an English woman, her 
family won't tell me it's because you want permission to stay in the UK. If I have 
some friends in town, they can't tell me anymore you are here to work. I can say I 
don't need you to believe me because the Home Office has already believed me. 
When you work and you pay tax, they will be happy, they will sit you down next to 
themselves and give you coffee and say you are British now' (Ziryan, para 179). 
Finally, as discussed earlier with regards to asylum seekers, the granting of the 
right to work, to which all refugees are entitled, and resulting formal employment 
can still foment host-community antagonism as much as the lack of a work 
permit. 
Refugees' efforts to be less conspicuous to host-community members 
However, over time, the negative impact of the dispersal policy on the social 
bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees who stay in their 
dispersal locality is lessened. Indeed, with the passage of time, according to the 
vast majority of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, this group tends to increasingly 
conceal their ethnic origin and immigration status, adjusting their appearance and 
behaviour to fit the white British norm. As the group becomes more 
communicative with and less conspicuous to host-community members, the 
latter's perceptions and attitudes also become less antagonistic and hostile. It is 
important to emphasise that the occurrence of this phenomenon is primarily tied 
to the length of time the Iraqi Kurd has been living in the UK rather than his/her 
immigration status. Moreover, according to my fieldwork, this experience is tied to 
the Iraqi Kurd's attitude towards Islam, the more publicly devout an individual is, 
the less s/he will change his/her appearance to match the white British norm. 
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Certainly, the small proportion of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed who did not practice 
or adhere to the view that over time, this group tries to be less conspicuous to 
host-community members were those individuals who identified themselves and 
were identified by their co-ethnics as the more outwardly devout Muslims 
amongst my sample. The ways in which Iraqi Kurds tend to conceal their ethnic 
origin and immigration status over time are now presented. 
Whilst an Iraqi Kurd who possesses a good knowledge of English might still be 
the target of host community enmity, co-ethnics who over time improve their level 
of spoken English can more easily conceal the fact that they are relatively new to 
the UK. Instead, they can pass as a member of an established, southern 
European BIVIE community, a group that currently is less vehemently harassed by 
members of the host society. The strategy of hiding one's ethnic origin and 
immigration status is one that has been widely and pro-actively adopted by the 
vast majority of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed for this research as a means of 
attenuating host-community hostility. Gernaz remarks that 'the good thing about 
the way we look is that you can say you are a student from Latin America, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece' (Gernaz, para 31 & 87). Felemez expresses the 
personal cost of adopting this tactic, noting that 'asylum seekers have a bad 
reputation, I say that I am a student and then people are sociable, nice. You lie to 
survive, I don't like doing it but sometimes it is necessary' (Felemez, para 19). 
Likewise, over time, the group under study adjusts their appearance and 
behaviour to match the white British norm, in order to be less obtrusive and 
noticeable. Indeed, Delav, states 'we don't want to be recognised as Kurds 
because we are afraid of racism. We want to be like other English people' (Delav, 
para 73). Consequently, Iraqi Kurdish men tend to shave their moustaches 
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because 'this will make us closer to the main host community' (Gernaz, para 
331). They also change the type of clothes they wear and walk around town in 
twos and threes rather than in larger groups, as they would habitually in Iraqi 
Kurdistan (Dijwar, para 79). Erdehan points out that 'when we see each other in 
the city centre, when we are kissing on the cheek, we say only two timesl I also 
don't hold on to my male friend's hand anymore when we go walking' (Erdehan, 
para 268). Dijwar remarks that 'even the colour of our face is lighter now, we are 
not so obvious' (Dijwar, para 79). 
It is noteworthy that, in the long term, whilst the outward appearances of Iraqi 
Kurds might converge towards the white British norm, making them less 
conspicuous, the cultural values and norms of Iraqi Kurds remain. A Kurdish 
businessman, remarking upon cross-cultural male-female relationships, notes 
that 'you can find a Kurdish man with an English woman. But how much do they 
understand each other? How long can they stay together? It's very confusing, the 
Kurdish man will remember his own values and his own culture and they will get 
into clashes and because he hasn't got any idea about his partner's culture and 
background, it is very difficult for him to cope' (Kurdish restaurant 2, para 155 & 
157). Similarly, Erdehan observes, regarding cross-cultural male friendships, that 
'English men don't spend a lot of time together, like we do. In my country, I have 
many male friends, they sleep over at my house. In the UK, if this happens, 
people think you are a homosexual. This and other differences make it difficult to 
make friends with English men' (Erdehan, para 268). Finally, Hazo bringing to the 
fore a further significant difference, suggests that 'you are not interested in your 
family that much to live with them for the rest of your life, not in the same house. 
But in my country, I am interested to have the big house, me living upstairs, mum 
and dad living downstairs' (Hazo, para 86). 
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It is also striking that Iraqi Kurds' adjustments can be far less constructive to 
social bridging, the modifications to their social activities at times isolating them 
from host-community members. For instance, in response to negative 
experiences, some of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed have decided not to go to pubs 
and nightclubs. Dijwar, living Newcastle, states that 'I used to go out on weekend 
nights but I had some problems, people were not nice. You go to a club, you 
spend money, you expect to have a good time but you are all the time afraid that 
somebody will say something. Even if you swear back, at the end of the day, the 
night is spoilt so there is no point in going out. Now, I spend time with friends in 
our homes, in safety zones. We have been forced to isolate ourselves. Because 
the social life in this country is mostly in the pubs and clubs and in these two 
places, there are drunk people and when the people are drunk, they cannot 
control themselves, they say something, they look at you in a bad way' (Dijwar, 
para 79 & 83). Similarly, Gernaz in Birmingham observes that 'some of us don't 
go to pubs. When we go and people start to get drunk then we need to leave 
because then the racism will come' (Gernaz, para 307). 
In conclusion, the hypothesis that the dispersal policy exercises a negative 
impact on the social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees is incorrect if 
applied to those who leave their dispersal locality following the receipt of their 
permission to stay in the UK. However, the hypothesis is valid for the dispersed 
refugees who remain in their dispersal locality after they have received their 
authorisation to remain in the UK, the impact being very similar to that of 
dispersed asylum seekers. Nevertheless, over time, it would appear that the 
negative impact of the policy on social bridges decreases somewhat as more 
Iraqi Kurds conceal their ethnic origin and immigration status as well as adjust 
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their appearances and behaviour to fit the white British norm, host-community 
views and behaviour towards this group becoming, in the process, less hostile 
and antagonistic. 
Significantly, several factors that may further influence the effect of dispersal on 
social bridging in both the short and long term have not been examined in this 
discussion, primarily because they were beyond the original scope of this thesis. 
It is important to note, for instance, that the extent to which host-community 
members feel informed and consulted regarding the life circumstances and arrival 
of asylum seekers in their area affects their perceptions and attitudes, namely 
their hostility towards or receptiveness of, the group under study. Overall, it would 
appear, at least in the early stages of the dispersal programme, that the 
community work undertaken with members of the receiving society by local and 
central government was insufficient and in many instances non-existent. The 
Audit Commission's fieldwork, for example, found that 80% of local authorities 
failed to notify local residents that asylum seekers were about to be resettled in 
their neighbourhoods (Audit Commission, 2000c). It is believed that a symptom of 
this lack of community preparation is the extent of racial harassment recorded in 
the dispersal localities, over 1,000 reports being submitted to NASS in the first 
eighteen months of dispersal (Refugee Council, 2004d: 21). Incidentally, since 
2003, NASS has devolved key functions from its headquarters in Croydon to the 
dispersal areas. This process of regionalisation has, according to, the Home 
Office, 'allowed NASS to provide a more effective system of support. The regions 
are able to advise NASS on local dispersal issues, for example increased 
tensions against asylum seekers, allowing NASS to take appropriate action, 
which might include suspending dispersals to a particular area. By responding to 
the concerns of the regions, NASS can reduce the risk of conflict between asylum 
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seekers and the dispersal area community' (Home Office, 2005a: 52). Moreover, 
the policy of replacing asylum seekers' monetary allowance with vouchers in the 
autumn of 1999, a measure that was actually withdrawn in the autumn of 2002, 
can affect the potential for social bridging by emphasising this group's belonging 
to an immigration status that, amongst many host-community members, is 
associated with illegality and 'scrounging'. Indeed, 'the introduction of vouchers, 
whilst being the cornerstone of the government's policy on deterring economic 
migrants, draws significant attention to asylum seekers by making them highly 
visible in their new community and this contributes to their marginalisation' 
(Transport and General Workers' Union, Oxfam GB and Refugee Council, 2000: 
21-23). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the impact of the dispersal policy on dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees' social bridging has been studied. The following 
hypothesis has been tested: the current UK dispersal policy wields a negative 
impact on the social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and 
refugees because this' policy sends this set of individuals to areas where the 
perceptions and attitudes of host-community members towards them are hostile. 
Firstly, it has been concluded that the dispersal policy exercises a negative 
impact on the social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers because 
this policy sends this set of individuals to areas where the perceptions and 
attitudes of host-community members towards them are hostile. This is 
particularly the case for those asylum seekers who were dispersed from 2001 
onwards to small and monocultural dispersal areas where significant numbers of 
this group are housed in full-board hostel accommodation and/or in overcrowded 
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dwellings. The hypothesis is less accurate for the asylum seekers who were 
dispersed prior to 2001 to large and multicultural dispersal localities where 
considerable numbers of dispersed asylum seekers reside in self-catering shared 
housing and/or in under or normally occupied abodes. Moreover, the impact of 
the dispersal policy on the social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum 
seekers is made worse by this set of individuals being primarily sent to 
significantly deprived wards. Furthermore, asylum seekers' possession as well as 
lack of a work permit can fuel host-community hostility towards them, thereby 
stunting their social bridging. Finally, the impact of the dispersal policy on the 
social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is experienced by 
persons as either more or less harmful, depending on their gender, marital status, 
age and level of English. 
It is noteworthy that some of the conditions that foment social bonds discourage 
the development of social bridges or vice versa. For instance, the period from 
2001 onwards is most propitious for the social bonding of dispersed asylum 
seekers but also the most inauspicious for the social bridging of this group. 
Nevertheless, whilst some states of affair work against the development of either 
social bonds or social bridges, there are some instances where, given the right 
conditions, both forms of social connections can grow. A large co-ethnic 
community in a sizeable multicultural city constitutes a more promising setting for 
both social bonding and bridging than a large co-ethnic community in a small 
monocultural town. 
Secondly, it would seem that the dispersal policy ceases to exercise any impact 
on the social bridges of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees who leave their 
dispersal locality following the receipt of their permission to stay in the UK. 
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However, the hypothesis is valid for the dispersed refugees who remain in their 
dispersal locality after they have received their authorisation to remain in the UK, 
the impact being very similar to that of dispersed asylum seekers. Significantly, 
over time, it would appear that Iraqi Kurds' defence mechanisms, in response to 
host-community hostility, improve. This phenomenon can facilitate social 
bridging. Indeed, Iraqi Kurds who learn to conceal their ethnic origin and 
immigration status as well as adjust their appearances and behaviour to fit the 
white British norm positively affect host-community views and behaviour towards 
them, this latter group becoming more friendly. Conversely, Iraqi Kurds' defence 
mechanisms can also obstruct social bridging. Certainly, the withdrawal of Iraqi 
Kurds from non co-ethnic interactions to protect themselves from host-community 
hostility lessens their potential for social bridging. Thus, the passage of time can 
be both beneficial and disadvantageous for the development of Iraqi Kurds'social 
bridging relationships. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPACT OF THE DISPERSAL POLICY ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF IRAQI 
KURDISH ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES 
In this chapter, the impact of the dispersal policy on dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees' employment is studied. As discussed in chapter 
two, access to suitable employment constitutes a key marker of and means to 
integration. It provides financial security, the potential for economic advancement 
and facilitates the development of social bridges (Ager and Strang, 2004b: 12-13; 
Ager and Strang, 2004a: 14). Certainly, securing work can foment a greater 
degree of acceptance from host-country members. An asylum seeker or refugee 
is heading towards integration when, in addition to developing social bonds and 
bridges, s/he is also accessing suitable employment. 
In the subsequent discussion, the following hypothesis is tested: the 
contemporary UK dispersal policy exercises a negative impact on the 
employment of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees because 
this policy sends this group to localities where suitable employment opportunities 
are limited. With the intention of evaluating the validity of this statement, an 
analysis of the nature of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seeker and refugee formal and 
informal employment is presented. Following this, the impact of the dispersal 
policy on the employment of dispersed asylum seekers is evaluated. Finally, the 
impact of the dispersal policy on the employment of dispersed refugees is 
analysed. 
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6.1 The formal and informal emplovment of asvlum seekers and refuciees 
It is important to reiterate, from the outset, that asylum seekers who lodged a 
claim for asylum prior to 23d July 2002 possess a formal work permit whilst 
asylum seekers who submitted an application for asylum from 23 rd July 2002 
onwards have no right to work formally. Refugees, however, are all allowed to 
work. Consequently, employed asylum seekers may be working formally or 
informally whilst employed refugees most generally work formally. 
6.1.1 Informal work 
Informal work constitutes 'the paid production and sale of goods or services 
which are unregistered by, or hidden from the state, for tax and/or benefit 
purposes, but which are legal in all other respects' (Small Business Council, 
2004: 3; Leonard, 1998: 11). With regards to those Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
who work informally, it would seem that they tend to be employees on irregular, 
short-term contracts, paid below the minimum wage, working more than the 
normal number of hours in labour intensive, unskilled, low-status jobs with 
unsocial working conditions and where opportunities for exploitation are 
pronounced (Leonard, 1998: 6& 78). Indeed, those interviewed for this research 
note that informal workers are usually paid C2.50-E3 per hour, working 8-10 hours 
per day most commonly in food factories, farms, restaurants and take-aways, 
construction sites and hotels with an average roundtrip travel time to work, for 
those residing in the West Midlands, for instance, of four hours. Moreover, 
individuals can be employed temporarily and irregularly, five to seven days a 
week or part-time, depending on the varying demand for their labour. Phillimore 
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(2005: 24) has also noted that there is evidence of many asylum seekers 
currently working in the informal economy. 
The informal work that Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers are engaged in can be 
accompanied by serious risks, the most severe being their personal safety. This 
is exemplified by the incident in July 2004 where 'three migrant workers who had 
travelled from Birmingham that morning to pick spring onions, were killed when 
the van in which they were travelling collided with a train at an unmanned level 
crossing in Worcestershire' (House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Committee, 2003). An additional hazard for this group, when opting to 
work informally, is their powerlessness when an employer fails to provide them 
with their wages. Significantly, the type of informal employment undertaken by 
Iraqi Kurds tends to be distinct from illegal business activity such as, for instance, 
human trafficking, drugs and prostitution (Small Business Council, 2004: 4). 
There is evidence from my fieldwork, nevertheless, that some Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers in Birmingham are involved in the buying and selling of 
contraband cigarettes, cars and telephones (Kereng, para 47 & 75; Housing, City 
Council 2, para 101). In sum, the type of informal work that Iraqi Kurdish asylum 
seekers are engaged in tends to lie within 'the peripheral exploitative forms of 
organised informal employment rather than the core more rewarding autonomous 
types of such work'(Williams and Windebank, 1998: 87). 
Importantly, it appears from my fieldwork that Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers are 
not financially indebted to their human traffickers given that their relatives 
customarily pay upfront, up to $15,000, for the cost of their journey. Instead, 
according to the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, this group is usually socially and 
culturally obliged to send remittances to their family residing in their home- 
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country. These payments constitute a means of reimbursing the debt incurred 
and constitute, for some, a way of financially supporting their relatives in the 
medium to long term. As Welan explains, 'ethically you have to send money back 
home because our families they have spent a lot of money on us. We are not 
slaves to the human smuggler, like in the Chinese community, but we are slaves 
to honour, to some moral criteria' (Welan speaking in Polat's interview, para 301). 
Basing myself upon my fieldwork, it would seem that Iraqi Kurdish asylum 
seekers are relatively accepting of informal work. This is because of their 
personal current circumstances, namely their wish and for some, their need, to 
promptly send remittances to their relatives in their home-country, despite their 
lack of a work permit. Moreover, as recently arrived immigrants, the practices and 
the attitudes they possessed in their country of origin remain very much at the 
forefront of their behaviour and perceptions in their new and significantly different 
host-country. Consequently, the customary less pronounced stance towards the 
division between informal and formal work in Iraqi Kurdistan is transferred, at 
least in the short-term, to their life in their country of reception. Using as a home- 
country example the regional trade undertaken, despite international sanctions, 
across national borders, Gernaz explains that 'on both sides of the border are 
Kurds so, for us, there is just some sort of imaginary border between Iraq and 
Iran. We do not see it as illegal work' (Gernaz, para 83). Gernaz continues, 
reflecting the standpoint of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, observing that 'there is no 
formal or informal work in Iraq. The only illegal work that you could do is if you 
are selling drugs' (Gernaz, para 79). 
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6.1.2 Formal work 
As noted earlier, both asylum seekers and refugees may work formally. 
According to those interviewed for this thesis, Iraqi Kurds 'are willing to start off 
anywhere' (Regional Development Agency, para 81). They tend to be 
underemployed in temporary, low-paid, relatively unskilled, manual, unpopular 
and strenuous jobs, working during the day or at night in restaurants, hotels, 
factories, warehouse depots and farms. Some of those who possess a good 
knowledge of the English language are successful in obtaining work as 
interpreters, translators or caseworkers in agencies or organisations whose client 
group includes asylum seekers and refugees. Importantly, however, at a national 
level, refugees possess low levels of economic participation (29%), lower even 
than ethnic minorities (60%) (Bloch, 2004: 7). At a more regional level, it has been 
estimated that 63% of refugees residing in Birmingham and Solihull, for instance, 
are unemployed (Phillimore and Goodson et al, 2004). Moreover, according to 
these authors, the rates of remuneration for the employed refugees are low. 
6.2 The impact of the dispersal policy on the employment of Iraq! Kurdish 
asvium seekers 
6.2.1 Asylum seekers dispersed before 2001 compared to asylum seekers 
dispersed from 2001 onwards 
It would appear that the dispersal policy impacts more negatively upon the 
employment of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers who are dispersed before 2001 
rather than from 2001 onwards. Indeed, the dispersal localities that asylum 
seekers are sent to prior to 2001 contain few co-ethnics, as discussed in chapter 
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four, and consequently less opportunities to obtain work via the invaluable 
assistance and support of fellow Iraqi Kurds. Similarly, the impact of the dispersal 
policy on the employment of asylum seekers who are sent from 2001 onwards to 
a dispersal locality is most harmful when they are sent to localities possessing a 
small rather than a large co-ethnic group. The larger and denser the co-ethnic 
network, the greater the help it can provide (Jordan and Duvell, 2002) in securing 
work for one of its members. For instance, the numerous Kurdish restaurants that 
have opened in the last five years in Birmingham provide an ideal meeting place, 
where newly arrived and more established co-ethnics can exchange experiences, 
offer advice and pass on information regarding current work opportunities. Hazo, 
advocating the benefits of large co-ethnic networks, notes that 'if they dispersed 
me to Glasgow, when I know that there are 10,000 Kurds in Birmingham, I will try 
to come to Birmingham because it is going to be much easier for me. If I can't 
speak English, I can ask them to find me a job somewhere. But if you are 10 
people in Glasgow, you cannot find a job so easily' (Hazo, para 60). Bendewar, 
illustrating the linguistic and communication benefits of residing in proximity to a 
large co-ethnic group, observes that 'there are a lot of factories in the West 
Midlands and there are already a few people from my own country there so you 
don't need to know how to speak English' (Bendewar, para 124). In contrast, in 
Newcastle, the other case study dispersal site for my research, it would appear 
that the group under study has less contact with employers because of the 
smaller size of its co-ethnic network. Moreover, there are far less English- 
speaking Iraqi Kurds residing in Newcastle, perhaps because those who are 
fluent in the host-country language have migrated to regions with greater work 
opportunities. 
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The harmful impact of the dispersal policy on the employment of asylum seekers 
dispersed prior to 2001 is altered by the dispersal programme under which these 
persons are dispersed, the more lenient interim scheme lessening the policy's 
negative impact and the more strictly implemented NASS scheme worsening the 
policy's detrimental effect. Certainly, those dispersed under the interim scheme, 
that is, those asylum claimants who generally lodged their application for asylum 
before April 2000, experience a more soft form of dispersal. Their preferences to 
reside near co-ethnics or live in proximity to greater work prospects are more 
commonly taken into account, without this affecting their entitlement to state- 
funded housing. Gernaz remarks, for instance, upon the imaginary difficult mental 
health circumstances of some interim dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers. He 
notes that in Newcastle he became friends with a doctor who would provide the 
authorities with 'false' evidence of mental health problems in order to facilitate the 
transfer of his asylum seeker patients to Birmingham, their preferred dispersal 
locality because of its employment opportunities (Gernaz, para 59). Gernaz 
notes, in jest, that 'my doctor friend in Newcastle said that the Kurds have got 
some sort of illness called Birmingham' (Gernaz, para 59). Similarly, a community 
services refugee advisor in Newcastle recounts that 'initially, there were a lot of 
dispersed asylum seekers drifting away from Newcastle. There were some 
people who arrived, they moved into the housing and the next day they had 
gone. We subsequently heard that they were receiving support in Birmingham 
and they were saying that they had been racially harassed' (Housing association, 
para 59). This phenomenon was also noted by a refugee employment adviser 
based in Birmingham (Employment, Specialist voluntary agency 2, para 3). Under 
NASS, the relocation of an asylum seeker to another dispersal locality is rarely 
granted and is only permitted in instances of extreme and proven poor mental 
health and/or racial harassment. 
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Other evidence supports the principle that the interim scheme is more lenient 
than the NASS programme. Indeed, some asylum seekers who had been 
dispersed to Newcastle by NASS appear to have been able to transfer their 
support arrangements over to the interim dispersal scheme, thereby enhancing 
destination flexibility and subsequently arranging for their move to Birmingham, 
without their right to state-funded housing being affected. A community services 
refugee advisor notes, commenting on this strategy, that 'their new support 
arrangements were provided by a local authority in East London, like an out-of- 
borough arrangement, wilh landlords in Birmingham. They were doing this by 
stretching a point, that even if you had come during the NASS period, you could 
still get interim support if you were a dependent of someone who was eligible for 
interim support. It was all eventually exposed' (Housing association, para 55). 
Importantly, the vast majority of asylum seekers who were dispersed from 2001 
onwards are sent to their dispersal locality under the NASS programme and 
consequently, the discussed distinction that exists prior to 2001 between interim 
and NASS dispersed asylum seekers no longer exists from 2001 onwards. 
6.2.2 Regions containing limited labour market opportunities In contrast to 
areas typified by relatively extensive labour market prospects 
The impact of the dispersal policy on the jobs of asylum seekers is more harmful 
for those sent to dispersal regions characterised by limited formal and informal 
employment prospects than for those sent to dispersal areas typified by relatively 
superior formal and informal employment opportunities. The prevalence of 
informal work in the West Midlands and the North East, the two dispersal regions 
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used as case studies in this research, is examined below. Following this, the 
incidence of formal work in these same regions is discussed. 
Informal work 
The West Midlands and the North East vary significantly with regards to the 
occurrence of informal work prospects, the former seemingly typified by a higher 
demand for organised informal employment. A Kurdish asylum support officer 
notes, supporting the view of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, that 'for asylum seekers 
looking for informal work, the West Midlands is better than the North East' 
(Birmingham Kurdish association, para 54 & 68). Similarly, Delav remarks that 
'when an asylum seeker arrives in Birmingham, in the first week, someone will 
come to knock on his door asking him if he wants to work' (Delav, para 23). 
Gernaz even argues that the recent development of a very large community of 
Iraqi Kurds in the West Midlands is a fundamental consequence of the informal 
work opportunities available to this group in this region combined with the 
dispersal policy's restrictions on residing in London and the rest of the South East 
(Gernaz, para 59). An employment adviser remarks that 'there's been a 
Londonisation of the employment situation in the West Midlands' (Employment, 
Specialist voluntary agency 2, para 23). 
Incidentally, the high levels of informal employment in the West Midlands appear 
to have led to the demand for and eventually the development of an extensive 
transport network to and from places of work. Indeed, Iraqi Kurdish asylum 
seekers residing in Birmingham benefit from a daily operating mini van transport 
system, run by informal employers (Kurdish restaurant 2, para 181). According to 
the Iraqi Kurds interviewed in this city, these vans shuttle the informal workforce 
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back and forth, from their place of residence to their workplace, departing early in 
the morning and returning late in the evening. This feature is particularly 
advantageous for those recently arrived asylum seekers who are seeking 
informal work first of all because members of this group possess a limited 
knowledge of the precise location of the factories and fields where labour is 
sought. As a Kurdish asylum support officer observes, 'the problem is how to find 
a job. Asian people take them to the job in the mini vans. These people have 
been here for quite a long time and they have a very good knowledge about the 
factories' (Birmingham Kurdish association, para 64 & 76). Moreover, it is less 
common for this set of individuals to possess or have access to their own mode 
of transport, given the difficulties, as an asylum seeker, in obtaining a driving 
license and the costs involved in purchasing and maintaining a car. 
Informal employment amongst Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers in the North East 
does take place, although not to the same degree as in the West Midlands. An 
asylum caseworker observes that 'quite a few Kurdish lads in the North East 
seem to get jobs in Italian restaurants probably because they look Italian, they 
have these nice accents. Quite a lot of them are cleaners on night shifts in hotels 
or factories. Some work at the amusement arcades' (Generalist voluntary agency 
1, para 147-151). Naso, illustrating the limited informal employment opportunities 
in the North East, observes that 'we have a lot of people who want to move down 
to Birmingham, whilst they are still asylum seekers, to Southampton, to 
Portsmouth, to the South. They emphasise the lack of job opportunities in 
Newcastle and the North East' (Naso, para 89). Thus, it would appear that Iraqi 
Kurdish asylum seekers who are dispersed to the West Midlands experience a 
greater and easier access to informal work than those sent to the North East. 
233 
Given the lower levels of employment overall in the North East, a transport 
system to and from work has not developed. Previously in the North East private 
bus companies would transport employees to work. However, with the overall 
slump in demand for labour in the region, employers now rely on owner-drivers 
(Morris, 1995: 6). This change in the regional transport arrangements is 
compounded by the difficulty asylum seekers encounter when trying to obtain 
their own car and secure a driving license. The early starting and late finishing 
times of this group's potential jobs makes the current absence of suitable 
transport facilities, in the North East a significant impediment to accessing 
informal employment. Ziryan remarks upon this problematic trend noting that 
'once you get a job in Consett, in Washington, in Stanley, outside of Newcastle or 
even in Tyne Valley, when you have to be there at 6am in the morning, how do I 
get there at that time? There is no bus. You can't pay for a taxi all the time. If you 
have no transport, you won't get a job' (Ziryan, para 89). 
Importantly, it is debatable whether informal work is actually adequate enough to 
promote economic integration. Certainly, informal work can provide a source of 
self-fulfilment and self-esteem, particularly for young single healthy men who are 
fully able, willing and used to working, who feel ashamed to be in receipt of state 
benefits and whose relatives in their home-country are expecting remittances. As 
a Kurdish asylum support officer notes, 'even they pay them very little money but 
for the first time, when they come here, they are working, they don't care because 
they are single, they have energy to work' (Birmingham Kurdish association, para 
64 & 68). Moreover, working informally can assist individuals with their future 
search for formal jobs. Indeed, as an informal employee, they are able to develop 
a pool of co-ethnic and host community acquaintances and contacts in the 
workplace that can then be used as a network through which they can first 
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enquire about and eventually obtain a formal job. However, on the other hand, 
working informally involves a significant degree of risk and can threaten one's 
personal safety. If the authorities discover that a person has been employed 
informally, their asylum application might be detrimentally affected. In addition, 
the experience gained whilst working informally cannot be included on a CV. 
Whilst some informal jobs are more beneficial for an individual's mental health 
than prolonged periods of inactivity, other informal work posts can be counter- 
productive, resulting in greater levels of stress, fatigue and frustration. Moreover, 
although working informally provides a person with the opportunity to broaden 
their social network of co-ethnics, it can reduce contact with the host-community 
by trapping them in co-ethnic networks. Finally, engaging in this form of 
employment can lead exclusively to the development of exploitative and 
manipulative relationships. In conclusion, informal work cannot be considered as 
adequate enough to stimulate the process of economic integration. Consequently 
the latter can only begin to develop when an individual is granted a work permit 
and once s/he is able to acquire a formal work post, a state of affairs that might 
occur whilst a person is an asylum seeker or alternatively once S/he has obtained 
his/her refugee status. 
Formal work 
Birmingham and Newcastle vary with regards to the occurrence of formal work 
prospects, the former offering, relative to the latter, greater formal employment 
opportunities. However, it is important to locate this trend within the context of the 
broader formal employment prospects of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers, the 
benefits of Birmingham over Newcastle equating in practice to slightly less 
unemployment in the former compared to the latter rather than full employment in 
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the former and complete unemployment in the latter. Indeed, overall, formal work 
opportunities for Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers in both cities are generally low. 
The absolute conditions of the labour markets in both cities are presented and 
the limited formal work prospects in Birmingham and the shortage of employment 
opportunities in Newcastle are noted. Following this, the reasons for Birmingham 
offering relatively more work opportunities than Newcastle are presented. 
Low formal work opportunities overall for dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
It is difficult to gage from my interviews whether the formal employment prospects 
for those residing in Birmingham are significantly worse than elsewhere in the 
UK. However, formal work is definitively perceived by refugees as being scarce in 
this city primarily because the supply of unskilled, low paid formal workers, 
seemingly significantly inflated by the presence of a substantial refugee 
population, appears to outstrip demand. As a Kurdish asylum support officer 
observes, 'there are too many refugees living here and not enough formal work. 
The employment agencies in Glasgow, the rest of the Midlands, they have a 
better choice' (Birmingham Kurdish association, para 54 & 58). Similarly, 
Erdehan, supporting the perspective of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed in. 
Birmingham, remarks that 'there are many jobs in Birmingham but there are also 
many young men, including refugees, wanting to work. We can't find a job. When 
you go to an employment agency here, there are many people registering but 
there is no job' (Erdehan, para 85 & 339). An additional reason for the scarcity of 
formal work for Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers in Birmingham seems to be the 
trend of formal employment posts being replaced by informal job positions. 
Certainly, the increased supply of informal workers in the region, since the 
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introduction of dispersal and the removal of asylum seekers' right to work, might 
be encouraging some employers to reduce their production costs by employing 
greater proportions of cheap labour. Bendewar illustrates this phenomenon 
noting that 'I was working legally in a factory in Birmingham making cushions and 
pillows. Then one day, some people came without a national insurance number 
asking for work, so the employer said, that's it, you need to make 100 cushions in 
ten minutes. If you don't do it, I have got other people who will work for less than 
the minimum wage and you can leave if you want. I didn't want to work illegally, 
so I left. I haven't found another job yet' (Bendewar, para 112-114). 
The lack of formal employment opportunities for Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers in 
Newcastle appears to reflect a more structural trend, namely the overall shortage 
of work amongst the indigenous population residing in this locality. As discussed 
more extensively in the section on informal jobs, the North East's 2001 figure of 
5.2% unemployed remains the highest in the country, standing at 2.2 points 
above the British rate of 3% (Stone and Braidford, 2002: 54). A voluntary agency 
manager, supporting this argument, observes that 'there is a problem for 
refugees everywhere in gaining employment but there is high unemployment in 
the North East so it is even more difficult to get jobs' (Specialist voluntary agency 
1, para 65). This assertion is supported by other local service providers 
interviewed in Newcastle (Manager, NERS One Stop Shop, para 55; Diversity, 
City Council 3, para 25). Significantly, Williams and Windebank (1998: 93) 
observe that Black and Minority Ethnic groups and recently arrived immigrants 
encounter greater obstacles when endeavouring to secure work in areas with 
high unemployment levels. Indeed, the widespread trend, in this environment, is 
for a greater proportion of the existing jobs to be filled by the majority white 
population. Illustrating this point with reference to the formal work prospects of 
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asylum seekers in Newcastle, a caseworker remarks that 'this is a high 
unemployment area. If you are competing for jobs with not much English, no 
recognisable qualifications or skills and limited UK work experience then it is 
necessarily going to be harder to find a job' (Generalist voluntary agency 1, para 
63). 
Relative to the North East, the West Midlands offers greater formal employment 
prospects for asylum seekers 
It would appear, in relative terms, that the West Midlands offers Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers greater formal employment opportunities than the North East. 
Firstly, as discussed in the section on informal work, the West Midlands offers, 
overall, more jobs than the North East. Thus, if an asylum seeker residing in 
Birmingham is unable to obtain work in the latter, s/he can broaden his/her 
search to the other dynamic West Midlands cities without having, necessarily, to 
move house. Whilst it is not guaranteed that this person will find employment in 
Evesharn or Worcester, for instance, his/her success potential is greater than if 
s/he were to reside in the North East. Indeed, if an asylum seeker is failing to 
acquire work in Newcastle, it is less likely that the surrounding cities will be able 
to offer him/her a job because of the less active nature of the economy in this 
region. Reflecting this trend, Hazo notes, 'I see that the Kurdish people are 
interested in the West Midlands because it is a very large space. If you cannot 
find a job in Birmingham, you can find a job in Coventry, in Dudley, in Stoke-on- 
Trent, in Solihull' (Hazo, para 68). 
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Secondly, there exists in Birmingham several specialised privately-owned 
employment agencies, a number of which are owned and managed by Kurds 
themselves, that actively and strategically attempt to overcome the employment 
barriers that asylum seekers face, namely their poor English language 
proficiency, their lack of UK work experience as well as recognised professional 
qualifications and skills. A Kurdish asylum support officer describes the approach 
of one of these agencies, noting that 'they send refugees to a very difficult job. It 
doesn't require English and the white people don't want to do it, and when the 
refugees get this job, they accumulate experience and it's easier for them to get 
another job' (Birmingham Kurdish association, para 326). 
Thirdly, the West Midlands seemingly hosts larger numbers of co-ethnic English- 
speakers than the North East who can help those asylum seekers possessing 
less knowledge of the English language into employment. In some workplaces, 
hierarchical structures exist whereby some of the foremen are English-speaking 
Iraqi Kurds and the employees managed by them are non-English speaking co- 
ethnics. Indeed, a Kurdish employment advisor, reflecting upon this particular 
trend, remarks that 'some employers have just one ethnic group as their 
workforce and a whole arrangement is set up with bilingual foremen who can 
communicate with the English bosses as well as with the non-English speaking 
co-ethnic employees. By doing this, there is that level of communication which 
you wouldn't have in a very multi-ethnic workforce. Some factories, they give jobs 
just to Kurdish people' (Connexions, para 123 & 135). 
It can be observed from this discussion on formal and informal work in 
Birmingham and Newcastle that the degree of available informal job posts varies 
more substantially between both case study cities / regions than the extent of 
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formal work posts. This suggests that the informal work prospects of Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers are more affected by the dispersal policy than the formal 
employment opportunities of this group, the latter being relatively limited, 
regardless of the dispersal location. 
6.2.3 Asylum seekers' possession or lack of a work permit 
The harmful impact of the dispersal policy on the employment of dispersed 
asylum seekers is modified by their ownership or lack of a work permit, the latter 
making the effect of the policy worse, informal employment, as discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, providing a lower wage and poorer working conditions 
than formal employment. Importantly, asylum claimants who lodged their 
application for asylum before 23d July 2002 are entitled to a work permit whilst 
those who placed their claim for asylum after 23rd July 2002 are forbidden to work 
until their claim has been processed. 
Significantly, networking amongst family, friends and acquaintances is very 
important for individuals in search of informal work as well as for those recruiting 
informal employees, the public advertising of this form of employment logically 
drawing the unwanted attention of the authorities. It has been noted that 'as the 
need for informal workers grows, the onus is placed on current informal 
employees to bring in other members of their families or communities' (Leonard, 
1998: 138, based on Sassen, 1996). According to Morris (1995: 28-29), it is 
beneficial for the employer to resort to this method of recruitment particularly 
because it can avoid employing people with an unknown background who might 
become 'troublemakers', that is individuals who are likely to encourage other 
employees to organise themselves and request improved working conditions. 
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Moreover, this approach draws on established relationships that involve a degree 
of trust and loyalty, which can be bolstered by offering work as a personal favour 
to the recruit or to the individual supplying the contact. From an employer's 
perspective, the greater quality of trust existing amongst the employees taken on 
via this method can aid with workforce control through the indebtedness the 
recruit feels towards their informant. Consequently, the negative impact of the 
dispersal policy on the employment of dispersed asylum seekers who do not 
possess a work permit is increased for those sent to localities containing a small 
co-ethnic group. 
6.2.4 The significance of the gender, age and English language proficiency 
of those who are dispersed 
The negative impact of the dispersal policy on the employment of dispersed Iraqi 
Kurdish asylum seekers is amplified in some cases and diminished in others 
depending upon the gender, age and level of English of those who are dispersed. 
Certainly, the harmful impact of the dispersal policy on the employment of asylum 
seekers is increased by being female and lessened by being male. Women are 
less susceptible to securing work because, as alluded to in previous chapters, in 
Iraqi Kurdish culture, it is men who overwhelmingly tend to fulfil the wage earner 
role whilst women usually take responsibility for the upkeep of the home and 
childrearing. Amongst dispersed Iraqi Kurdish men, the detrimental effect of the 
dispersal policy on asylum seeker employment is heightened for those aged 40 
and above, and to a lesser extent those aged between 30 and 39. This group 
encounter the most barriers to employment, their motivation and ability to learn 
English, an important facilitator for participation in the labour market, as well as 
convert their existing qualifications and skills or retrain being less pronounced 
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than for those aged 21-29. Incidentally, the marital status of Iraqi Kurdish men 
does not influence the impact of the dispersal policy on their employment. Finally, 
the harmful impact of the dispersal policy on asylum seeker employment is 
increased for those possessing a poor level of English. This group finds work less 
easily as well as less independently from their co-ethnic support networks, 
members of the latter providing, on occasions and, in some cases, at a financial 
cost, interpretation or assistance in the workplace for those who require it. In 
contrast, the negative impact of the dispersal policy on asylum seeker 
employment is reduced for those benefiting from a good level of English. 
Significantly, in 1erms of info"rmal - employment, those with greater English 
language proficiency can earn higher wages than their colleagues. Certainly, the 
former tend to manage groups of co-ethnics on behalf of their employer, selecting 
new recruits and providing any necessary interpreting and translation services in 
the workplace. 
The negative impact of the dispersal policy on the employment of Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers does not seem to augment or decrease according to individuals' 
home-country education, qualifications and work experience. Indeed, the formal 
and informal jobs available to asylum seekers are sought primarily through a 
process of networking rather than via an application procedure based on 
educational achievement, qualifications and experience. Moreover, given the 
fundamentally different industrial structures of Iraq and England, it is unlikely for 
home-country work experience, if it does indeed exist, in similar labour intensive, 
unskilled, low status jobs to be of significant added value in the course of 
recruitment. However, there does appear to exist a correlation between an 
asylum seeker's proficiency in English in the host-country and the level of their 
home-country education and qualifications, the more schooling they have 
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received, the more skilled they appear to be at promptly acquiring an adequate 
level of English language proficiency. 
In sum, the impact of the dispersal policy on the employment of Iraqi Kurdish 
dispersed asylum seekers varies depending firstly, on the employment and co- 
ethnic group characteristics of the dispersal locality. The scheme under which 
individuals are dispersed is also significant, as are other related governmental 
policies, namely the Home Office's position on asylum seekers' access to a work 
permit. The personal traits of the individuals dispersed are equally important. The 
hypothesis that the dispersal policy wields a negative impact on the employment 
of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers because this policy sends this set of 
individuals to areas where suitable employment prospects are limited is most 
accurate: 
a. prior to 2001 when few co-ethnics had been sent to the dispersal localities, 
b. for asylum seekers dispersed under the strict NASS programme that 
excludes the clients' residential preferences 
c. to dispersal localities characterised by overall low formal and informal 
employment opportunities. 
The hypothesis is least accurate: 
a. from 2001 onwards when more co-ethnics; were settling in the dispersal 
areas, 
b. for asylum seekers sent to dispersal localities typified by overall high formal 
and informal employment prospects and a large co-ethnic community. 
The lack of a work permit for those asylum seekers who claimed asylum from 
July 2002 affects the suitability of the employment they can obtain, informal work 
being more detrimental for them than formal work. Finally, the impact of the 
dispersal policy on the employment of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is 
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experienced by individuals as either more or less detrimental, depending on their 
gender, age and level of English. Women suffer the effect of dispersal more than 
men; those aged 30 and above, but especially those aged 40 and above 
aggravate the influence of dispersal more than those aged 29 or less; and those 
possessing a poor level of English intensify the negative impact of dispersal more 
than those who have a good level of English. 
It can be noted from this discussion that the shared conditions that stimulate the 
social bonds and employment of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers in the 
dispersal areas are virtually identical. Being male is generally more helpful than 
being female. Moreover, regarding men specifically, those aged between 21 and 
29 and dispersed from 2001 onwards to a locality containing a large co-ethnic 
support network benefit both from greater social bonding and work opportunities 
than those aged 30 and above and dispersed prior to 2001 to an area containing 
a small co-ethnic group. In addition, it would seem that the conditions that 
stimulate social bridging prospects and employment opportunities are much less 
similar. For instance, the timing of dispersal is divergent, being sent to a dispersal 
area preceding 2001 being most conducive to the social bridging of the group 
under study in the dispersal areas whilst being least propitious for obtaining 
employment. 
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6.3 The impact of the dispersal Policv on the emplovment of Iraqi Kurdish 
refu_qees 
6.3.1 Dispersed refugees who move away from their dispersal locality 
following the receipt of their authorlsation to stay in the UK 
The dispersal policy ceases to affect the employment of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
refugees who leave their dispersal area following the receipt of their permission 
to remain in the UK. Certainly, dispersed refugees are freer to leave their 
dispersal locality than dispersed asylum seekers, the former, unlike the latter, 
possessing the right to move and choose their place of residence without this 
decision affecting their welfare entitlements. Unfortunately, there is no statistical 
data available on the residential location of dispersed refugees across the UK 
and therefore it is impossible to quantify the proportion of this group who relocate, 
and by extension the percentage whose employment is no longer affected by the 
dispersal policy. However, it has been possible, on the basis of my fieldwork, to 
identify the characteristics and circumstances of the dispersed refugees who are 
most and least likely to move following the receipt of their right to remain. These 
are outlined in detail in chapter four. 
It is necessary to note, as in-the case with social bonds and social bridges, that 
the dispersal policy indirectly impacts upon the employment of some of the 
dispersed refugees who leave their dispersal locality following the receipt of their 
permission to remain in the UK. The employment of the dispersed refugees who 
move to another dispersal locality rather than relocate to the South East of 
England, a non-dispersal region, are impacted upon by the dispersal policy in a 
similar way as the dispersed refugees who remain in their initial dispersal area, 
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albeit less negatively. Indeed, it is likely that the former group chose another 
dispersal area as their new residence because, amongst other things, of the 
greater employment prospects available to them there. 
6.3.2 Dispersed refugees who remain in their dispersal locality following the 
receipt of their permission to remain in the UK 
One of the principal changes, relevant to employment, that arises on receipt of 
the refugee status is the universal granting of a formal work permit to this group. 
As a result, the negative impact of the dispersal policy on the suitable 
employment of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees who stay in their dispersal area 
following the authorisation of their stay in the UK is, in theory, reduced, for this 
set of individuals since all, potentially, have access to the form of employment 
that eventually leads to economic integration. 
A further change that occurs on receipt of the refugee status is the 
implementation of the 28 day notice period measure which leads new refugees to 
lose their entitlement, within 28 days theoretically and within seven days in 
practice, to the financial subsistence supplied to them by the interim or NASS 
dispersal authorities. Unfortunately, the transfer from benefits provided by the 
dispersal authorities to mainstream benefits, a process that begins on receipt of 
the refugee status, tends to take six weeks (Move-on officer, Housing, City 
Council 1, para 11). In addition, whilst refugees are allowed to work, they cannot 
acquire employment or Job Seekers Allowance until their application for a 
national insurance number has been processed, a procedure that also takes 
approximately six weeks to resolve. Consequently, the negative impact of the 
dispersal policy on the employment of these refugees is augmented, at least in 
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the short term, since this set of individuals is confronted with significant financial 
difficulty and as a result, they customarily have to postpone their search for work 
until they possess a degree of financial security and stability. The negative impact 
of the policy is significantly increased if the individual concerned resides in a 
dispersal locality containing a small co-ethnic community and is moderately 
amplified if the person concerned lives in a dispersal area possessing a large co- 
ethnic group, his/her access to the potential financial support of acquaintances in 
the former being lower than in the latter. 
Under this -same measure, new refugees also lose their dispersal 
accommodation, as discussed in chapter seven, being given theoretically a 28- 
day notice and in reality a seven day grace period within which they have to 
obtain alternative housing. The harmful impact of the dispersal policy on the 
employment of refugees is deepened by this measure, at least in the short term, 
since the lack of a permanent (and personal) abode tends to further delay this 
group's ability to seek and secure work. Rojdar, reflecting upon the distractions 
involved in finding suitable accommodation and the difficulty in simultaneously 
searching for work, remarks that 'the Job Centre pushes refugees to work, and 
the refugees say we have nowhere to stay, we live in a different place every day, 
how can we get a jobT (Rojdar, para 267). 
Apart from these primarily short-term differences, the impact of the dispersal 
policy on the employment of this group is indistinguishable from the effect the 
policy wielded on this set of individuals when they were asylum seekers. 
Significantly, the extent to which dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees become 
economically integrated is highly debatable. Firstly, significant proportions of 
refugees are unable to secure formal work and remain unemployed for long 
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periods of time not because of the constraining effects of the dispersal policy but 
rather because of the powerful influence of certain employment barriers. These 
include low levels of English language and literacy, lack of UK work experience, 
lack of (recognised) qualifications, unfamiliarity with the UK system and employer 
discrimination (Bloch, 2004: 26). Secondly, for those refugees successful in 
obtaining work, their jobs are formal but usually of a temporary nature and 
generally well below the person's level of qualifications and prior professional 
experience. This type of job places the individual one step closer to economic 
integration, relative to being employed informally. However, significant progress 
is required before these individuals can be considered economically integrated. 
In sum, the hypothesis that the dispersal policy exercises a negative impact on 
the employment of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees is incorrect if applied to 
those who leave their dispersal locality following the receipt of their authorisation 
to stay in the UK. However, the hypothesis is applicable to the dispersed 
refugees who settle in their dispersal locality after they have received their 
permission to stay in the UK, the impact being virtually identical to that of 
dispersed asylum seekers. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the impact of the dispersal policy on dispersed Iraq! Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees' employment has been examined. The following 
hypothesis has been tested: the contemporary UK dispersal policy exercises a 
negative impact on the employment of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
and refugees because this policy sends this group to localities where suitable 
employment opportunities are limited. 
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It has been concluded that this hypothesis is most accurate prior to 2001 for 
asylum seekers dispersed under the strict NASS programme to dispersal 
localities characterised by overall low formal and informal employment 
opportunities. This hypothesis is least accurate from 2001 onwards, for asylum 
seekers sent to dispersal localities typified by overall high formal and informal 
employment prospects and a large co-ethnic community. Moreover, the lack of a 
work permit for those asylum seekers who claimed asylum from July 2002 affects 
the suitability of the employment they can obtain, informal work being more 
detrimental for them than formal work. Certainly, the former involves a significant 
degree of risk. It can threaten an individual's personal safety and, for asylum 
seekers, it can potentially be detrimental to their asylum application. Moreover, 
the experience gained whilst working informally cannot be included on a CV. 
Informal work can also cause high levels of stress, fatigue and frustration. In 
addition, this type of employment can reduce contact with the host-community 
and can lead exclusively to the development of exploitative and manipulative 
relationships. Finally, the impact of the dispersal policy on the employment of 
dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is experienced by individuals as either 
more or less detrimental, depending on their gender, age and level of English. It 
is noteworthy that the conditions that stimulate the social bonds and employment 
of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers in the dispersal areas are virtually 
identical whilst the set of circumstances that fuel social bridging prospects and 
employment opportunities are much less similar. 
A further conclusion drawn from this chapter is that the dispersal policy fails to 
exercise any impact on the employment of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees who 
leave their dispersal locality following the receipt of their authorisation to stay in 
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the UK. Nevertheless, for those refugees who remain in their dispersal locality, 
the employment hypothesis is applicable, the impact of the dispersal policy being 
virtually identical to that of dispersed asylum seekers. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE IMPACT OF THE DISPERSAL POLICY ON THE HOUSING OF IRAQI 
KURDISH ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES 
In this chapter, the impact of the dispersal policy on dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees' housing is studied. As discussed in chapter two, 
access to adequate housing represents a central marker of integration as well as 
being a launching pad for the growth of other means to integration (Ager and 
Strang, 2004b: 12,14). An asylum seeker or refugee is heading towards 
integration when, in addition to developing social bonds and bridges and 
obtaining suitable employment, s/he is also accessing adequate housing. 
In this chapter, the following hypothesis is tested: the current UK dispersal policy 
wields a negative impact on the housing of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum 
seekers and refugees because this policy houses this set of individuals in 
inadequate dwellings. With the intention of evaluating the validity of this 
statement, an analysis of the impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of 
dispersed asylum seekers is presented. Following this, the' impact of the 
dispersal policy on the housing of dispersed refugees is evaluated. 
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7.1 The impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of Iracli Kurdish 
asvlum seekers 
7.1.1 Living in a shared room in a hostel compared to residing in a room in 
a shared house or flat 
The impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of asylum seekers is more 
detrimental for those accommodated, by the dispersal authorities, in a shared 
room in a hostel than for those housed in a room in a shared dwelling, the latter 
offering greater overcrowding, threats to personal safety, levels of poverty and 
mental health problems. 
A shared room in a hostel 
One of the forms of accommodation that asylum seekers obtain, on arrival in their 
dispersal area, is a room in a hostel that they have to share with one or several 
other individuals (Refugee Council One Stop Shop, para 85). They might 
occasionally be provided with their own individual room, its relative size, 
nevertheless, being significantly reduced as a result. The hostel itself tends to be 
occupied by both men and women, these are asylum seekers who originate from 
a variety of countries and ethnic groups as well as host-country citizens who are 
homeless. It would appear, according to my fieldwork, that this particular type of 
dwelling is unpopular amongst Iraqi Kurds, especially when occupied for several 
months, partly because it offers individuals limited personal as well as shared 
space. Indeed, hostels are portrayed by Iraqi Kurds as busy, noisy and crammed 
places where opportunities for private as well as collective relaxation are scarce. 
In addition to the existence of standard overcrowding in some of the hostels, 
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Kereng notes that hostel managers can also be intimidated by residents and, in 
order to appease them, offer more personal space than has been planned for, at 
the cost of creating a more cramped living area for the more passive occupants. 
Indeed, in one of the hostels he resided in, Kereng observed this exact 
phenomenon and remarks that five people were sharing one bedroom whilst in 
other bedrooms there was only one person (Kereng, para 33). 
Importantly, in this kind of housing, when overcrowding occurs, it is usually 
accompanied by moderate to high degrees of risk to personal safety, the larger 
the hostel, the greater the threat to physical security. Indeed, according to the 
Vice-Chair of NERS, in hostels of 200 bedspaces or more, it seems difficult to 
effectively protect occupants from the risk and occurrence of theft, vandalism and 
physical Violence, even rape (Vice-Chair, NERS One Stop Shop, para 13). The 
other local service providers interviewed in both Newcastle and Birmingham also 
support this view. In response to the known problematic nature of large and 
crowded hostels, the European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) 
recommends that the accommodation of asylum seekers in these types of 
establishments is avoided wherever possible (ECRE, 2001: 9). 
Moreover, hostel accommodation for asylum seekers is usually full board, 
residents customarily being provided with less financial support in kind, 
customarily a E10 weekly allowance, than those living in houses or flats. 
According to interviews with Iraqi Kurds, the meals offered appear to be average 
on the whole and the eating times rigid. Reflecting the approach adopted by 
various hostel accommodation providers, one organisation has stated that some 
6gave asylum seekers curry on the basis that if they weren't English they must eat 
curry' (Generalist voluntary agency 1, para 85). Occasionally, following repeated 
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complaints from asylum seekers, opportunities arise where residents can 
influence the type of food provided (Cenik, para 39; Community advisor, NERS 
One Stop Shop, para 57; Private housing company, para. 97). Incidentally, ECRE 
recommends that provisions should be made for residents to prepare their own 
food, following their religious beliefs and practices (2001: 16). 
In addition, as stated earlier, asylum seekers residing in full-board hostel 
accommodation receive less financial subsistence than those living in self- 
catering houses or flats, the risk of poverty therefore being most acute in the case 
of the former. Indeed, in some instances, the monetary allowance is insufficient 
for the needs of asylum seekers, despite their residence in full board dwellings. 
Kinyaz, for example, observes that he lacked satisfactory finances to purchase 
winter clothes (Kinyaz, para 3). Importantly, for those living in full board hostels, a 
shortage of money can also be detrimental to their mental health. Certainly, 
according to the interviews with Iraqi Kurds, the dearth of pecuniary resources 
impedes this group's ability to spend time away from their accommodation, thus 
compelling them to remain in the company of other hostel residents, who are 
likely to have concerns and problems of their own. As a caseworker notes, 'you 
can only walk round the local park so many times, you can't go into town much 
with no money for a bus pass so you really are in the hostel most of the time' 
(Refugee Council One Stop Shop, para 85). Clearly, the inadequate level of 
financial support distributed by local or central agencies to asylum seekers in full 
board hostels, when occurring over a prolonged period of time, encourages some 
individuals to seek informal work. It is worthwhile noting that the government's 
decision to provide asylum seekers residing in full-board hostel accommodation 
with limited benefits was not intended to push this group into the informal labour 
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market. Rather, this phenomenon constitutes an unexpected and unintentional 
consequence of the dispersal programme. 
Furthermore, in many cases, the services and facilities offered to the asylum 
seekers residing in the hostels are inadequate and the ensuing inactivity of the 
occupants can be significantly detrimental to their mental health. Naso, for 
instance, describing his experience in a hostel in Sunderland, remarks that he 
had 'a sense that it was hopeless, I was useless, just stay there, sleep and eat. I 
felt like a druggie, I didn't feel myself, just in four walls' (Naso, para 193). 
Certainly, the absence of a communal relaxation area in a hostel in Newcastle 
appears to have been one of the reasons behind the clashes that occurred there 
between resident asylum seekers and hostel managers. A London-based service 
provider, involved in trying to resolve the issue, remarked that 'there were huge 
numbers of young Iraqi Kurds, 200 people, and they wanted to have somewhere 
to spend time because there was nothing in the hostel for them. There was a big 
riot, they started smashing all the windows, some people were arrested and put 
into prison. Clearly, you could see that the people had been left there, nothing to 
do, just arrived in the country, no direction, not even something to keep them 
busy. That was a typical case of unplanned dispersal with no thinking about 
provision of services and having a proper plan for these people' (Borough Council 
1, para 87). Reflecting upon this particular incident, the Chief Executive of NERS 
emphasised in a newspaper article, that 'the level of support is not there. The 
hostel residents are totally isolated, not allowed visitors, to consume certain 
foods, or to smoke. There is no money to socialise or mix with the outside world. 
They don't have the means to integrate into the community'. Despite this trend, 
there also exist cases from my fieldwork where hostel managers do organise 
leisure as well as purposeful activities for asylum seeker residents. For instance, 
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the manager of one of the privately-run hostels in Birmingham ensures that 
'people are registered for the English course that is set up for people in the 
hostel' (Private housing company, para 19). Also, a seemingly successful 'Afghan 
night' was recently organised 'with food, a drama group, toys, musicians, a 
competition with prizes, children's activities. About 500 people turned up. We are 
organising an Iraqi night at the moment. And we will also be organising an African 
night' (Private housing company, para 99). It is valuable to note, as in the 
previous paragraph, that the riots in the Newcastle hostel constituted an 
unanticipated and inadvertent consequence of an overly harsh aspect of the 
current UK dispersal programme. 
A final, and unpopular, aspect of this type of accommodation, amongst the Iraqi 
Kurds interviewed, tends to be its relatively old age, poor state of repair and 
mediocre cleanliness. 
A room in a shared house or flat 
Alternatively, dispersed asylum seekers acquire a room in a shared house or flat, 
where they reside, most commonly, with other same sex co-ethnics. Families 
usually obtain access to several rooms in shared housing or instead are offered a 
dwelling for their sole use. In this type of housing, there continues to exist a risk 
of overcrowding as well as a potential for threatened personal safety. 
Nevertheless, living in a room located in a self-catering shared house or flat, 
where the individual is in receipt of the asylum seeker's full subsistence 
allowance, offers, overall, the potential for as well as the reality of a more suitable 
place of residence than a shared room in a full-board hostel. Kereng, for 
instance, supports this view, justifying his position by observing that 'in a house 
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you don't see lots of people. It's just space for yourself, you do what you want in 
your room. In the hostel, there might be five people in one room' (Kereng, para 
45). Despite the general trend presented above, there exist instances where 
significant overcrowding occurs in shared houses or flats. Cenik, for example, 
recounting her experience of residing in a shared dwelling with her husband, 
remarks that 'there were six bedrooms with one family per bedroom and we all 
shared one small living room, one kitchen and two bathrooms (Cenik, para 59 & 
63). 
Furthermore, according to the interviews with Iraqi Kurds, the quality of the 
shared houses and flats appears marginally superior to that of the hostels. In 
some instances, the dwellings tend to be old, dirty and neglected whilst on other 
occasions the abodes tend to be new, clean and well-maintained. Incidentally, 
ECRE (2001: 9) advocates that the basis of a national reception system for asylum 
seekers should be independent housing coupled with community development 
rather than hostel accommodation. 
7.1.2 Living In private sector accommodation versus residing in public 
sector housing 
The impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of asylum seekers is more 
detrimental for those accommodated, by the dispersal authorities, in the private 
sector rather than in the public sector, the former type possessing a greater risk 
of overcrowding as well as poorer dwelling quality than the latter primarily 
because this sector is less rigorously regulated and monitored. On the occasions 
when local public housing providers are aware of the poor quality of some of the 
local private sector accommodation, it is difficult for them to challenge the private 
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providers. Indeed, the contracts between the latter and NASS are confidential, 
the exact terms of the agreement remaining thus largely unknown. Some hostel 
managers, in the private housing sector, take advantage of this relative lack of 
accountability coupled with the limited knowledge of their residents concerning 
the minimum living standards they are to expect in the UK. Indeed, Kereng notes 
that, in one hostel he lived in, 'your friends are not allowed to come to see you 
because the hostel manager doesn't want someone who has been in the UK one 
or two years to see what is your life like and tell you your rights' (Kereng, para 
39). The complaints procedure, in the private housing sector, can also be 
relatively ineffective (Boswell, 2001: 34) and asylum seekers, themselves, are 
customarily reluctant to draw attention to their poor housing conditions since they 
are concerned that this might affect their asylum claim or alternatively, they feel 
ashamed of being ungrateful. Furthermore, some asylum seekers lack the 
necessary language skills to communicate their complaint effectively. Illustrating 
the situation of asylum seekers residing in unsatisfactory accommodation, Birwaz 
recounts being placed in a very small room in a hostel, stating that 'when I 
complained about the size of my room, the hostel manager threatened to 
withdraw my support altogether' (Birwaz, para 117). Finally, in some dispersal 
localities, the characteristics of the private dwellings procured for asylum seeker 
occupation lend themselves more to overcrowding than the traits of the social 
accommodation. For example, in the case of Birmingham, the City Council 
primarily houses asylum seekers in small properties, such as flats located in 
tower blocks, whilst private sector contractors tend to procure larger homes 
consisting mainly in pre-1919, three to four bedroom Victorian properties 
intended for use as multiple occupation (Housing, City Council 2, para 49 & 91). 
258 
The lower standard of private sector dispersed housing has been documented in 
other dispersal localities. In Manchester, for instance, 'the quality of NASS 
commissioned private accommodation inspected by Manchester's Private Sector 
Housing Team, found high levels of disrepair and unfit properties' (House of 
Commons Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: Housing, Planning, Local 
Government and the Regions Select Committee, '14 th July 2003). This trend has 
also been noted in other research where private sector NASS procured 
accommodation is described as sub-standard, with problems of overcrowding 
and buildings in disrepair, some private landlords exploiting the government's 
need to disperse asylum seekers promptly (Robinson, 2003a: 137). Garvie 
(2001), in a survey undertaken between January and March 2000, notes, for 
example, that 17% of the private dwellings designated for asylum seekers are 
unfit for human habitation, 28% accommodating more occupants than the 
number of bed spaces contained with 10% possessing inadequate facilities 
(Garvie, 2001: 9). 
7.1.3 Dispersal via NASS in contrast to dispersal via the interim programme 
The impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of asylum seekers is more 
harmful for those dispersed via the NASS scheme than for those dispersed via 
the interim programme. Indeed, the former is customarily characterised by a 
delay in the transfer of asylum seekers from emergency accommodation to their 
dispersed dwelling as well as being typified as more strict in its allocation of 
dispersal housing than the interim programme. 
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Transfer rate of asylum seekers from emergency accommodation to their 
dispersed dwellinci 
The pace at which asylum seekers are relocated from their emergency 
accommodation to their dispersed dwelling varies, depending on the policy under 
which the transfer is taking place. Importantly, the role of emergency 
accommodation, under both dispersal regimes, is to provide new asylum 
claimants who have applied for dispersed state-funded housing with basic 
shelter. This form of housing is offered for seven to fourteen days in an asylum 
seeker's current residential area whilst the authorities firstly assess his/her 
eligibility to support and secondly secure suitable housing for him/her in a 
dispersal locality. Emergency accommodation consists customarily in a shared 
room in a full board hostel. 
Whilst this particular aspect of the dispersal process is largely unproblematic 
under the interim programme, in the NASS system, asylum seekers tend to 
reside several months rather than a number of days in this form of housing. 
Consequently, not only does the quantity of emergency accommodation required 
grow in a somewhat unmanageable manner but also new asylum claimants are 
compelled to live for a prolonged period of time in dwellings and under 
arrangements that are in effect unintended and therefore unsuitable for medium 
to long term residence. The suitability of full board hostel accommodation has 
already been discussed above, the detrimental import of the factors examined 
growing in significance the longer an individual is compelled to reside in this form 
of dwelling. In addition, residing in emergency accommodation, unlike living in 
dispersed full board hostels or self-catering houses or flats, involves less 
permanence and greater levels of unpredictability. Indeed, dispersal from 
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emergency accommodation can take place at a day's notice, within a week or six 
months of residing in the dwelling whereas asylum seekers living in dispersed 
housing tend to remain in the same dwelling until they receive their final decision 
from the IND on their asylum case. As a result, it is rare for asylum seekers living 
in emergency accommodation to undertake the primary aspects of settlement 
such as registering with a GP or enrolling their children at a local school, the 
trend being to postpone these activities until dispersal is completed. In support of 
this argument, a caseworker remarks that emergency accommodation is 'very 
insecure, you don't know when you're going to be moved. You know that you 
won't be permanently in the area so it's actually very hard to start setting yourself 
up if all you are anticipating is moving elsewhere. People hold off' (Refugee 
Council One Stop Shop, para 51). 
Several factors account for the slower than projected transfer of new asylum 
seekers from their emergency accommodation to their dispersed dwelling. Firstly, 
NASS procured dispersed housing is itself vacated at a slower rate than 
anticipated since, until recently, the duration of the asylum application process 
significantly exceeded the IND's projected time schedule, lasting one year or 
more rather than the intended six months. Secondly, it would appear that the 
dispersed dwellings obtained by NASS fail to match the variety of the asylum 
seeker household sizes, the supply of large family accommodation in particular 
falling significantly below the demand for this size of dwelling (EA provider, para 
33). Indeed, an asylum housing officer remarks that 'there is a shortage of 
suitable accommodation and difficulty matching, particularly large families. NASS 
has great anxieties about having over-procured accommodation so they are very 
very reluctant to procure anymore. NASS ought to be taking steps with the 
providers to turn some of that single accommodation into large family 
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accommodation' (Housing, City Council 2, para 35). An additional element 
contributing to the delayed transfer of some asylum seekers from their 
emergency accommodation to their dispersed abode is the implementation of 
Section 55 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 on 8'h January 
2003. This particular aspect of the Act states that the Home Secretary is legally 
permitted to deny asylum seekers access to apply for housing and financial 
support from NASS if they fail to claim asylum 'as soon as reasonably 
practicable' (s. 55.1), as long as this does not result in the breach of a person's 
Convention rights (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998) (Refugee 
Inter-agency Partnership, 2004: 6). Under this new measure, whilst the outcome 
of applications for NASS support is processed, asylum claimants reside in 
emergency accommodation. However, these individuals cannot be dispersed 
until a decision is made on their entitlement to the welfare support packages and 
the final verdict on their case might take several months. The manager of an 
emergency accommodation provider service, for instance, remarks in March 
2004 that 'currently, 50% of the asylum seekers living in our emergency 
accommodation are Section 55 cases, they are waiting to hear from NASS' (EA 
provider, para 31). Similarly, an asylum housing officer notes in January 2004 
that 'over half of the asylum seekers living in emergency accommodation in 
Birmingham are section 55 cases' (Housing, City Council 2, para 23). 
It is noteworthy that the transfer rate of asylum seekers from emergency 
accommodation to their dispersed dwelling tends to be lower in the dispersal 
areas than in London and the South East. This is primarily tied to the dispersal of 
new asylum claimants residing in the latter areas being prioritised over that of 
recent asylum applicants living in the former localities (Refugee Council One Stop 
Shop, para 19). It even appears, for reasons of political expediency, that 
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dispersal from Dover's relatively new, high profile induction centre to other 
regions of the UK takes precedence over dispersal from London and all other UK 
areas. Indeed, the manager of an emergency accommodation provider in London 
remarks that 'Dover gets more coaches to disperse their people than we do. If 
you don't get the coaches to put people on, you can't disperse. The politicians 
obviously want to see the Dover induction centre work' (EA provider, para 73). 
Reflecting upon the impact of this form of dispersal prioritisation on Birmingham, 
an asylum housing officer states'all the other emergency accommodation around 
the country got second take so dispersal from those other areas reduced and the 
emergency accommodation filled up. You got to 5-6,000 in Birmingham, for 
example. Then NASS began to procure more emergency accommodation in 
Birmingham, purchasing it blind, with no clue where people were being put. Once 
it started doing this, Birmingham became an overspill for the whole country so all 
the other regions started to send the people that they couldn't accommodate in 
their emergency accommodation down to Birmingham because of the Dover 
'success' or problem' (Housing, City Council 2, para 17). 
Extent of freedom to choose olace of residence within disr)ersal localitv as well as 
co-sharers in dispersed housinci 
Significantly, asylum seekers under the interim policy tend to possess, overall, a 
greater degree of residential choice than those dispersed by NASS. This appears 
to be the result of the clecentralised management of the former combined with the 
smaller number of applications for asylum in the UK in addition to the presence of 
less media hype and public opinion pressure at the time of the policy's 
introduction. Whilst it is difficult for individuals dispersed via the interim measures 
to influence the location of their city of residence, many actively participate in 
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determining the site of their dwelling within the dispersal area as well as take part 
in electing the persons they share their accommodation with. The involvement of 
asylum seekers in these decisions can enhance the suitability of their housing to 
their needs. Indeed, the personal physical security of this group can be 
enhanced, as efforts are made by local service providers to follow the residential 
preferences of those dispersed. Furthermore, the opportunity of sharing a 
dwelling with relatives, friends or acquaintances rather than strangers, albeit 
usually co-ethnics, can greatly ameliorate the social interactions in the home as 
well as increase the offering and receiving of practical and emotional support on 
a daily basis. In contrast, asylum seekers dispersed through NASS are 
considerably more constrained, often unable to take part in any of the decisions 
undertaken regarding both the location of their abode in their allocated dispersal 
area and the individuals with whom they share their housing. 
7.1.4 Living in localities with scarce available accommodation in 
comparison with residing in areas typified by an abundance of available 
housing 
The impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of asylum seekers is more 
detrimental for those sent to areas where available accommodation is scarce 
than for those dispersed to localities where available housing is abundant, 
asylum seekers in the latter more customarily experiencing overcrowding in their 
dwelling. Newcastle and Birmingham have been used to illustrate both types of 
dispersal areas, the former being characterised by the existence of substantial 
vacant properties and the latter being typified by the presence of limited void 
abodes. 
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The housing traits of Newcastle 
As discussed in chapter six, the North East is characterised by relatively low 
employment prospects for its population as a whole. This phenomenon is largely 
the product of the collapse of the heavy industries in the 1970s and 1980s and 
the difficulty in recovering from this structuýal change in the region's economy. 
The long-standing limited availability of work, the subsequent increase in 
migration from the North to the South (Mumford and Power, 2002: 12) combined 
with a slightly more recent trend towards localised counter-urbanisation (Mumford 
and Power, 2002: 13) have all led to significant reductions in Newcastle's 
population from the 1970s onwards (DTZ Pieda Consulting, 2003: 5). 
Significantly, urban population decline tends to accelerate in cases where there 
exist high concentrations of social housing, individuals commonly preferring to 
buy and consequently perceiving the former as a poor dwelling choice 
(Unpopular Housing Action Team, 1999 in Mumford and Power, 2002: 15). In 
comparison with the national tenure profile, Newcastle possesses a lower level of 
owner occupation and private rented accommodation than the rest of England 
and instead has a higher level of social renting (DTZ Pieda Consulting, 2003: 8). 
An assessment of the current situation, in a review of mid-year population 
estimates for 1998-1999 and 1999-2000, reveals that Newcastle's population is 
continuing to decline, dropping more quickly than any other English city 
(Newcastle Community Housing Directorate, 2001 in Mumford and Power, 2002: 
79). Certainly, according to Newcastle City Council, 'the population of the city has 
been in decline for decades, having fallen from over 340,000 in 1951 to 276,000 
in 1999, with predictions that it will fall by another 17,000 over the next 20 years' 
(Newcastle Council, 2000a in Shaw, 2001: 2). Importantly, the majority of the net 
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loss of population in Newcastle consists now in the movement of individuals from 
the city to the surrounding areas (DTZ Pieda Consulting, 2003: 6). 
The progressive and continued decrease in the population size of Newcastle has 
led to an over-supply of housing in this city (Mumford and Power, 2002: 106; 
Manager, Housing, City Council 1, para 11). Indeed, the North East as a whole 
possesses the highest proportion of low demand housing stock in England, after 
the North West, 22% of its local authority properties, 16% of its Registered Social 
Landlords' estate and 2.8% of its privately owned housing failing into this 
category (Bramley et al, 2000 in Mumford and Power, 2002: 11). The proportion 
of void properties in Newcastle itself is high (Mumford and Power, 2002: 98), 
particularly in the Byker ward, a locality dominated by social housing, where in 
June 2001,6% of all its housing was vacant (Newcastle City Council, 2001g in 
Mumford and Power, 2002: 93). Incidentally, and expectedly, Byker tends to 
accommodate the majority of the asylum seekers dispersed to Newcastle, 2% of 
its population in 2000-2001 consisting of asylum seekers compared to 0.8% in 
1995-1996 (Neighbourhood Manager, 2001 in Mumford and Power, 2002: 95). It 
is noteworthy that the city's average applicants to lets ratio for social housing is 
low, consisting in 1.6: 1 (DTZ Pieda Consulting, 2003: 35). 
The over-supply of dwellings in Newcastle can be beneficial for those asylum 
seekers residing in this city. Indeed, the under-occupation of some abodes can 
occur whereby two or three individuals share a four bedroom house instead of a 
three bedroom dwelling (Mumford and Power, 2002: 106). Certainly, occupancy 
levels in the private rented sector in Newcastle are good, only 3% of households 
experiencing overcrowding, defined as having an occupation level of more than 
one person per room, and only 20% of those residing in overcrowded conditions 
266 
considering their arrangements as problematic (DTZ Pieda Consulting, 2003: 89). 
This trend appears to be reflected in the interviews, the group under study 
commonly remarking upon the relatively spacious housing available to them in 
the North East. Kanyaw, for instance, who resides in Newcastle, was able to 
move to a larger public sector property along with her husband and two children 
when she became pregnant with her third child (Kanyaw, para. 21). The policies in 
place for asylum seekers housed by Newcastle City Council reflect the relative 
over-supply of housing in this city. Indeed, the Council's practice is to offer 
abodes to this group, where no more than two single people have to share and 
where families can reside in self-contained properties (Support manager, 
Housing, City Council 1, para 65). 
Importantly, as part of a city-wide regeneration strategy, commenced in January 
2000, significant demolition is planned in Newcastle, particularly in the 
Scotswood, Benwell, Rye Hill, Cruddas Park and Walker localities (Shaw, 2001: 
1-3). Whilst the Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers interviewed for this research appear 
to reside primarily in non-demolition areas, with the exception of an individual 
living in Elswick ward, it is probable that other asylum seekers inhabit dwellings 
that are in proximity to these localities. Significantly, areas where demolition has 
been undertaken or where demolition is scheduled, as well as the surrounding 
localities, can experience severe degradation, schools and shops closing and the 
service infrastructure declining (Mumford and Power, 2002: 107). Moreover, once 
demolition is completed, area repopulation and infrastructure improvement both 
develop at a relatively slow pace (Mumford and Power, 2002: 108). On the other 
hand, some asylum seekers' housing might benefit as a result of the regeneration 
strategy, particularly those who are accommodated in tower blocks near the city 
centre. Indeed, the latter are experiencing, in an attempt to increase demand for 
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this type of housing and avoid their costly demolition, rejuvenation projects, with 
improvements being undertaken in the fields of security, caretaking and social 
support (Mumford and Power, 2002: 91). 
The housinci traits of Birminaham 
As examined in chapter six, the West Midlands is typified by comparatively high 
formal and informal employment opportunities for its population as a whole. It is 
possible that the work prospects in the region have contributed to reducing 
population decline in the West Midlands, Birmingham, for instance, experiencing 
a population change of -3.4 compared to'-7.4 in Newcastle between 1982 and 
2002 (ONS, 2005)25. Certainly, with regards to the Iraq! Kurdish asylum seeker 
population in the UK, the work opportunities in the West Midlands, in addition to 
the chances for social bonding and social bridging, appears to have attracted 
significant numbers of failed asylum applicants, subsistence only, disbenefited 
and voluntarily dispersed asylum seekers as well as new refugees to 
Birmingham. 
In addition, as mentioned with regards to Newcastle, urban population decline 
has a propensity to gather speed in instances where there exist significant 
concentrations of social housing. It might be that the relatively lower proportion of 
publicly owned dwelling stock in Birmingham (27.99%), compared with Newcastle 
(34.26%) (ODPM, 2005a)26 for example, has further contributed to reducing the 
25 The Office for National Statistics (ONS) generates annual estimates of the resident population as 
at 30th June each year. The data used here show the change in population estimates between 1982 
and 2002. A negative value signifies a decline in the population over the twenty-year period. 
26 The figures presented here provide a snapshot of the dwelling stock by tenure at I April 2003. 
The data were taken from the Housing Investment Programme (HIP) 'Housing Strategy Statistical 
Appendix' (HSSA) and the 'Housing Revenue Account Business Plan Statistical Appendix' (HRA 
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scale of the city's population decline. In turn, the relatively less substantial 
population decline in Birmingham, compared to Newcastle, has led to a lower 
proportion of difficult to let and low demand local authority and housing 
association dwellings. As an example, low demand local authority dwellings in 
Birmingham constitute 29.4% of the total local authority dwelling stock whilst in 
Newcastle it comprises 52.2%. Similarly, difficult to let local authority dwellings in 
Birmingham represent 7.6% of the total local authority dwelling stock whereas in 
Newcastle it makes up 12.9% (ODPM, 2005b)27. 
The limited over-supply of dwellings in Birmingham can be disadvantageous for 
asylum seekers living in this city. Overcrowding amongst the population as a 
whole is more pronounced in Birmingham than it is in Newcastle, for example, 
with 6.42% of households in the former lacking one additional room in their 
dwelling and 3.14% missing two rooms compared to 5.9% and 1.85% 
respectively in the latter city (ONS, 2001 b)28 . Housing overcrowding amongst the 
Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers in Birmingham is compounded by the relatively high 
proportion of failed asylum applicants, disbenefited asylum seekers and new 
refugees in the total co-ethnic population in this city. Understandably, 
disbenefited asylum seekers as well as those failed asylum applicants who 
remain in the UK, possessing no entitlement to state-funded housing, financial 
subsistence or a work permit, are in need of some form of accommodation. 
BPSA) for each year. Ownership of this dataset is with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
(ODPM). 
27 This dataset provides details on difficult to let and low demand dwellings by tenure and are 
taken from the Housing Investment Programme (HIP) 'Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix' 
(HSSA). The figures presented are drawn from a snapshot taken at I April 2003. Ownership of this 
dataset is with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). 
28 This data on occupancy rating is from one of the set of Univariate tables produced as part of the 
Census Area Statistics from the 2001 Census. A household is defined as one person living alone, 
or a group of people (not necessarily related) living at the same address with common 
housekeeping - that is, sharing either a living room or sitting room or at least one meal a day. 
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Likewise, new refugees, given the limited time period they possess to acquire 
housing (28 days), require lodgings. 
There exists a correlation between the number of individuals who form part of the 
groupings discussed above, that is those in need of shelter, and the level of 
overcrowding in co-ethnic lodgings because Iraqi Kurds, regardless of their own 
housing arrangements, usually offer accommodation within their dwelling to those 
community members who are in need of an abode. As a national liaison officer 
notes 'the government is saying, where are these people? They are not on your 
rough sleepers headcounts. It's because they are sleeping on people's sofas, on 
people's floors, possibly in NASS accommodation. These communities are 
financially already very stretched and yet they are still finding enough to 
potentially support quite a large population of failed and disbenefited asylum 
seekers' (LGA, para 23 & 117). The other service providers interviewed in 
Birmingham and London support this view. Importantly, those portions of the Iraqi 
Kurdish community whose dwellings will be most overcrowded are those who 
possess the greatest ties with the groups of individuals described above, namely 
the co-ethnics who have arrived in the last six years. Anik, exemplifying the effect 
of the growth in the number of disbenefitted asylum seekers on the overcrowding 
of Iraqi Kurdish housing, notes that 'there wasn't such a problem of overcrowding 
before because accommodation was provided for everyone, but they changed 
the regulation. Now, if someone is not applying for asylum at the port, then that's 
it' (Anik, para 181). 
Presenting the three different categories of individuals in need of shelter, an 
asylum housing officer describes the phenomenon of overcrowding in 
Birmingham, stating that'in some streets, there are some medium sized Victorian 
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terraces with three or four bedrooms and there are supposed to be 5-6 asylum 
seekers in there. But there may be 15-20 people instead. These are people who 
have got the right to remain but who have not yet managed to access the 
housing market yet, people who have been refused asylum, who are illegals and 
then there are the Section 55 cases' (Housing, City Council 2, para 91). Similarly, 
Erdehan, reflecting the perspective of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed in Birmingham, 
note that'most of the people come from other cities to Birmingham. I was living in 
a house with two people, each of them they brought two to three friends or 
relatives and they would sleep there until they found a job. Most of them they 
found a job and when they did that, they would just stay there. There was about 
six or seven of us in a three bedroom house' (Erdehan, para 246). Significantly, 
an asylum housing officer maintains that approximately 50% of Birmingham's 
NASS subsistence only cases are residing in NASS dispersal accommodation. 
Indeed, 'this is accommodation that I am contracted to provide to NASS and 
there is a family there of three and then there is another family in there as 
subsistence only. It's just not being picked up. NASS doesn't know what it's right 
and left hand are doing' (Housing, City Council 2, para 155). 
Significantly, the proportion of failed asylum applicants and new refugees in the 
total population of Iraqi Kurds has grown, primarily, as a result of a rise in co- 
ethnic asylum applications. The UK, for instance, experienced two substantial 
rises in the number of Iraq i29 asylum applications, first in 2000 (from 1,800 in 
1999 to 7,475 in 2000) and then in 2002 (from 6,705 in 2001 to 14,570 in 2002). 
These increases led to a growth in the number of failed asylum applicants and 
refugees as a proportion of the total Iraqi population and subsequent growths in 
the extent of overcrowding in this community in 2001 and 2003. The share of 
29 Figures for Iraqis are used as a proxy because there are no figures for Iraqi Kurds. 
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disbenifitted asylum seekers, that is those whose application for NASS support 
has been rejected, in the total population of Iraqi Kurds is principally the result of 
the implementation on 8th January 2003 of section 55 of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum 2002 Act, a measure discussed previously. Basing 
myself on the number of Iraqi asylum applications as well as the date of the 
implementation of section 55, it would appear that the overcrowding of Iraqi 
Kurdish accommodation has,, so far, been most acute in 2003, with carry over 
into 2004. 
7.1.5 Asylum seekers are primarily dispersed to deprived wards 
The detrimental effect of the dispersal policy on the housing of dispersed asylum 
seekers is increased by this set of individuals being primarily dispersed to highly 
deprived wards, accommodation situated in wards characterised by high levels of 
deprivation tending to be in worse condition than those situated in less deprived 
wards. According to my fieldwork, almost half of the wards where asylum seekers 
tend to reside in both Newcastle and Birmingham are amongst the top 10% most 
deprived wards in England, the asylum seeker wards in the former overall being 
more deprived than those in the latter (DETR, 2000). A similar trend has been 
observed in Manchester. 'Although it is fair to report that the situation has 
improved slightly, the pattern of NASS dispersal in Manchester is still highly 
skewed. To illustrate this point, the three poorer Manchester constituencies, 
where all the wards are in the top 10% most deprived in the country have 96% of 
all NASS placements. Over a third of all NASS placements are in just three of the 
most deprived wards in the city, none of which have any sizeable pre-existing 
BME communities' (House of Commons Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: 
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Housing, Planning, Local Government and the Regions Select Committee, 14 Ih 
July 2003). 
7.1.6 The significance of the gender and marital status of those who are 
dispersed 
The detrimental impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of dispersed Iraqi 
Kurdish asylum seekers is augmented in some instances and lessened in others 
depending upon the gender, marital status, age and level of English of those who 
are dispersed. Combining marital status and gender, the negative impact of the 
dispersal policy on the housing of asylum seekers is increased by being a single 
male, this group's dwellings being prone to overcrowding, each resident 
customarily possessing their own network of relatives and friends who might 
require, at similar or different times, a temporary or permanent shelter. Indeed, it 
would appear that single Iraqi Kurds constitute a particularly mobile population, 
individuals moving from one dispersal city to another in search of work, residing 
for various periods of time in the homes of co-ethnics. Additionally, puffing aside 
the issue of job seeking, a proportion of this community is temporarily or 
permanently in need of an abode because they have not succeeded in obtaining 
public or private sector housing as refugees or because they are not or no longer 
entitled to state-funded accommodation. The harmful impact of the dispersal 
policy on the housing of asylum seekers is mitigated by being a single female, 
this group's abodes being less prone to overcrowding because their network of 
contacts is less extensive, given their smaller number in the total population of 
newly arrived (since 1998) Iraqi Kurds and their relatively limited social bonding. 
Additionally, they constitute a less mobile group since they are less likely to be 
travelling between dispersal areas in search of work, the broader Iraqi Kurdish 
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community's stance on women's roles and daily tasks obstructing the efforts of 
those who do wish to be employed. The negative impact of the dispersal policy 
on the housing of married men and women accompanied by their spouses is 
divergently modified. For some married men and women with their spouses, the 
negative impact is increased, overcrowding occurring because there exists a 
shortage of large family accommodation amongst the dispersal authorities' 
procured dwellings and as a result, a couple with children, for instance, might be 
obliged to live in an insufficiently large abode. For other married men and women 
with their spouses, the harmful impact of the dispersal policy is lessened, 
overcrowding being limited because as in the case of single women, their 
network of acquaintances is less broad. Moreover, this group's relatives and 
friends overlap more than those of single men sharing an abode together 
because of the former's common past. 
In sum, the impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of Iraqi Kurdish 
dispersed asylum seekers varies depending on the housing characteristics of the 
dispersal locality, the scheme under which individuals are dispersed, the type of 
the accommodation provided by the dispersal authorities and the personal traits 
of the individuals dispersed. The hypothesis that the dispersal policy wields a 
negative impact on the housing of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is 
most accurate for persons who were dispersed via the NASS scheme to 
dispersal localities typified by scarce available accommodation and who were 
accommodated by the dispersal authorities in a shared room in a hostel, in the 
private housing sector. The hypothesis is least accurate for persons who were 
dispersed via the interim programme, to dispersal areas characterized by 
abundant available accommodation and who were accommodated by the 
dispersal authorities in a room in a shared house or flat in the public housing 
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sector. The impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of dispersed Iraqi 
Kurdish asylum seekers is made worse by this set of individuals being 
predominantly sent to significantly deprived wards. Finally, the impact of the 
dispersal policy on the housing of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is 
experienced by persons as either more or less harmful, depending on their 
gender and marital status, single men worsening the effect of dispersal more than 
single women and married men/women accompanied by their spouse. 
Importantly, whilst some asylum seekers obtain relatively more suitable dwellings 
than others, the quality of the group's abodes in more absolute terms remains 
low, compared to the population of the UK as a whole. 
It can be concluded from this discussion that the conditions that foment access to 
adequate housing and suitable employment are seemingly opposed. Indeed, 
being male is more beneficial than being female when searching for work but, 
when assessing the relative quality of asylum seekers' dispersal abodes, being a 
man tends to be more detrimental than being a woman. Similarly, it is easier for 
an asylum seeker to secure an adequate job if s/he resides in a dispersal locality 
containing a large co-ethnic community but the presence of this sizeable co- 
ethnic support network is also' significantly detrimental to the quality of his/her 
housing. Finally, whilst high levels of work opportunities in a dispersal locality for 
the local population as a whole aids asylum seekers in their own search for 
employment, this phenomenon is disadvantageous for accessing suitable 
housing, overcrowding tending to occur where job prospects are present. 
Concerning dispersed asylum seekers' access to suitable housing and social 
bridges, it is noteworthy that the best and worst housing conditions overall, the 
former being a room in a self-catering shared house and the latter consisting in a 
shared room in a full-board hostel, also correspond closely to the most and least 
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appropriate type and quality of abode for fomenting social bridges. A similar 
pattern can be observed concerning the level of ward deprivation. Regarding 
dispersed asylum seekers' access to social bonds and adequate housing, it is 
necessary to stress that the ideal co-ethnic group size diverges, the former being 
most developed when asylum seekers reside in localities containing a large co- 
ethnic network and the latter being most suitable when asylum seekers live in 
areas typified by a small co-ethnic community. 
7.2 The impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of Iraqi Kurdish 
refuqees 
7.2.1 Dispersed refugees who move away from their dispersal locality 
following the receipt of their authorisation to stay in the UK 
The dispersal policy's effect on the housing of those who depart from their 
dispersal locality following the receipt of their authorisation to stay in the UK is 
non-existent. The reasons for this trend as well as the traits and circumstances of 
the dispersed refugees who are most and least prone to move following the 
receipt of their right to remain are presented in chapter six and chapter four. 
Importantly, the dispersal policy indirectly impacts upon the housing of some of 
the dispersed refugees who depart from their dispersal area. An explanation of a 
very similar trend relating to refugee employment is presented in chapter six. 
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7.2.2 Dispersed refugees who remain In their dispersal locality following the 
receipt of their permission to stay In the UK 
The primary change, pertinent to housing, that occurs on receipt of the refugee 
status is the universal granting by the dispersal authorities of a 28 day notice 
period following which new refugees lose their entitlement to dispersed 
accommodation and financial subsistence and are required to vacate their 
dispersal dwelling. This grace period was originally 14 days regardless of the 
outcome of the asylum claim and was amended to 28 days for successful asylum 
claimants in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Unfortunately, the 
length of the notice period frequently shortens to seven days. A NASS policy- 
maker explains that the short duration of the grace period is tied to poor 
synchronisation between the Asylum Caseworking Directorate and NASS rather 
than an over-zealous stance towards expelling new refugees from their dispersed 
accommodation. Indeed, he notes that the Asylum Caseworking Directorate 'will 
send out their decision letter and that starts the clock on the grace period. They 
then need to tell us (NASS). We need to record it on our computer and send a 
termination letter. At the same time, we send a notice to the accommodation 
provider and they need to process that and give a notice to quit to the person and 
they can only do that once we've told them and then they've got to give the 
person at least 7 days to quit. It is all rather tight' (NASS, para 107 & 108). 
The harmful impact of the dispersal policy on the housing of dispersed Iraqi 
Kurdish refugees is modified by the 28-day grace period at least during the early 
stages of being a refugee. Indeed, those residing in a dispersal locality containing 
a large co-ethnic community are less negatively affected, because of their 
ensuing greater opportunities to obtain temporary accommodation with an 
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acquaintance, than those living in a dispersal area characterised by a small co- 
ethnic group. Certainly, according to a move-on officer, new refugees are 
customarily compelled to reside at least temporarily with relatives, friends or in 
homeless hostels given the short time period they possess to acquire their own 
accommodation (Housing, City Council 1, para 11 & 81). The other local service 
providers interviewed in Newcastle and Birmingham also support this claim. 
Welan, reflecting the perspective of the Iraqi Kurds interviewed, notes that 'I have 
seen lots of people, when they get their status NASS or immigration kicks them 
out from the property and they have nowhere to stay. So they go to live with 
relatives or friends. What else can you doT (Welan, para 219). This ensuing 
refugee homelessness is certainly an unintended consequence of the '28' day 
notice period measure. 
In both of my case study dispersal cities, measures have been introduced locally 
in an attempt to facilitate the transfer of refugees from the dispersal 
arrangements to the mainstream system. In Newcastle, for instance, since 
October 2002, the City Council offers advice and guidance as well as housing for 
six months to new refugee families. Importantly, however, this service is only for 
those who were accommodated, as asylum seekers, in council housing 
contracted out to NASS and who wish to move into a council dwelling (Move-on 
officer, para 11 & 39). Unfortunately, in Newcastle, for all new single refugees 
and for those new refugee families who, as asylum seekers, resided in private 
sector housing, there are no equivalent schemes in place (Specialist voluntary 
agency 1, para 213). Significantly, part of NERS' official remit, as a One Stop 
Service, consists in assisting new refugees with their accommodation. However, 
NERS staff are already overwhelmed with the assistance they are required to 
provide to asylum seekers (Housing association, para 81). A voluntary agency 
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manager, summing up the support situation in Newcastle, in October-November 
2003, for new refugees notes that 'there is a two tier system where you have 
refugees who are getting help and you have lots of refugees who don't get any 
help at all' (Specialist voluntary agency 1, para 215). 
With regards to Birmingham, since April 2003, twenty-two local organisations 
receive funding, from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), via the 
Supporting People Fund. These agencies provide new refugees with financial 
support and housing in hostels or shared accommodation in houses or flats for a 
period of six months (Housing, Specialist voluntary agency 2, para 11 & 3). 
However, regrettably, occupants residing in this form of housing are failing to 
acquire alternative dwellings and consequently remain in their current 
accommodation beyond the six month period (Housing, City Council 2, para 117) 
within a context where demand for this type of housing continues to increase 
(Housing, Specialist voluntary agency 2, para 123). Birmingham City Council also 
assists new refugee families with access to council housing (Connexions, para 
3). Yet, their client base represents a small proportion of the total population of 
individuals recently granted refugee status in the city (Housing, City Council 2, 
para 115) and moreover, the waiting list for this type of property is augmenting 
(Housing, Specialist voluntary agency 2, para 37). As an illustration, in 2001, it 
was estimated that a new refugee would access a flat within one month of 
applying to the Council whereas in December2003-January 2004, the waiting 
period was closer to one, two or even three years, according tol the Iraqi Kurds 
interviewed in Birmingham. 
Affordable and readily available non-council housing for new refugees in 
Birmingham, as in Newcastle, is scarce. Indeed, the cost of renting a property in 
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the private or housing association sector can exceed the housing benefit 
allowance, particularly in Birmingham (Birmingham Kurdish association, para 370 
& 374). The other local service providers interviewed in Birmingham agree with 
this assertion. Moreover, private sector landlords often request one month's rent 
in advance along with a deposit, both demands consisting in financial 
commitments that new refugees understandably cannot meet. In addition, across 
both case study cities, there exists a dearth of reliable advice and support and 
consequently, in the private housing sector, many refugees fail to fully 
comprehend the process of acquiring a home. Importantly, it would appear that, 
from 2001 onwards, Birmingham City Council re-opened its Bed & Breakfast 
accommodation, a form of housing in disuse for thirty years, this phenomenon 
representing 'a symptom of a growing number of homeless people of whom a 
significant portion are refugees' (Housing, City Council 2, para 51). 
Thus, the hypothesis that the dispersal policy exerts a harmful impact on the 
housing of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees is incorrect if applied to those who 
leave their dispersal area following the receipt of their authorisation to stay in the 
UK. Nevertheless, the hypothesis is applicable to the dispersed refugees who 
settle in their dispersal area after they have received their permission to stay in 
the UK, the impact being similar, save for the primarily short-term effect of the 28- 
day notice period measure, to the influence the policy exercises on this set of 
individuals when they were asylum seekers. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the impact of the dispersal policy on dispersed Iraqi Kurdish 
asylum seekers and refugees' housing has been examined. The following 
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hypothesis has been tested: the dispersal policy wields a negative impact on the 
housing of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees because this 
policy houses this set of individuals in inadequate dwellings. 
This hypothesis is most accurate for asylum seekers who were dispersed via the 
NASS scheme to dispersal localities typified by scarce available accommodation 
and who were accommodated by the dispersal authorities in a shared room in a 
hostel, in the private housing sector. This hypothesis is least accurate for asylum 
seekers who were dispersed via the interim programme, to dispersal areas 
characterized by abundant available accommodation and who were 
accommodated by the dispersal authorities in a room in a shared house or flat in 
the public housing sector. Significantly, the impact of the dispersal policy on the 
housing of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is made worse by this group 
being predominantly sent to significantly deprived wards. Additionally, the impact 
of the dispersal policy on the housing of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
is experienced by persons as either more or less harmful, depending on their 
gender and marital status, single men suffering the effect of dispersal more than 
single women and married men/women accompanied by their spouse. 
It is important to stress that the conditions that foment access to adequate 
housing and suitable employment are seemingly opposed. For instance, it is 
easier for an asylum seeker to secure an adequate job if s/he resides in a 
dispersal locality containing a large co-ethnic community but the presence of this 
sizeable co-ethnic support network is also significantly detrimental to the quality 
of his/her housing. Concerning dispersed asylum seekers' access to suitable 
housing and social bridges, it is noteworthy that the best and worst housing 
conditions overall also correspond closely to the most and least appropriate type 
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and quality of abode for fomenting social bridges. A similar pattern can be 
observed concerning the level of ward deprivation. Regarding dispersed asylum 
seekers' access to social bonds and adequate housing, it is necessary to stress 
that the ideal co-ethnic group size diverges, social bonds developing most when 
asylum seekers reside in localities containing a large co-ethnic network and 
housing being most suitable when asylum seekers live in areas typified by a 
small co-ethnic community. Importantly, whilst some asylum seekers obtain 
relatively more suitable dwellings than others, the quality of this group's abodes 
in more absolute terms remains low, compared to the population of the UK as a 
whole. 
Finally, it is apparent that the dispersal policy fails to exercise any impact on the 
housing of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees who leave their dispersal locality 
following the receipt of their authorisation to stay in the UK. Nevertheless, for 
those refugees who remain in their dispersal locality, the housing hypothesis is 
pertinent the impact being similar, save for the short-term effect of the 28-day 
notice period measure, to the influence the policy exercises on dispersed asylum 
seekers. 
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis has been to identify the influence of the current UK 
dispersal policy on asylum seeker and refugee integration. In order to facilitate 
this study, I have adopted Ager and Strang's (2004a: 5) approach to integration 
and have chosen to focus upon the effect of this policy on four main components 
of integration, namely access to employment and housing, on the functional side, 
and access to co-ethnic social bonds and social bridges, on the relational side. 
The focal point of this study involved exploring in depth the significantly different 
integration opportunities encountered by asylum seekers and refugees in their 
respective dispersal localities. In order to achieve this, I chose to compare the 
experiences of this group in two contrasting dispersal cities, Newcastle and 
Birmingham. Significantly, this thesis focuses primarily on the experiences of 
asylum seekers, the findings regarding refugee circumstances nevertheless 
enriching this thesis, as they highlight, more powerfully, the situation of asylum 
seekers. The difficulty of studying the experiences of all asylum seekers and 
refugees, given the national, ethnic and socio-economic heterogeneity of this 
group encouraged me to adopt a case study approach. Kurds from Iraq were 
chosen as a case study because of my existing knowledge of Kurdistan and Iraq. 
Moreover, Iraqis, a large proportion of whom are Kurds, currently constitute a 
significant share of the total population of asylum seekers and refugees in the UK 
and thus, a study focusing on Iraqi Kurds is valuable for policymakers and 
academic researchers alike. 
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The impact of the current UK dispersal programme on the integration of 
dispersed Iraq! Kurdish asylum seekers 
Overall, the effect of dispersal on the integration of dispersed asylum seekers is 
significant, because this policy places this group in a pre-designated locality 
where they are obliged to remain until they receive a decision on their asylum 
application from the Immigration and Nationality Directorate in the Home Office. If 
a dispersed asylum seeker leaves his/her allocated abode of his/her own accord, 
s/he risks losing his/her entitlement to state-funded housing. It is important to 
recall that only asylum seekers who are designated by NASS as destitute, 
following a special assessment procedure, are entitled to subsistence support 
and/or state-funded dispersed accommodation. The removal of a dispersed 
asylum seeker's right to state-funded housing following non-compliance with 
dispersal regulations therefore constitutes a significantly detrimental sanction 
when implemented. 
Social bonds 
Regarding social bonds, I tested the following hypothesis, namely that the 
contemporary UK dispersal policy exercises a negative impact on the social 
bonds of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers because this policy sends this 
group to localities were there are no settled co-ethnics. 
I concluded that this hypothesis was largely correct for those asylum seekers who 
were dispersed prior to 2001. Firstly, from the beginning of the dispersal 
programme onwards, as explained in chapter one, the process of determining the 
area to which asylum seekers should be dispersed was primarily based on the 
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location of available and affordable housing rather than the principle of language 
clustering. Moreover, with the majority of the Iraq! Kurdish population traditionally 
residing in London and the South East of England, very few settled co-ethnics 
were residing in the dispersal localities before 2001. However, from 2000 
onwards, Iraqi Kurds constituted a high proportion of the total asylum seeker 
population in the UK. Furthermore, from 2000 onwards, the number of total 
dispersals taking place increased significantly, NASS becoming operational on 
3 rd April 2000. 
Table C Iraqi asylum applications in the UK (excluding dependents) and 
cumulative *number of NASS dispersals (including dependents), 2000-2003. 
Year Percentage of all asylum Cumulative number of NASS 
applications from Iraqis dispersals (including dependents) 
2000 9.3 13530 
2001 9.4 40325 
2002 17.3 54045 
2003 8.1 49760 
Source: Home Office Asylum statistics (Matz, Hill and Heath, 2001; Heath and Hill, 2002; 
Heath, Jeffries and Llyod, 2003 and Heath, Jeffries and Purcell, 2004). 
Additionally, dispersed asylum seekers were sent to a relatively small number of 
localities, as mentioned above, leading in effect to this group's concentration in a 
few areas rather than to their dispersal across the UK. For instance, in 2001, 
approximately half of asylum seekers supported in NASS accommodation 
(22,500 of 40,325) were sent to one fifth (12 out of 64) of the designated 
dispersal areas (Heath and Hill, 2002). 
Consequently, Iraqi Kurds slowly began to accumulate in the various dispersal 
localities and thus, from 2001 onwards, the newly arrived Iraqi Kurdish asylum 
seekers were dispersed to areas containing co-ethnics. As a result, for those 
asylum seekers dispersed from 2001 onwards, the dispersal policy exercises a 
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less negative impact on their social bonds, relative to its effect pre-2001. 
Notwithstanding this improvement, evidence from my interviews suggests that, 
for asylum seekers dispersed from 2001 onwards, the impact of the dispersal 
policy on their co-ethnic social bonding can still be harmful, particularly for those 
who are sent to areas containing a relatively small Iraqi Kurdish group. It is 
noteworthy that the impact of the dispersal policy on the co-ethnic social bonds of 
dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is experienced by individuals as either 
more or less detrimental, depending on their gender, marital status and age. 
Social bridges 
Concerning social bridges, I tested the following hypothesis, namely that the 
current UK dispersal policy wields a negative impact on the social bridges of 
dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers because this policy sends this set of 
individuals to areas where the perceptions and attitudes of host-community 
members towards them are hostile. 
As observed in chapter one, one of the cluster area criteria set out by the Home 
Office at' the policy formulation stage was the presence of a multi-ethnic 
population and existing communities with whom the dispersed asylum seekers 
could link in with. However, as referred to above, in practice, the cluster localities 
were chosen based on the presence of available and affordable housing in the 
area. Data from my interviews suggests that this trend detrimentally affects the 
social bridging of asylum seekers, and thus confirms my second hypothesis. 
Indeed, areas containing cheap and empty housing are usually localities that are 
typified by high levels of deprivation and social exclusion, where support services 
are already over-stretched. Social bridging in these areas, between asylum 
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seekers and host-community members, is consequently fraught with tensions, 
local residents feeling threatened by the added competition from this new group 
for scarce resources. Evidence from my fieldwork indicates that the difficulty in 
building social bridges in the dispersal localities increased from 2001 onwards. 
Certainly, from this date forwards, significant numbers of asylum seekers were 
beginning to reside in the dispersal localities and more host-community members 
were aware of this group's presence in their neighbourhood. Concomitantly, as 
discussed earlier, negative media coverage of asylum seekers rose and the 
nation-wide politicisation of the asylum issue increased. Local organisations in 
the dispersal areas remained largely unprepared for, and at times, were not 
informed of the arrival of asylum seekers in their locality. In addition, there was 
little or no time for local agencies to prepare, and on occasions, even inform 
deprived and socially excluded host-community members of the dispersal of 
asylum seekers to their residential area. 
Another important finding from my research is that the type of housing occupied 
by the dispersed asylum seekers affects social bridging. Indeed, hostility between 
host-community members and asylum seekers tends to be more pronounced 
when the latter are housed in hostel accommodation and/or reside in 
overcrowded dwellings. Conversely, antagonism is less marked when asylum 
seekers live in self-catering abodes and/or reside in under or normally occupied 
housing. Certainly, accommodating asylum seekers in hostels can lead to very 
localised concentrations of this group and their highly visible presence in a few 
neighbouring streets can be intimidating for host-community members. Moreover, 
overcrowding can lead to more neighbourhood noise and more household refuse. 
A further essential finding is that the impact of the dispersal policy on the social 
bridging of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers is experienced by persons as 
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either more or less harmful, depending on their gender, marital status, age and 
proficiency in English. Finally, I noted that some of the conditions that foster 
social bonds discourage the development of social bridges and vice versa. For 
example, the period from 2001 onwards is most favourable for the social bonding 
of dispersed asylum seekers, because from this time forward concentrations of 
co-ethnics began to develop in the dispersal localities. However, the very 
concentration of co-ethnics in the dispersal areas can be detrimental for social 
bridging. This is especially the case, as in Newcastle, when the localities in 
question are typified by a deprived and socially excluded monocultural population 
who possess limited prior experience of living alongside members of Black and 
Minority Ethnic groups. Nevertheless, there are some instances where, given the 
right conditions, both forms of social connections can grow. Indeed, the presence 
of a large co-ethnic community in a sizeable multicultural city, like Birmingham, 
constitutes a very promising setting for both social bonding and bridging. 
Emr)lovment 
Turning to employment, I tested the following hypothesis, namely that the 
contemporary UK dispersal policy exercises a negative impact on the 
employment of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers because this policy sends 
this group to localities where suitable employment opportunities are limited. 
Importantly, the employment of asylum seekers is controversial as it is deliberate 
government policy since 2001 to prevent this group from working. As noted in 
chapter one, government policy is not to encourage settlement and integration 
until permission has been granted to remain in the UK. This is enormously 
frustrating for asylum seekers as they need to build a new life even though, in the 
long term, they may wish to return to their home-country. 
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I have concluded that this third hypothesis is largely correct. Indeed, as remarked 
upon earlier, asylum seekers have been overwhelmingly dispersed to areas of 
the UK containing very low-cost, vacant housing and few Black and Minority 
Ethnic groups. It is important to note, firstly, that the accommodation in these 
localities is affordable and available precisely because there are limited local 
employment opportunities. Thus, by prioritising cost-savings on housing, the 
government has necessarily compromised the job prospects of dispersed asylum 
seekers. This is not surprising as asylum seekers are not allowed to work. 
Secondly, the presence of Black and Minority Ethnic groups in the dispersal 
localities would have enhanced asylum seekers'job prospects. As discussed in 
chapters five and six, social and therefore professional relationships are more 
easily developed with members of these communities than with individuals from 
the white British majority group. 
However, from 2001 onwards, the progressive concentration of Iraqi Kurds in the 
dispersal localities, as noted previously, a wholly unintended consequence of the 
policy, does increase the informal and, pre-23rd July 2002, formal employment 
opportunities of asylum seekers. Moreover, if work prospects are sufficiently 
enhanced by the presence of co-ethnics in the dispersal localities, some 
individuals on receipt of their refugee status choose to remain in their initial 
dispersal area. Another important finding from my research is that the impact of 
the dispersal policy on the employment of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum 
seekers is experienced by individuals as either more or less detrimental, 
depending on their gender, age and proficiency in English. Finally, it is 
noteworthy that the conditions that stimulate the social bonds and employment of 
dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers in the dispersal areas are virtually 
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identical whilst the set of circumstances that fuel social bridging prospects and 
employment opportunities are much less similar. 
Housinci 
With reference to housing, I tested the following hypothesis, namely that the 
dispersal policy wields a negative impact on the housing of dispersed Iraqi 
Kurdish asylum seekers because this policy houses them in inadequate 
dwellings. 
I have concluded that overall, my housing hypothesis is largely correct. Dispersed 
Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers are primarily sent, as a result of the government's 
emphasis on costs savings, to the most deprived wards of the UK where the 
housing is in severe disrepair. The housing circumstances of this group do, 
nevertheless, vary. Indeed, the dwellings of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers are 
worst for those who firstly, were dispersed via the NASS scheme to dispersal 
localities where accommodation choice for asylum seekers was limited and 
secondly, were accommodated by the dispersal authorities in a shared room in a 
hostel, in the private housing sector. The abodes of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
are least worst for those who firstly, were dispersed via the interim programme to 
dispersal areas where housing choice for asylum seekers was abundant and 
secondly, were accommodated by the dispersal authorities in a room in a shared 
house or flat in the public housing sector. An additional finding is that the impact 
of the dispersal policy on the housing of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers 
is experienced by persons as either more or less harmful, depending on their 
gender and marital status, single men suffering more from dispersal than single 
women and married men/women accompanied by their spouse. 
Jý 
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Finally, it is important to stress that the conditions that encourage access to 
adequate housing and suitable employment are seemingly opposed. For 
example, it is easier for an asylum seeker to secure an adequate job if s/he 
resides in a dispersal locality containing a large co-ethnic community but the 
presence of this sizeable co-ethnic support network is also significantly 
detrimental to the quality of his/her housing. Concerning dispersed asylum 
seekers' access to suitable housing and social bridges, it is noteworthy that the 
best and worst housing conditions overall also correspond closely to the most 
and least appropriate type and quality of accommodation for encouraging social 
bridges. Regarding dispersed asylum seekers' access to social bonds and 
adequate housing, it is necessary to stress that the ideal co-ethnic group size 
diverges, the former being most developed when asylum seekers reside in 
localities containing a large co-ethnic network and the latter being most suitable 
when asylum seekers live in areas typified by a small co-ethnic community. 
The impact of the current UK dispersal programme on the integration of 
dispersed Iraq! Kurdish refugees 
Overall, the influence of the dispersal policy on the integration of dispersed Iraqi 
Kurdish refugees varies. Certainly, the dispersal policy ceases to wield any direct 
effect on the four aspects of integration studied in this thesis for those dispersed 
refugees who choose to leave their dispersal area following the receipt of their 
authorisation to remain in the UK. Dispersed refugees are freer to leave their 
dispersal locality than dispersed asylum seekers, the former, unlike the latter, 
generally possessing the right to move and choose their place of residence 
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without this decision affecting their welfare entitlementS30. Unfortunately, there is 
no statistical data available on the residential location of dispersed refugees 
across the UK and therefore it is impossible to quantify the proportion of this 
group who relocate, and by extension the percentage whose integration is no 
longer affected by the dispersal policy. 
However, on the basis of my fieldwork, I have been able to identify the 
characteristics and circumstances of the dispersed refugees who are most and 
least likely to move following the receipt of their right to remain. Indeed, it would 
seem that those who are most inclined to relocate on receipt of their permission 
to stay in the UK are dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees who are firstly, aged 
between 21 and 29 years old. Those who are most likely to relocate also tend to 
have resided, as asylum seekers, for a comparatively short period of time, in a 
relatively small dispersal locality characterised by low employment opportunities, 
a small co-ethnic group and a monocultural host-community. Finally, those who 
are most prone to relocating usually have housing available for them elsewhere 
in the UK, with relatives or friends, in a locality suitable to their needs. As a result, 
it is likely that the integration of this group ceases to be affected by the disp ersal 
policy. Conversely, it would appear that those who are most likely to remain in 
their dispersal locality on receipt of their authorisation to stay in the UK are 
dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees who are firstly, aged 40 and above. Those who 
most commonly stay in their dispersal area also tend to have accessed formal 
work as asylum seekers. Furthermore, this group is most likely to have been sent 
to their dispersal locality from 2001 onwards and have resided, as asylum 
seekers, for a comparatively long period of time, in a relatively large dispersal 
30 Since 4h January 2005, this has slightly changed with the coming into force of section II of the 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc. ) Act 2004. 
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area typified by comparatively high employment prospects, a large co-ethnic 
group and a multicultural host-community. Finally, this group usually have 
housing available for them in their dispersal area. Consequently, it is likely that 
the integration of this set of individuals continues to be influenced by the 
dispersal policy. 
Significantly, the dispersal policy indirectly impacts upon the integration of the 
dispersed refugees who move to another dispersal locality. Their experience, 
however, is likely to be less negative than those who remain in their dispersal 
area because it is probable that the former group chose another dispersal area 
as their new residence because of the greater benefits available to them there, 
such as employment opportunities or the location of relatives and friends. 
Regarding the social bonds of refugees who stay in their dispersal area, I 
conclude that the main changes that occur on receipt of an individual's 
permission to remain in the UK do not affect the local co-ethnic social bonds of 
this group. Consequently, the impact of the dispersal policy on this aspect of 
integration is identical to the effect the policy has on dispersed asylum seekers. 
Concerning the social bridges of refugees who remain in their dispersal area, I 
also conclude that the influence of the dispersal policy on this aspect of 
integration is very similar to the impact the policy has on dispersed asylum 
seekers. Nevertheless, over time, it would appear that the negative impact of the 
policy on social bridges decreases somewhat as more Iraqi Kurds conceal their 
ethnic origin and immigration status as well as adjust their appearances and 
behaviour to fit the white British norm, host-community views and behaviour 
towards this group becoming, in the process, less hostile and antagonistic. 
Pertaining to the employment of refugees who settle in their dispersal area, I 
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conclude that the impact of the dispersal policy on this aspect of integration is 
virtually identical to the influence the policy has on dispersed asylum seekers. 
With reference to the housing of refugees who remain in their dispersal area, I 
also conclude that the effect of the dispersal policy on this aspect of integration is 
similar to the influence the policy has on dispersed asylum seekers, save for the 
primarily short-term effect of the 28-day notice period measure. 
Importantly, this piece of research suggests that the effect of the dispersal policy 
on the integration of dispersed Iraqi Kurdish refugees is, comparatively, far less 
pronounced than the effect the policy has on the integration of dispersed Iraqi 
Kurdish asylum seekers. This is partly the product of the greater freedom of 
movement that refugees are entitled to compared to asylum seekers. In the 
instances where the policy does affect refugees, it does so in a way that parallels 
the way it affects asylum seekers. The differences between these two groups 
might have been more pronounced if the researcher had been able to analyse 
the longer term effects of the dispersal policy on integration by interviewing 
refugees who had resided in the UK for more than five years. However, this was 
not possible to achieve in this piece of research since the current UK dispersal 
policy was only introduced five years prior to the fieldwork taking place. 
Critique of Ager and Strang's (2004a) integration framework 
Whilst Ager and Strang's (2004a) framework for analysing integration constitutes 
a highly comprehensive and useful approach, the findings of this piece of 
research highlight several gaps that are present in their analysis. Firstly, these 
authors omit the spatial dimension of integration. Indeed, the conclusions of this 
thesis indicate that asylum seeker and refugee integration prospects vary 
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spatially, within a country, depending upon the local characteristics of their 
dispersal area. Thus, an Iraqi Kurd's chances of bonding and bridging as well as 
accessing employment and housing vary depending on whether Who lives In 
Birmingham or Newcastle, the former offering an overall better Integration 
'package', for the four variables studied, than the latter. Secondly, Agor and 
Strang (2004a) fail to Include the ambivalent effect of time In their Integration 
framework. Certainly, the results of this study suggest that levels of asylum 
seeker and refugee Integration vary with the passage of time. For Instance, the 
social bonds of Iraqi Kurds appear to improve over time as greater spatial 
concentrations of co-ethnics develop and deeper co-othnic relationships grow In 
the dispersal localities. Over time, Iraqi Kurds' defence mechanisms, In response 
to host-community hostility, also Improve. This phenomenon, however, exorcises 
contradictory effects on social bridging. Thus, Iraqi Kurds' concealment, over 
time, of their ethnic origin and immigration status as well as the adjusting of their 
appearance and behaviour to fit their perception of a white British norm positively 
affects their social bridging. However, the withdrawal. over time. of Iraqi Kurds 
from many non co-ethnic interactions In order to protect themselves from prior 
experiences of host-community hostility also lessons their social bridging. Finally, 
Ager and Strang (2004a) neglect the possibility that success In one sub-aroa of 
Integration can reduce progress In another. Indeed. the findings of this piece of 
research reveal that the conditions encouraging Iraqi Kurdish social bonding may 
discourage the development of this group's social bridges. Similarly, It would 
appear that the conditions that generate Iraqi Kurds' access to suitable 
employment dampen the circumstances that ongondor access to adequate 
housing for this group. Figure A presents a modified version of Agor and Strang's 
(2004a) Integration framework, incorporating a spatial dimension as well as 
acknowledging the ambivalent, non-linoar effect of the passago of timo. 
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Furthermore, the arrows emphasise how propitious conditions for one element of 
integration (the full line) can hamper the development of another aspect of 
integration (the dotted line). The four components focused upon if) this thesis are 
highlighted in bold. 
Figure A Refugee integration framework, based on Ager and Strang (2004a) 
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Dispersal: a barrier to integration? 
It is important to address the question stated in the title of this thesisý Dispersal - 
a barrier to integration? In other words, does the UK dispersal policy obstruct the 
integration of Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees? It would appear, on the 
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basis of my findings, that Iraqi Kurds' potential to integrate as refugees has not 
irreparably been obstructed by what might appear to be a relatively harsh 
dispersal policy. Certainly, members of this group, through their strategic actions, 
have shown that they are far from being passive victims and instead, individually 
and collectively, participate in determining their life circumstances and outcomes. 
Firstly, my research showed that some Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers were able to 
circumvent the government's dispersal policy and concurrently improve their 
personal circumstances. For instance, from 2001 onwards, some newly arrived 
Iraqi Kurds deliberately applied for asylum in the dispersal areas recommended 
to them by their relatives and friends, in this instance Birmingham, rather than 
regularise their situation in London or at their port of entry. This pattern of 
behaviour was used as a means for this group to proactively influence their place 
of residence whilst remaining entitled to dispersed state-funded housing. A 
similar phenomenon has been observed in the Yorkshire and Humberside region 
(Wilson, 2001: 12). Incidentally, this group's active initiative to undermine 
governmental dispersal reveals the difficulties faced by the UK government in 
controlling asylum seekers' geographical movement and spatial settlement 
pattern even when sanctions like the subsistence only option are in place. 
Furthermore, my research revealed that Iraqi Kurdish refugees were frequently 
able to arrange their relocation to more suitable settlement localities, such as 
London, another part of the South East of England or another dispersal locality. 
Secondly, according to my findings, some, although not all, Iraqi Kurdish 
refugees settled in their dispersal localities, having found housing and work, 
being able to pursue social bonding and engage, to a degree, in social bridging. 
In other words, some of the dispersal destinations, according to my research, 
297 
were not as inauspicious as expected. One of the outcomes of the current UK 
dispersal policy appears to have been a degree of Iraqi Kurdish clustering in 
certain dispersal areas, a phenomenon that has made particular localities more 
attractive, both socially and in terms of employment opportunities, for this co- 
ethnic group. Interestingly, whilst clustering people who shared a nationality or an 
ethnicity was a stated objective of the dispersal policy, the model of dispersal 
adopted in practice made it impossible for the government to intentionally achieve 
this aim. Indeed, the UK government's focus on cost-effectiveness led it to 
prioritise, in its selection of dispersal localities, areas containing low-cost vacant 
housing, rather than areas typified by the presence of Black and Minority Ethnic 
groups and refugee communities. It would appear, however, that, in some 
instances, the main concentrations of affordable dispersal accommodation were 
confined to a relatively small number of areas. Moreover, Iraqi asylum seekers, a 
significant amount of which tend to be Kurdish, constituted a relatively large 
proportion of the total asylum seeker population from 2001 onwards and 
consequently, the likelihood of being dispersed with a group of other co-ethnics 
or to a locality containing other dispersed co-ethnics was relatively high, in some 
instances. This likelihood increased, to a degree, with the passage of time, the 
more dispersals taking place, the more co-ethnics accumulated in some of the 
dispersal areas. This unintended consequence has also helped fulfil, indirectly 
and to a degree, another long term objective of dispersal, namely to encourage 
the settlement of reugees in their dispersal locality. These findings clearly 
illustrate the unexpected workings of policy implementation and its outcomes. In 
this instance, two of the more integration-focused aims of the dispersal policy 
were achieved, albeit only to a degree, via a dispersal model that primarily 
emphasised cost-effectiveness and host-community appeasement. 
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My findings demonstrate that the current UK dispersal policy has had a relatively 
more lasting effect on the spatial distribution of refugees than previous policies, 
such as that involving the Vietnamese. This has been acknowledged not only by 
the government but also by the Refugee Council. Lord Richard Best (Director of 
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and Joseph Rowntree Housing Trust) notes 
that 'dispersal is showing some signs of working. Those who have been sent to 
northern cities are prepared to make a go of it and stay there' (HL Deb, 15th July 
2002, col. 968). Similarly, Nick Hardwick, from the Refugee Council, remarked 
that 'local services are beginning to adapt, communities are beginning to form. 
We see about 40,000 people a year going through the initial part of the system. 
To begin with very large numbers of those were coming back to us and saying, "it 
is dreadful, we cannot cope". That return rate of numbers of people coming back 
has very significantly reduced' (House of Commons Home Affairs Select 
Committee, 17 1h September 2002). The relative success of this policy is in part 
the consequence of the phenomenon described above. Furthermore, according 
to my research, there appears to have been a realisation amongst some Iraqi 
Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees that London, although a highly desirable 
place to live because of its status as one of the most famous capital cities in the 
world, is not necessarily 'paved with gold'. Through the experience of dispersal, 
Iraqi Kurds have become familiar with other parts of the UK and recognised, in 
some instances, that other cities may present them with as good, or even better, 
opportunities than the traditional areas of co-ethnic concentration. As noted 
earlier, some asylum seekers have voluntarily migrated to the West Midlands, 
according to my own findings, as well as to Yorkshire and the Humber, according 
to Wilson (2001). Furthermore, some of the refugees who moved to London from 
their dispersal locality following the receipt of their status have returned, or intend 
to return, to their initial dispersal area or another locality outside of the South East 
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of England. Several reasons have been put forward, according to my research, 
for this migratory trend. Outside of London and the South East, accommodation 
is cheaper and distances between home, friends, relatives and the place of work 
can be shorter. In addition, with co-ethnic networks having been developed, to a 
degree, in other parts of the country via dispersal, refugees in London may have 
other Iraqi Kurds in the regions who can temporarily accommodate them, help 
them find work and accompany them on their journey of building a new life in 
their host-country. In any case, many of the Iraqi Kurds are unaccustomed to 
living in large metropolitan areas like London and may find the relatively smaller 
cities and towns in other part of the UK similar in size to their place of origin in 
their home-country. 
Thus, in the case of Iraqi Kurds, in the long term, refugees' experience of 
dispersal and their process of integrating into UK society are not necessarily 
contradictory phenomena. In fact, in some instances, the dispersal policy has 
introduced this group to better integration opportunities than they would 
otherwise have encountered in their voluntarily chosen, traditional areas of 
concentration, in London and the South East of England. 
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APPENDIX ONE - SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDELINES 
Interview quidelines for asvlum seekers and refuqees 
Example: Birmingham 
- Receipt of positive decision - ELR or ILR? Receipt of negative decision - in 
process of appealing or exhausted right of appeal? When? 
Process of arrival in Birminqham (includes movements linked to EA and 
dispersal) 
1. How did you get to Birmingham? 
2. IF CHOICE -good/ bad decision to come to this city? 
3. IF FORCED - How did you feel when you found out that you were being sent 
to Birmingham? 
4. Previous knowledge of Birmingham? 
5. Explanations given about why you were sent to this city? 
6. On arrival in UK, was there a particular city you wanted to go to? 
7. Date of arrival in Birmingham 
Emergency accommodation 
1. Did you stay in EA? For how long? Where? Positive - negative side 
2. Were you in EA when you received your R status? 
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. 
Dispersal 
1. What kind of support did you receive as an AS - subs only or subs + 
accomm? 
2. Did you change this support? Why? How long did it take for change of 
circumstances to come through? 
Experience of other UK cities 
1. Lived in other cities in the UK before coming to this city? 
2. Reasons for leaving these cities? 
3. Comparison between these cities and this one? 
Stayincl in or leaving Birmin_qham 
1. Plans to move to another city in the UK in the future? Why? Where? When? 
2. Why do you want to stay in this city 
Emplovment 
1. Worked as an AS - LR - refused asylum 
Job; hours worked per week; salary; work location; employer; process of finding 
work - easy / difficult; most enjoy and most dislike about job - satisfaction with 
current job; voluntary work 
2. Birmingham - good job opportunities? Foreign employers, work available that 
requires less language skills? 
I What kind of job did you expect you would have in the UK? 
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4. Job in Kurdistan 
5. Possibility of having similar job in the UK? 
6. Difficulties in finding better work? 
Difference between UK - IK system of finding work - application process 
7. Debt owed to smugglers, others? 
8. Remittances 
, 
Traininci courses 
1. Courses followed as AS and R adults- Why? 
2. Have children gone to school throughout their stay in the UK? What class? 
Positive - negative aspects... 
, 
Housina chronolo-a 
1. Number of houses lived in since arriving in Birmingham? 
Shared - number; IK or others; Atmosphere in house; Time spent in each place; 
landlord - council or private, good - bad; quality of housing; process of getting 
housing as R- who helped you; atmosphere in neighbourhood; reasons for 
moving-on - move-on experience. 
2. Preferred accommodation out of all those lived in - where would you like to 
live in B'am? 
3. Satisfaction with current home 
4. What kind of home did you expect to have in the UK? 
5. House in Kurdistan? 
6. Sleeping on other people's floors? 
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Solicitors - lecial representative 
Difficulty in finding solicitor? 
Solicitor in one city - client in another - cost of travel 
. 
Relationships 
1. Friends or relatives in this city, the Region, the UK pre-arrival? 
2. Where are your friends in this city from? 
3. Where did you first meet them - at work, at pub, at friend's house? 
4. What kind of welcome have you received from local residents - white and 
BMEs (Muslims, Arabs, other Kurds, settled Iraqi Kurds)? Have you observed 
changes in Birmingham in this welcome since being here? Impact of 9/11 and 
Iraqi war? 
5. What kind of welcome had you expected? 
6. Which people / friends do you feel closest to (identity) in Birmingham? Why? 
7. Are you satisfied with your relationships /friendships in Birmingham? 
8. Family reunion? 
Kurdistan and UK culture 
1. Do you have plans to go back to Kurdistan? Why? 
2. How do your expectations of English life and culture compare with the reality 
of it? Thoughts about English culture in contrast with Kurdish culture. 
3. What are the main differences between your life here in the UK and your life. 
in Kurdistan? 
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4. Do you feel that you have changed since being in the UK? How? Why? 
5. Tribes in the UK? 
Kurdish association(s) 
1. Are you a member of the Kurdish association? Why? 
2. What are the activities of the Kurdish association in Birmingham? 
3. Political affiliations? 
4. What more could the association offer? 
5. Successes and challenges? 
6. What are the benefits and disadvantages of having a Kurdish association? 
Why? 
7. Do you take part in any other organisations - leisure, political? 
Treatment of AS and R bv the U 
1. In the UK, have you been treated as you expected to be treated? Why? 
Choice, freedom 
2. Thoughts on the forced dispersal policy - benefits and drawbacks for AS and 
R 
3. Thoughts on immigration policy/ asylum application procedure 
4. Thoughts on UK media re AS and R- impact on your view of the British 
government and the British people? 
5. Thoughts re local organisations work with AS and R? 
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Difference in experience between AS and LR 
1. How different is your experience as an AS v. as an ELR - ILR v. negative 
decision? 
2. Change in relationship with UK people - because you are working, paying 
tax, you have a right to stay in the UK? 
I Develop more friendships with UK people - because meeting more people 
through work? 
. 
Integration 
Do you feel integrated? Why? 
General re Iraqi Kurds in Birminaham 
Approx number of IK in Birmingham 
Date of first arrival of IK in Birmingham 
Proportion of Iraqi Kurds who stay - leave this city, as AS and R? Why? 
Number of Iraqi Kurds who choose to move to this city? Why? 
Do people come back to Birmingham after trying out life elsewhere in the UK? 
- Where are you from in Kurdistan? 
- How long have you been in the UK? 
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Interview auidelines for national Policv makers and local service providers 
Example: Birmingham 
Orcianisation's activities 
1. Organisation's activities with AS and LRs in this city 
2. Nber of AS and LRs clients - nationalities 
3. Length of time doing this work 
4. Source of funding 
(5. Successes and challenges) 
Emergeng :y accommodation 
1. History of EA in Birmingham - when did it begin, why? 
2. Why are more AS travelling further into the country? 
3. Are AS in EA able to register with a GP? 
4. Role of Refugee Council in Birmingham - history of its role in the city 
Implementation of dispersal 
1. Starting date of dispersal in region - by stealth, voluntary interim, 
statutory interim, NASS 
2. Why do AS change their support arrangements from subs only to accomm 
subs or vice versa? 
3. Why do some AS fiil to travel to dispersed accomm from EA? 
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4. Why do some who are dispersed to their accomm then leave NASS 
accomm? 
5. How is decision made about who is dispersed where, criteria? Who 
decides? 
6. Cost of supporting AS and R in Birmingham - reimbursements from 
central government? 
Disr)ersal and its impa 
Has dispersal avoided adding to problems of social exclusion? 
2. Has dispersal avoided creating racial tension? 
3. Has dispersal linked AS up with existing communities or has it primarily 
been accommodation-led? 
a. Language clustering in the city? Positive - negative aspects of 
clustering? 
4. Has dispersal avoided AS migrating back to London? 
5. Has the supporting infrastructure for AS and R developed in Birmingham 
since the beginning of dispersal? Is it equivalent to that available in 
London? 
6. Is the AS accommodation suitable? Hostels with full board -self-catering; 
flats and housing with self-catering; supported accommodation. 
, 
Assessment of dispersal 
1. Pros and cons of forced dispersal policy for city; for AS and LRs 
a. Are AS concerned about where they are located in the UK? 
2. Should dispersal be stopped? Alternatives to dispersal? 
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3. Possible improvements to dispersal - in general + to promote integration 
Settlement and secondarv miciration 
1. Proportion of AS and LRs who leave - stay in the city 
2. Reasons for leaving - staying 
3. For those leaving, destination? Why? 
4. Voluntary migration of AS and LRs to the city? From where -N or L? 
5. Reasons for voluntary migration? 
6. Measures in place to minimise secondary migration? 
Intearation 
1. Why do Home Office argue that integration starts from day one of being 
an LR rather than from day one in this country? 
2. Integration of AS and LRs in this city? 
3. Facilitators of integration 
4. Barriers of integration 
5. Initiatives to promote integration 
6. How does experience as AS affect person's ability and willingness to 
integrate in this city as LR? 
a. Forced nature of dispersal 
b. Length of asylum application procedure 
c. Prior regional experience of BME's 
d. Absence of right to work for AS 
7. Integration of AS and LRs who were dispersed v. those who weren't 
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Emr)lovment 
1. Employment prospects of AS and LRs - comparison with prospects of 
general population - opportunities in construction? 
2. Advantages and difficulties with employment - comparison 
a. Employers? 
b. Language 
c. Qualification equivalence 
3. Projects in place to assist' AS and LRs with access to satisfactory 
employment 
a. Encouragement of entrepreneurship? 
b. Mainstream support? 
4. Voluntary work - benefits and drawbacks; allowed? 
5. Impact of AS and R on local labour market? 
6. Indebtedness of AS and R to smugglers, others? 
7. Presence of more foreign employers in Birmingham - easier for other 
foreigners to find work? 
8. Opportunities for agricultural labour - requires less language skills. 
9. Remittances? 
Housina 
1. Providers in the city for AS accommodation (see quantitative table) 
2. Allocation of housing to AS - procedure 
3. Hostel accommodation 
4. Homelessness (7-28 day deadline) - move-on period 
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a. Need for LR-specific move-on project? Mainstream insufficient? 
Why? 
b. Projects in place 
5. Process for LRs of finding housing post move-on: advantages and 
difficulties 
a. LR access to mainstream housing - public, RSL, private 
b. Projects in place 
6. Frequency of AS and LR moves - reasons 
7. Impact of AS and R on local housing market - NASS rent v. housing 
benefit rent 
. 
Solicitors - lecial representation 
Difficulty in finding solicitor? 
Solicitor in one city and client in another city - cost of travel 
Welcome 
1. Response from local residents - white and BMEs - to AS and LRs - reasons 
Awareness training - preparing local, established communities to receive AS and 
R? 
2. Local media - reasons 
3. Awareness raising initiatives? 
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Iragi Kurdish community in the cit 
1. Presence of established community pre-dispersal - barrier or facilitator to 
integration? 
2. Particularity of Iraqi Kurds, ways in which they have integrated? Family 
reunion? 
Name of any Iraqi Kurdish organisations 
4. Date of first arrival of IK AS and R in Birmingham? 
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APPENDIX TWO - CHARACTERISTICS OF IRAQI KURDISH SAMPLE 
Alias name Case study Gender Age Marital If married, Number of Education Occupation In Iraq Level of 
area (years) status location of children In (years) spoken 
spouse UK English 
Arenan Newcastle Male 30-39 Single N/A I Unspecified Electrician Medium 
Armanc Newcastle Male 30-39 Single N/A 0 7 to 13 Retail Good 
Besna Newcastle Female 30-39 Married In UK 2 7 to 13 Teacher Poor 
Dijwar Newcastle Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 14 or more Lawyer Good 
Dozdar Newcastle Male 30-39 Single N/A 0 14 or more Peshmerga (senior) Good 
Felemez Newcastle Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 14 or more Doctor Good 
Gerdengaz Newcastle Male 40-49 Married Outside UK 2 Unspecified Business (chicken farm) Poor 
Kanyaw, Newcastle Male 30-39 Married In UK 3 Unspecified Carpenter Poor 
Kinyaz Newcastle Male 30-39 Single N/A 0 14 or more Trader Good 
Lane Newcastle Female 30-39 Married In UK 0 7 to 13 Social worker (with women) Good 
Mezdar Newcastle Male 40-49 Married In UK 2 Unspecified Business (car shop & clothes factory) Poor 
Naso Newcastle Male 30-39 Single N/A 0 14 or more University lecturer Good 
Nebez Newcastle Female 30-39 Married In UK 0 Unspecified Military clerk (husband) Poor 
Rengo Newcastle Male 30-39 Single N/A 0 Unspecified Trader Medium 
Sabar Newcastle Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 7 to 13 Student Good 
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Alias name Case study Gender Age 
area (years) 
Marital 
status 
If married, Number of Education 
location of children In (years) 
spouse UK 
Occupation In Iraq Level of 
spoken 
English 
Yardil Newcastle Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 Unspecified Manager (sand factory) Medium 
Yekdil Newcastle Male 20-29 Married Outside UK 0 14 or more Accountant Good 
Zinar Newcastle Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 Unspecified Carpenter Medium 
Ziryan Newcastle Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 Unspecified Retail Good 
Anik Birmingham Female 30-39 Single N/A 0 14 or more Accountant Good 
Bendewar Birmingham Male 40-49 Married In UK 3 Unspecified Driver (bus) Poor 
Birwaz Birmingham Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 14 or more Journalist Good 
Casim Birmingham Female 30-39 Married In UK 3 Unspecified Manager (shop) Poor 
Cenik Birmingham Female 30-39 Married In UK 0 14 or more Cashier (bank) Good 
Delav Birmingham Male 20-29 Single NIA 0 14 or more Business (mechanic shop) Good 
Enwa Birmingham Female 40-49 Married Outside UK 0 14 or more University lecturer Good 
Erdehan Birmingham Male 20-29 Single N/A a 7 to 13 Trader Good 
Fodil Birmingham Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 7 to 13 Barter Poor 
Gemaz Birmingham Male 30-39 Single N/A 0 14 or more Student Good 
Gurzi Birmingham Female 40-49 Widowed N/A 0 7 to 13 Teacher Poor 
Jan Birmingham Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 6 or less Mechanic Poor 
Kereng Birmingham Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 Unspecified Trader Medium 
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Alias name Case study Gender Age Marital if married, Number of Education Occupation In Iraq Levelof 
area (years) status location of children In (years) spoken 
spouse UK English 
Mokan Birmingham Male 20-29 Married Outside UK 0 7 to 13 Shoe-maker Medium 
Polat Birmingham Male 30-39 Single N/A 0 14 or more Journalist Medium 
Oubat Birmingham Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 Unspecified Manager (shop) Good 
Rojdar Birmingham Male 30-39 Single N/A 0 7 to 13 Nurse Good 
Warzan Birmingham Female 30-39 Married In UK 3 Unspecified Manager (shop) Poor 
Welan Birmingham Male 20-29 Single N/A 0 14 or more Teacher Medium 
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APPENDIX THREE - LIST OF ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED 
Borough Council 1 
Borough Council 2 
City Council 1, Housing, Manager 
City Council 1, Housing, Move-on officer 
City Council 1, Housing, Support manager 
City Council 1, Housing, Support worker 
City Council 2, Housing 
City Council 3, Diversity 
Connexions 
EA provider 
ESOL provider institute 
Generalist voluntary agency 1 
Generalist voluntary agency 2 
Home Office Integration Unit 
Housing association 
Kurdish association 1, London 
Kurdish association 2, London 
Kurdish association 3, London 
Kurdish association 4, Birmingham 
Kurdish restaurant 1 OR Salahaddin 
Kurdish restaurant 2 
LGA 
NASS 
NERS One Stop Shop, Chief Executive 
NERS One Stop Shop, Community advisor 
NERS One Stop Shop, Manager 
NERS One Stop Shop, Vice-Chair 
Private housing company 
Refugee Council, Community Officer 
Refugee Council, Head of Policy 
Refugee Council, One Stop Shop 
Regional Development Agency 
Specialist voluntary agency 1 
Specialist voluntary agency 2, Employment 
Specialist voluntary agency 2, Housing 
Specialist voluntary agency 3 
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